Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP GET requests initiated by the Windows PowerShell User-Agent where the destination host is a decimal-encoded IP address. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, where users are tricked into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands to download malicious payloads.
Detects a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis first-stage loader, which involves the loading of specific suspicious DLLs (masquerading as common software components) followed by the extraction or creation of an 'encryptbase64.ps1' second-stage loader within a short timeframe (10 minutes) on the same host.
This rule detects suspicious process lineage where a Python interpreter executes system commands indicative of a compromised or trojanized pandas package. Specifically, it identifies Python processes spawning command-line utilities for malicious shell operations (e.g., cmd.exe /c calc.exe on Windows or uname -a on Linux/macOS), suggesting an attempt to verify successful arbitrary code execution via a hijacked library function like read_json.
Detects the suspicious execution of common Windows system binaries (LOLBAS) often used for proxying malicious code execution or deobfuscating payloads. This includes regsvr32.exe for remote scriptlet execution, mshta.exe for remote HTA execution, rundll32.exe for JavaScript or DLL function execution, and certutil.exe for decoding or retrieving remote files.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects the creation or modification of WMI Event Subscriptions (Filters, Consumers, and Bindings) using administrative tools like wmic, powershell, or mofcomp. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution via WMI event triggers.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device involving a remote MSI installation followed by PowerShell-based process elevation and administrative checks using fltmc.exe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to deploy malicious packages remotely and escalate privileges within the environment.
Detects execution of MeshAgent binaries when initiated by common scripting or application processes (e.g., java, sh, bash, python) or when displaying suspicious command-line patterns indicative of unauthorized remote access or download activity, particularly in environments like WebLogic or PeopleSoft.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects potential device-code phishing abuse where a successful device code authentication is followed by scripted API activity using common automation user agents within a short time window (10 minutes). This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has successfully phished a user's device code and is immediately leveraging the stolen token to interact with Microsoft Graph, Azure, or Intune services.
Detects instances of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe executing from suspicious locations or with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., URLs, JavaScript, or script file extensions) initiated by an unsigned process. This is a common technique used to proxy malicious code execution while evading security monitoring.
Detects the execution of script files with .js or .se extensions using wscript.exe or cscript.exe outside of standard system directories. This behavior is consistent with the More_eggs JScript backdoor, which has been utilized by the FIN6 threat group (also known as Skeleton Spider) to establish persistent backdoors for follow-on payload delivery.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Winword/Excel) spawning PowerShell or MSHTA with base64-encoded command-line arguments, followed by subsequent persistence mechanisms such as creating scheduled tasks or modifying Registry Run keys. This behavior is indicative of APT38 (BlueNoroff) and similar campaigns delivering banking Trojans via malicious Office macros.
Detects the execution of known Python scripts (CES_Enroll.py, ntlm_ces_relay.py, ces_negotiate_ntlm.py) often associated with NTLM relay attacks or forced authentication techniques. These scripts leverage Python to interact with authentication protocols or relay requests.
This rule detects automated browser-based processes (such as chromedriver, msedgedriver, geckodriver, playwright, or node/python scripts leveraging browser automation frameworks) initiating network connections to domains or URLs identified in active threat intelligence as malicious. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent or automated script being steered toward attacker-controlled infrastructure, potentially for drive-by compromise or exploitation.
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects node.exe processes initiating network connections to specific C2-related URI patterns commonly associated with ChainScript-style remote script loading. This behavior indicates an agent process retrieving attacker-supplied JavaScript code for execution via vm.runInNewContext, or establishing unauthorized C2 communication channels.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where a file (in this case, a PDF) is downloaded using curl via conhost, followed shortly by a PowerShell command that searches the file for a specific marker ("cAB") and decodes/executes embedded Base64 content. This pattern aligns with known TTPs observed in Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaigns.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell command execution originating from a Windows Remote Management (WinRM) process (wsmprovhost.exe). It monitors for child processes of wsmprovhost.exe launching powershell.exe or pwsh.exe combined with indicators of obfuscated command-line arguments, such as encoded commands, base64 strings, or common bypass/evasion parameters like IEX or -NoProfile.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
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