Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where suspicious processes load the amsi.dll module, which is a common precursor to performing in-memory patching of the AmsiScanBuffer function. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to disable Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) to evade security scanning, specifically observed in techniques like the SNOWLIGHT dropper.
Detects modifications to the memory protection flags of the ntdll.dll library to PAGE_READWRITE (0x04). This behavior is commonly associated with shellcode injection, hooking, or patching of core system libraries to facilitate malicious activity or evasion.
Detects the GT_NET or Gt_net executable calling the VirtualProtectEx API to modify memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE. This behavior is a common indicator of process injection, where an attacker modifies memory to execute shellcode or malicious payloads within the context of a legitimate process.
Detects indicators of VILE ransomware activity, specifically identifying attempts to suppress Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) via NtTraceEvent patching, alongside execution of low-level NT syscalls and the presence of identified VILE-associated artifact files (e.g., .ico, .zip, .json).
Detects a registry modification where the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) 'Debugger' value for the agent service process 'agntsvc.exe' is set to 'Systray.exe'. This technique is used by the Pay2Key ransomware to hijack the process execution flow, potentially to impair security or backup services.
Detects the specific behavior associated with the TrymeLocker malware DestroyCMD function, which involves stripping file permissions from cmd.exe using takeown and icacls, followed by the deletion or renaming of cmd.exe within the System32 or SysWOW64 directories to disable command execution.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry's Image File Execution Options (IFEO) to inject a debugger for 'agntsvc.exe'. This technique is used by Pay2Key ransomware to hijack and suppress backup agent services, preventing them from functioning during the encryption process.
Detects unauthorized modification of Windows Registry keys intended to disable core administrative tools, including Task Manager, Registry Editor, Command Prompt/Run dialogs, and the Control Panel. Additionally, it identifies the creation of 'DisallowRun' entries used to block security and remediation utilities like Process Explorer, Autoruns, and System Configuration tools.
Detects instances where VBScript or JScript engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) spawn PowerShell or BCDedit processes. The rule specifically monitors for activities related to disk tampering (e.g., physical drive access or File I/O) and the suppression of Windows recovery features via bcdedit, which are common tactics used by ransomware and destructive malware to disable system backups and prevent remediation.
Detects modifications to Windows registry keys that control system policies, such as disabling the Task Manager, Registry Tools, or suppressing UAC prompts, when performed by scripting engines like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This activity is often associated with malware or adversarial post-exploitation efforts to impair defensive capabilities and maintain persistence.
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior characterized by the disabling of Windows Defender real-time monitoring followed by an attempt to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) on PhysicalDrive0 using PowerShell. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe that reference disk drive objects or specific LCRYX image files, and correlates them with Defender tampering activities.
Detects malware modifying memory protections to hook AccessCheckByType to force access success.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, cipher) to delete Volume Shadow Copies or modify boot/recovery configurations, which is a common behavior used by ransomware and attackers to inhibit system recovery.
Detects the MYRA RAT using the prctl system call to rename its process to 'systemd-userdbd'. This masquerading technique aims to evade detection by blending in with legitimate system processes on Linux endpoints. The rule monitors process execution events for instances of 'systemd-userdbd' that do not originate from authorized system directories.
This rule monitors process events for the combined usage of multiple Windows security APIs associated with access token manipulation. Specifically, it flags processes that call two or more of the following functions: AdjustTokenPrivileges, LookupPrivilegeValueW, SetTokenInformation, OpenProcessToken, DuplicateTokenEx, or GetTokenInformation. This behavior is indicative of token stealing or impersonation attempts, often used by malware such as Vile Ransomware to escalate privileges or bypass security controls. The rule also includes heuristic filtering for common system processes.
This rule detects the registration of a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) by specific process names (gt_net.exe, grixba) or processes running from suspicious paths (e.g., C:\Users\Public\Music). This behavior is associated with the Grixba component of Play ransomware, which uses VEH for anti-debugging and execution hijacking.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with process injection, specifically identifying memory regions allocated as Read-Write-Execute (RWX) or the loading of sensitive DLLs (amsi.dll, wldp.dll) from unbacked memory regions, which is a common indicator of process injection or shellcode execution.
Detects modifications to the 'Debugger' registry value for the 'agntsvc.exe' executable under 'Image File Execution Options'. This technique, known as IFEO injection, is used by adversaries to gain persistence or privilege escalation by forcing a malicious binary to run whenever a specific process is launched.
Identifies the fake VPN installer executing process hollowing, spawning suspended legitimate .NET binaries (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe) to inject the Vidar or Lumma stealer payload.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll in conjunction with command-line arguments that reference sensitive APIs often used to patch or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), such as VirtualProtect, GetProcAddress, or BCrypt-related functions.
This rule detects advanced evasion techniques involving the patching of Native APIs (specifically WriteProcessMemory on ntdll.dll) combined with the spawning of suspended processes (process hollowing). This combination is indicative of attempts to unhook EDRs and execute malicious code stealthily.
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