Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence of actions where a process first enumerates security software (e.g., via WMIC, Registry, or PowerShell) followed by an attempt to stop or terminate security-related services or processes within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to identify and disable endpoint protection before executing further malicious activity.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity on Linux systems where a web application process (e.g., Python-based servers like uvicorn or gunicorn) initiates network requests using curl or wget, followed within 30 minutes by attempts to disable the system firewall or terminate security monitoring agents.
This rule monitors for two high-confidence indicators of malicious activity: the execution of known Payouts King ransomware binaries and the termination of security software processes by non-system actors, which is indicative of defensive evasion techniques such as syscall abuse.
This rule detects potential tampering with security agents by monitoring for the load of suspicious drivers (Sysmon Event ID 6) immediately followed by the termination of known security software processes (Sysmon Event ID 5) or signs of security service disability (Windows Security Center 5004) or unauthorized raw disk access (Sysmon Event ID 9). This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass EDR or AV solutions by loading a malicious kernel driver to blind them.
This rule detects potential tampering with security agents by monitoring for the load of suspicious drivers (Sysmon Event ID 6) immediately followed by the termination of known security software processes (Sysmon Event ID 5) or signs of security service disability (Windows Security Center 5004) or unauthorized raw disk access (Sysmon Event ID 9). This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass EDR or AV solutions by loading a malicious kernel driver to blind them.
This rule detects when a single computer executes 5 or more process termination commands (taskkill or Stop-Process) within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to disrupt system operations or evade defenses by stopping security tools or critical services.
Detects nmap processes performing IPv6 scans (using flags such as -6) that result in abnormal process termination or the spawning of unexpected child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, sh, bash). This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts targeting the nmap IPv6 extension header length integer wrap vulnerability, including the execution of associated PoC harness binaries.
Detects the use of WMI (via WmiPrvSE.exe or wmic.exe) to enumerate or terminate PowerShell processes. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey/StealC delivery chain, where a JScript dropper uses WMI to clean up script execution artifacts after a specified timeout, aiding in defense evasion.
Detects behavior consistent with the Vidar/Wingo loader, part of Operation Turb00, where a process probes for VM/sandbox artifacts, specifically the VMware Tools daemon path and WMI ETW restrictions registry keys, followed by a rapid process termination characteristic of sandbox evasion.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with VILE ransomware, specifically focused on defense evasion through Windows event log clearing, termination of security-related processes, and the presence of specific ransomware-related configuration or identity files in common staging directories.
This rule detects two suspicious behaviors associated with the TinyRCT malware family: the execution of common installer or archiver utilities in the Downloads folder that terminate within two seconds, and the use of 'choice.exe' for self-deletion of an executing process within a short timeframe.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity within Linux environments or containers where a single user context concurrently performs credential hunting (via environment variable dumping or accessing .env files) and terminates processes associated with known cryptocurrency miners or competing malicious actors. This behavior is highly indicative of a cryptojacking infection or a malicious actor clearing out existing resource-hijacking threats.
Detects abnormal termination, crash, or error messages related to the 'sharingd' process on macOS. 'sharingd' is a daemon responsible for various sharing features including AirDrop, Handoff, and Instant Hotspot. Unexpected errors or crashes within this process may indicate service instability, potential exploitation attempts, or abnormal interactions with sharing services.
Detects instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a VBScript file subsequently spawns taskkill.exe with arguments intended to terminate PowerShell processes. This is a common pattern used by malicious scripts to disrupt security monitoring or automated management tasks.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes or stop security-related services using common administrative tools like taskkill.exe, sc.exe, net.exe, or net1.exe. This activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring and protection software to facilitate further malicious actions.
This rule detects potential tampering with security software processes and services, as well as the execution of suspicious batch scripts (i.bat). It identifies when administrative tools like sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or net.exe are used to stop or delete security agents such as Sysmon, Filebeat, SentinelAgent, or antivirus services. It also monitors for the execution of 'i.bat' via command shell, which is commonly associated with malicious automation or persistence.
Detects the execution of batch files that perform multiple actions to impair or disable security tools, including Windows Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and IIS logging components. The rule monitors for a pattern of suspicious process commands (stop, config, delete, kill, Set-MpPreference) originating from a .bat file, flagging hosts where two or more distinct impairment actions are executed by the same parent process.
Detects anomalous activity where a process or user attempts to stop or disable multiple security-related services (e.g., Windows Defender, Sysmon, EDR agents) within a short window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defensive monitoring and protection tools during a compromise.
Detects VLC media player crash conditions or suspicious child process creation immediately following the processing of VP9-encoded video files (.webm, .mkv). This behavior is indicative of potential memory corruption exploitation, such as the vlc-vp9-reschange-crash-poc, which aims to leverage malformed resolution change events for application instability or code execution.
Detects Reynolds ransomware terminating hardcoded EDR/AV process names via its NSecKrnl kernel driver. The rule identifies process terminations of known security software executables and correlates it with the presence of the '402.sys' driver in the 'C:\ProgramData' folder, which is associated with the NSecKrnl driver used by Reynolds ransomware.
Detects unauthorized attempts to terminate, stop, or access Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus agent processes. This is identified by monitoring command-line utilities like taskkill, net, and sc targeting known security service names, as well as detecting suspicious cross-process access (e.g., OpenProcess) by unauthorized processes targeting security agent PIDs.
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