Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the installation or configuration of the NvFsFilter (Alinubx.sys) persistence driver, often associated with malicious behavior that continuously terminates security software processes to allow for persistent unauthorized activity after system reboots.
This rule detects the loading of the known vulnerable NvFsFilter (Alinubx) driver, followed by the abrupt cessation of multiple active AV/EDR processes within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack, where the driver is used to execute kernel-mode commands to terminate security software, bypassing standard protection mechanisms.
Detects the use of native Windows binaries such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, bcdedit.exe, and wbadmin.exe to inhibit system recovery by deleting shadow copies, clearing backup catalogs, or disabling automatic system recovery.
This rule detects attempts by an attacker to disable or modify Windows security software and features. It monitors for three distinct behaviors: execution of 'Set-MpPreference' to modify Windows Defender settings (exclusions or real-time monitoring), execution of 'sc.exe' to stop security-related services (such as EDR or AV services), and direct modification of Windows registry keys to disable Windows Defender components.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell. The rule looks for command-line arguments referencing AMSI-related memory structures, methods, and DLLs such as AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiInitFailed, and amsi.dll. Bypassing AMSI is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts and deploy fileless payloads, such as Cobalt Strike or Sliver, while avoiding detection by endpoint security solutions.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory operations where a source process requests process creation/write permissions on a target process (e.g., browsers, explorer.exe, or svchost.exe), followed immediately by the execution of a remote thread injection technique such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, or NtCreateThreadEx within the same process pair.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
This rule detects potential process injection activity where a process is created in a suspended state and subsequently performs memory unmapping followed by a remote memory write operation. This behavior targets critical system processes such as svchost, explorer, lsass, services, and spoolsv, which is highly indicative of process hollowing or similar injection techniques used by malicious actors.
Detects the creation of a remote thread in a process by another process, excluding self-injection. This behavior is a common indicator of process injection techniques used to execute code within the address space of a target process.
Detects non-SYSTEM processes enabling SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege shortly before launching a process as the SYSTEM user. This behavior is highly indicative of token manipulation and impersonation techniques (e.g., Potato-family exploits) used to elevate privileges from a standard or administrative account to SYSTEM.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by monitoring script block logs for specific patterns used to disable or manipulate memory scanning mechanisms, a common precursor to executing malicious, memory-resident payloads.
Detects potential process injection attempts where a browser or Office application attempts to write to the memory or create a remote thread within high-value or trusted system processes like svchost.exe or explorer.exe. This activity is indicative of defense evasion techniques such as DLL or PE injection.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by monitoring for common bypass techniques such as reflective loading of AmsiUtils, tampering with the amsiInitFailed field, or memory patching of AmsiScanBuffer via Script Block Logging (EventID 4104).
Detects the creation of a remote thread (Sysmon Event ID 8) by a process into a set of common host processes (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe) where the starting address of the thread does not map to a known loaded module. This behavior is highly indicative of reflective code injection or shellcode execution within the address space of a remote process.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious cross-process access attempts by monitoring relationships between source and target processes. It specifically flags instances where common target processes (e.g., browsers or core system processes) are accessed by a source process that is not on a known allowlist of legitimate parent/child or service-related processes. This pattern is often indicative of process injection or unauthorized memory access attempts.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features via PowerShell, terminate critical security services using administrative tools like sc.exe or net.exe, or inject/patch AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) within a process context to evade detection.
This rule detects attempts to impair or disable security defenses on Windows systems. It specifically monitors for three categories of malicious behavior: PowerShell-based AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass techniques, commands to stop security-related services (e.g., Windows Defender, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike Falcon), and the use of 'reg' or 'PowerShell' to modify registry keys associated with disabling antivirus or real-time monitoring.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
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