Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
442 detections
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The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "Control\\MiniNt" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It leverages Sysmon EventID 7 to monitor registry changes in paths and values related to Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a common tactic for bypassing security measures and maintaining persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Review the modified registry paths and concurrent processes to identify the attack source.
The following analytic detects the modification of the UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry, which is often used by attackers to establish persistence and gain privilege escalation upon system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by APT groups and malware to ensure their payloads execute automatically when the system starts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and potentially escalate their privileges on the compromised host.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object in a Windows domain, specifically the addition of new rules. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Security Event Log, focusing on changes to the nTSecurityDescriptor attribute. This activity is significant because the AdminSDHolder object secures privileged group members, and unauthorized changes can allow attackers to establish persistence and escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to control domain-level permissions, compromising the entire Active Directory environment.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at preventing the execution of specific computer programs. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\DisallowRun*" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to disable security tools, a tactic used by malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to evade detection and maintain persistence on the compromised host.
The following analytic detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows services and their configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to service registry keys can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to control service behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys to disable System Restore on a machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with System Restore settings. This activity is significant because disabling System Restore can hinder recovery efforts and is a tactic often used by Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to maintain persistence on an infected system. If confirmed malicious, this action could prevent system recovery, allowing the attacker to sustain their foothold and potentially cause further damage or data loss.
The following analytic detects modifications to undocumented registry keys that allow a DLL to load into lsass.exe, potentially capturing credentials. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\DirectoryServiceExtPt or \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\LsaDbExtPt. This activity is significant as it indicates a possible attempt to inject malicious code into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and escalate privileges within the environment.
The analytic identifies the creation or modification of Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry keys, detected via EventCode 3000 in the Application channel. This detection leverages Windows Event Logs to monitor for process names added to IFEO under specific registry paths. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to set traps for process monitoring or debugging, often used by attackers for persistence or evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or manipulate process behavior, leading to potential system compromise.
The analytic detects modifications to Windows Proxy settings via registry keys, specifically focusing on the path `*\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp*`. This activity is significant because `netsh.exe` can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever `netsh.exe` runs. This could enable persistence, network configuration manipulation, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on events where the registry path is modified. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this registry key to load arbitrary .dll files, which will execute with elevated SYSTEM permissions and persist after a reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code with high privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.
This rule detects modifications to the Access Control List (ACL) of the domain root object in Active Directory. Such modifications are significant and can have a high impact on the security of the Active Directory environment. The rule specifically looks for EventCode 5136 (A directory service object was modified) where the ObjectClass is 'domainDNS'. It then parses the old and new ACL values to identify specific changes, including the type of access control entry (ACE), flags, access rights, and the security identifier (SID) of the user or group affected. The rule also attempts to resolve SIDs to user or group names for better readability. Microsoft guidance suggests that all changes at this level should be reviewed.
The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry key that controls the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). It detects changes to the registry path `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA` where the value is set to `0x00000000`. This activity is significant because disabling UAC can allow unauthorized changes to the system without user consent, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated privileges, making it easier to execute further attacks or maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders" registry path. This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.
This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modifications targeting BitLocker settings. The malware ShrinkLocker alters various registry keys to change how BitLocker handles encryption, potentially bypassing TPM requirements, enabling BitLocker without TPM, and enforcing specific startup key and PIN configurations. Such modifications can weaken system security, making it easier for unauthorized access and data breaches. Detecting these changes is crucial for maintaining robust encryption and data protection.
The analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows registry's default icon settings, a technique associated with Lockbit ransomware. It leverages data from the Endpoint Registry data model, focusing on changes to registry paths under "*HKCR\\*\\defaultIcon\\(Default)*". This activity is significant as it is uncommon for normal users to modify these settings, and such changes can indicate ransomware infection or other malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system defacement and signal a broader ransomware attack, potentially compromising sensitive data and system integrity.
The following analytic detects a potential addition or modification of firewall rules, signaling possible configuration changes or security policy adjustments. It tracks commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall add rule and netsh advfirewall firewall set rule, which may indicate attempts to alter network access controls. Monitoring these actions ensures the integrity of firewall settings and helps prevent unauthorized network access.
The following analytic detects the disabling of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) by monitoring changes in the Windows registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically focusing on registry paths and values related to HVCI settings. This activity is significant because HVCI helps protect the kernel and system processes from tampering by malicious code. If confirmed malicious, disabling HVCI could allow attackers to execute unsigned kernel-mode code, potentially leading to kernel-level rootkits or other severe security breaches.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender raw write notification feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender's real-time protection settings. This activity is significant because disabling raw write notifications can allow malware, such as Azorult, to bypass Windows Defender's behavior monitoring, potentially leading to undetected malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute code, persist in the environment, and access sensitive information without detection.
This analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It specifically monitors changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware often uses hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the sdclt.exe registry, a technique often used to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry paths and values associated with sdclt.exe. This activity is significant because UAC bypasses can allow attackers to execute payloads with elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and potential persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
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