Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript, mshta, certutil) directly spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This is a common indicator of macro-based attacks or other exploit delivery chains where Office documents are used to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of VBScript or VBE files (.vbs, .vbe) from common temporary or user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, tmp, ProgramData) when launched by common desktop applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, mshta, explorer, cmd, or powershell). This behavior is characteristic of macro-enabled documents or droppers executing staged malicious scripts.
This rule detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to run JavaScript (.js) or VBScript (.vbs) files located in common user-writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Documents. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious scripts dropped as part of phishing attacks or initial access vectors.
Detects native Windows command and scripting interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) initiating external network connections to multiple distinct IP addresses, which is often an indicator of automated C2 beaconing or lateral movement activity.
Detects the execution of regsvr32.exe with command-line arguments indicative of 'Squiblydoo' style attacks, which use the signed Windows binary to proxy the execution of remote scripts or local COM scriptlets (.sct files). The rule specifically flags the use of /i with HTTP(S) URLs, loading scrobj.dll, or specific combinations of /s /u /i flags to bypass application control mechanisms.
Detects suspicious execution patterns (such as encoded commands, downloading files via web clients, or using administration utilities) originating from third-party update, monitoring, or deployment agents. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain compromise or malicious activity leveraging trusted binaries to execute arbitrary code.
Detects instances where common browser processes or Windows Explorer initiate suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe. The rule uses a scoring mechanism based on the presence of encoded command indicators, web-related payloads, or specific HTA script arguments to identify potentially malicious activity such as drive-by downloads or living-off-the-land execution.
Detects the creation of files with specific, non-standard extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpxQ, .lpXD) within the C:\ProgramData directory by scripting engines like wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This activity is associated with the Kimsuky threat group, who use these scripts as loaders to drop NUKESPED DLL payloads.
Detects the execution of JSE files by wscript.exe or cscript.exe followed by the immediate self-deletion of the file from the Downloads folder, a behavior commonly observed in Kimsuky dropper activity.
Detects instances where WScript.exe queries or modifies multiple sensitive Windows Registry keys. This behavior is often associated with script-based malware attempting to modify file associations, persistence mechanisms, or security policies as part of an infection or post-exploitation process.
Detects the creation of files with specific, non-standard extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpxQ, .lpXD) within the C:\ProgramData directory by scripting engines like wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This activity is associated with the Kimsuky threat group, who use these scripts as loaders to drop NUKESPED DLL payloads.
Detects the execution of command interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) initiated by explorer.exe when the parent process command line or the child process command line indicates activity involving files located in user-writable 'Temp' or 'Downloads' directories, specifically targeting LNK files. This behavior is commonly associated with malicious shortcut files used as initial vectors for execution.
Detects RemotePC RMM software (REMOTEPCSERVICE.EXE / RPCCMDHOST.EXE) spawning PowerShell with hidden window and IEX download cradle, consistent with Prinz Eugen ransomware group using RemotePC as a persistence and C2 channel.
Detects instances where common web browsers initiate secondary processes such as command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe). This pattern is frequently indicative of drive-by download attacks or initial access where an adversary uses web browser activity to execute malicious scripts or commands.
Detects the execution of command interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) initiated by explorer.exe when the parent process command line or the child process command line indicates activity involving files located in user-writable 'Temp' or 'Downloads' directories, specifically targeting LNK files. This behavior is commonly associated with malicious shortcut files used as initial vectors for execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell processes initiated by common non-terminal applications (e.g., browser, office, script hosts) that perform in-memory code execution (using commands like IEX or System.Reflection) and simultaneously establish rapid network connections to multiple distinct external IP addresses within a one-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a staged payload download or beaconing activity.
Detects the execution of common Windows system information discovery utilities (systeminfo, hostname, ver) when spawned by command interpreters or scripting engines, which is a common behavior in post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects execution of common Windows network configuration utilities (ipconfig, arp, route) by known command-line and script interpreters. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance to gather information about the host's network settings, interfaces, and connectivity.
Detects execution of common Windows network configuration utilities (ipconfig, arp, route) by known command-line and script interpreters. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance to gather information about the host's network settings, interfaces, and connectivity.
This rule detects common PowerShell code patterns associated with Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. The detection monitors for the presence of specific keywords and method calls in script content, such as 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and reflection-based attempts to modify memory buffers used by AMSI to scan for malicious scripts.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
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