Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with Flowise Model Context Protocol (MCP) implementations, specifically detecting environment variable bypasses using Node.js --require, potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting internal infrastructure and cloud metadata services, and the creation of known proof-of-concept (PoC) artifacts.
Detects unauthorized access to the Veeam Backup PostgreSQL database to extract credentials, a technique observed in Akira ransomware campaigns. The rule monitors for suspicious execution of psql.exe or PowerShell scripts designed to query the 'VeeamBackup' database for credentials, which are subsequently decrypted using DPAPI.
This rule detects a scenario where an AI agent (Python or Node.js based) reads a corporate document (PDF, DOCX, TXT, MD) and subsequently spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, sh, bash) within a 30-second window. This behavior indicates a potential indirect Remote Code Execution (RCE) where a prompt-injected payload from a poisoned document was executed by the AI agent.
Detects bash or sh executing a fanout script from a temporary directory. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement or propagation activities by adversaries.
Detects the execution of a Python script characteristic of the AsyncRAT polymorphic APC injector. This involves python.exe running a script with arguments for an input binary file (-i *.bin) and a key file (-k *.txt).
Detects the execution of a JScript file by cscript.exe using a legacy NTFS 8.3 shortname format. This is a specific behavior observed in Gootloader's persistence mechanism, where a .LNK file in the Startup folder executes a second-stage script.
Detects the execution of a Python script characteristic of the AsyncRAT polymorphic APC injector. This involves python.exe running a script with arguments for an input binary file (-i *.bin) and a key file (-k *.txt).
This rule detects instances where Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) initiates a DNS query to 'ip-api.com' within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with reconnaissance activity, where an adversary uses scripts to determine the public IP address or geolocation of the compromised host for C2 registration or environment awareness.
Detects the creation or execution of files associated with the Floci remote code execution (RCE) proof-of-concept tool. It monitors for specific filenames or command-line patterns indicative of this exploit, particularly when spawned from Java-based applications or involving shell command execution.
Detects Node.js or JavaScript runtimes executing code patterns commonly associated with GlassWorm-style supply chain attacks. The campaign abuses invisible Unicode variation selectors to hide malicious payloads that are decoded and executed through eval(). Investigate execution originating from repositories, package managers, VS Code extensions, or temporary development directories.
Detects behavior patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically the use of wscript.exe or cscript.exe to execute VBScript files that perform geolocation checks against ip-api.com, followed by the dropping of an executable file in the user's AppData\Local directory.
Detects indicators of Grandoreiro banking trojan infection, including the loading of associated malicious DLLs from user-writable AppData directories, the execution of the specific binary 'ROt4I@m$etqv1Ns.exe' via script interpreters, and the spawning of unsigned executables from AppData by wscript.exe or cscript.exe.
Detects multiple concurrent attempts by a process to identify virtualization or analysis environments (sandbox evasion). The rule monitors for registry key lookups related to VMware/VirtualBox, as well as the execution of commands (via wmic, powershell, or tasklist) aimed at enumerating system information such as video controllers, boot times, operating system details, or process lists. An alert is generated when three or more distinct types of these checks are observed within a 60-second window by the same process, excluding administrative or system-level accounts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell processes where command lines contain references to Nishang framework scripts, 'Invoke-PowerShellTcp' reverse shell patterns, or indicators of attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) such as 'AmsiScanBuffer' or 'amsiInitFailed'.
This rule detects PowerShell script block execution containing indicators commonly associated with JIT heap memory manipulation and AMSI bypass techniques. It uses a scoring system based on the presence of specific .NET classes and methods used to allocate, copy, and change protection on memory pages, which are typical of fileless payload execution and security feature subversion.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to tamper with or bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by reflecting on the 'AmsiUtils' class within the 'System.Management.Automation' assembly. This activity is a common technique used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts without security product intervention.
This rule detects PowerShell script block execution (EventID 4104) that contains indicators of process injection and memory manipulation. It specifically monitors for the presence of native Windows APIs (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or NtCreateThreadEx), memory protection flags indicating executable/writable memory (like 0x40), and unsafe native method calls. A scoring mechanism is used to aggregate these indicators and flag suspicious scripts, commonly associated with fileless malware or offensive security tools.
Detects sophisticated AMSI bypass attempts in PowerShell sessions. The rule monitors for a combination of techniques, including patching the 'InternalNotify' function in the AMSI vtable using 'VirtualProtect', and leveraging 'Marshal.WriteInt64' to nullify critical security scan paths ('WinScanContent' and 'WinReportContent') in memory.
Detects suspicious DNS TXT record queries originating from common script interpreters (e.g., PowerShell, Python, Node.js) that are not recognized legitimate resolvers. The rule further correlates these DNS queries with subsequent process execution or network connection activity within a 60-second window, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication or stager activity.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell 5.1 by using .NET reflection to manipulate the 'amsiInitFailed' field within the 'AmsiUtils' class. The rule monitors both script block logs and command-line arguments for patterns involving reflective field access, string concatenation of sensitive keywords, and reflection binding flags.
Detects attempts to patch AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) managed methods in PowerShell memory using JIT (Just-In-Time) compilation and memory write operations. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of terms related to method preparation, memory manipulation (via System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal), and direct references to AMSI components within PowerShell Script Block logs (Event ID 4104).
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