Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to disable PowerShell history logging by using 'Set-PSReadlineOption' with 'HistorySaveStyle' set to 'SaveNothing'. This technique can be used by adversaries to hinder forensic analysis and hide their command execution history.
Detects the execution of known offensive security toolkits commonly used for Active Directory enumeration and exploitation, including Impacket (mini_imp) and BloodHound/SharpHound. The rule monitors for command-line arguments and file creation artifacts associated with these tools.
Detects the use of Wscript.exe or Cscript.exe to spawn wmic.exe with arguments indicative of remote WMI execution, such as 'Win32_Process', 'process call create', or '/node:'. This pattern is frequently associated with lateral movement, worm propagation (like VBScript-based malware), and ransomware deployment.
Detects LCRYX ransomware activity by monitoring wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing mass file renames with the .lcryx extension and the creation of PLEASEREADME.txt ransom notes within sensitive user directories.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell with parameters indicating an attempt to elevate privileges using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs'. This technique can be used to bypass User Account Control (UAC) and execute commands with administrative privileges.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe with the /elevated argument, where the process was spawned by another wscript.exe instance. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution attempting to bypass normal user execution constraints or using techniques to maintain elevation, often associated with living-off-the-land binaries.
Detects LCRYX ransomware or similar malicious scripts using wscript.exe or cscript.exe to disable Windows security features and system controls via registry modifications, such as disabling UAC, Task Manager, and Registry Tools.
Detects evidence of LCRYX ransomware activity, specifically identifying beaconing behavior via a 'ping.exe' loop targeting the 'ragebot.fun' domain, and the execution of suspicious Visual Basic scripts (systemconfig.exe.vbs) via wscript or cscript, which are often used for stage-loading malicious payloads.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or batch scripts that mimic legitimate Realtek audio services, a known tactic used by AsyncRAT. Specifically, it looks for process command lines containing "RealtekAudioService64.ps1", "RealtekAudioService64.bat", "RealtekAudioEnhancements64.ahk", or "RtkNGUI64.ahk".
This rule detects the use of password derivation functions (like argon2id, scrypt, pbkdf2) in command lines, which can be indicative of ransomware activity, specifically associated with Prinz Eugen. It focuses on processes like 'servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe', and 'powershell.exe' initiating these commands.
Detects a script interpreter deleting a downloaded HTA, JavaScript, PowerShell, or batch file after persistence has been created. This behavior is often associated with malware like InstallFix to remove initial infection artifacts.
Detects a batch or PowerShell loader reading 'msedge.txt' from a writable path (Temp, AppData, Downloads, ProgramData) and treating its content as encoded executable data. This behavior is indicative of the Banana RAT malware.
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
Identifies execution of the Windows PowerShell cradle used by GLASSWORM's WASM loader. It looks for 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) fetching a URL containing the specific '/win32/i/_' path structure, piped to 'iex' (Invoke-Expression). This pattern is indicative of the GLASSWORM malware's initial payload delivery mechanism.
Detects bash or sh executing install.sh from an OpenClaw skill directory, matching the alternate macOS and Linux GhostLoader bootstrap path. This activity is associated with the malicious OpenClaw skill distributing Remcos RAT and GhostLoader.
Detects the execution of RemotePC (IDriveRemotePC.exe, RemotePC.exe, IDrive.exe) by common scripting or command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments. This could indicate abuse of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software for malicious purposes, such as by ransomware.
Detects script content that invokes 'mshta.exe' from the 'SysWOW64' directory to access a remote resource ending with '.7z' via HTTP or HTTPS. This pattern is associated with the Animateclipper malware, which uses MSHTA for initial access or execution of malicious scripts.
Hunts for PowerShell commands setting up the RijndaelManaged API in ECB mode, a cryptographic pattern used by AsyncRAT for C2 packet encryption.
Detects Pony malware dropping a self-deletion batch script into %TEMP% via ShellExecuteA, then executing it with cmd.exe. The batch loops using 'if exist %1 goto' until the loader file lock is released, deletes the loader, then deletes itself with 'del %0'. Correlates .bat file creation in TEMP with subsequent cmd.exe execution of that same file on the same device.
This rule detects suspicious update requests to the Ghost CMS Admin API that indicate an attempt at dynamic script injection. It specifically looks for PUT requests to `/ghost/api/admin/posts/` containing markers associated with Base64 decoding (`atob(`) and dynamic DOM manipulation (`appendChild`, `createElement`), or specific strings (`ghost_once_footer_`, `btoa(a.origin)`) known to be used in the Ghost ClickFix attack chain. This activity suggests an attacker is attempting to inject malicious JavaScript into Ghost CMS content, potentially leveraging a vulnerability like CVE-2026-26980.
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