Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects potential malicious activities involving PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify unusual or suspicious use of cmdlets like 'New-ScheduledTask' and 'Set-ScheduledTask'. This activity is significant as attackers often use these cmdlets for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, deliver additional payloads, or execute ransomware, leading to data theft or other severe impacts. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.
The analytic detects the execution of tasks registered in Windows Task Scheduler by monitoring EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed) from the Task Scheduler logs. This detection leverages Task Scheduler logs to identify potentially suspicious or unauthorized task executions. Monitoring these events is significant for a SOC as it helps uncover evasive techniques used for persistence, unauthorized code execution, or other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or the execution of harmful payloads, posing a significant threat to the environment.
Looks for rare process launch as a scheduled task and activity done by the processes.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/hunting-for-malicious-scheduled-tasks/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/hunting-for-malicious-scheduled-tasks/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, May 2019 0-day disclosures.
In May and June of 2019, a security researcher with the online alias, SandboxEscaper, discovered and published several elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities on Github. The researcher included proofs-of-concept demonstrating how to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Patches and more information about each vulnerability are available below:
1. CVE-2019-0863 | Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
2. CVE-2019-1069 | Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
3. CVE-2019-1053 | Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
4. CVE-2019-1064 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
5. CVE-2019-0973 | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
6. CVE-2019-1129 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This query locates possible activity that exploits CVE-2019-0863 (also known as AngryPolarBearBug2), the first vulnerability listed above.
Reference - https://threatpost.com/sandboxescaper-more-exploits-ie-zero-day/145010/
In May and June of 2019, a security researcher with the online alias, SandboxEscaper, discovered and published several elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities on Github. The researcher included proofs-of-concept demonstrating how to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Patches and more information about each vulnerability are available below:
1. CVE-2019-0863 | Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
2. CVE-2019-1069 | Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
3. CVE-2019-1053 | Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
4. CVE-2019-1064 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
5. CVE-2019-0973 | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
6. CVE-2019-1129 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This query locates possible activity that exploits CVE-2019-0863 (also known as AngryPolarBearBug2), the first vulnerability listed above.
Reference - https://threatpost.com/sandboxescaper-more-exploits-ie-zero-day/145010/
This rule detects remote RPC calls specifically targeting the Task Scheduler service (SASec) to read information about scheduled tasks. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance by adversaries attempting to understand the environment's scheduled jobs.
Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks via AtScv. This activity can indicate an adversary performing reconnaissance to understand the environment and identify potential lateral movement opportunities.
This rule detects remote RPC calls made to query information about scheduled tasks. Specifically, it monitors for RPC Firewall events (EventID 3) with a specific InterfaceUuid (86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c) which corresponds to the ITaskSchedulerService. The rule filters out common operational numbers (OpNum 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) to reduce false positives, focusing on less common or potentially malicious reconnaissance activities related to scheduled tasks.
The following analytic detects the execution of the "At" application in Linux, which can be used by attackers to create persistence entries on a compromised host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names associated with "at" or "atd". This activity is significant because the "At" application can be exploited to maintain unauthorized access or deliver additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other severe consequences. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the execution and mitigate potential risks.
This analytic detects when the Windows Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule) spawns common command-line interpreters or scripting engines such as powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe. This activity is significant because attackers frequently abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, attempting to blend in with legitimate Windows operations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
The analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process details such as process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often abuse Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
The analytic detects the execution of a Windows Scheduled Task on demand via the shell or command line. It leverages process-related data, including process name, parent process, and command-line executions, sourced from endpoint logs. The detection focuses on 'schtasks.exe' with an associated 'run' command. This activity is significant as adversaries often use it to force the execution of their created Scheduled Tasks for persistent access or lateral movement within a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence or move laterally within the network, potentially leading to further compromise.
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