Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious installation attempts of ManageEngine Endpoint Central (ADSelfService.exe) potentially associated with Prinz Eugen ransomware. The rule looks for silent installation parameters or execution initiated by PowerShell or Cmd.exe, which could indicate malicious deployment.
Detects script querying Win32_Process for taskmgr.exe.
Detection of VBScript/HTA components executing from NTFS Alternate Data Streams (e.g., :GTR or :URL) used by GammaWorm.
Identifies PowerShell utilizing ProcessHollowing.Execute to hijack MsBuild.exe.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe running .vbs scripts from within user profile directories. This is a common early-stage infection vector for deploying memory-resident loaders.
This rule detects suspicious DNS queries originating from VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) processes. It specifically filters out common legitimate domains like Microsoft, Windows, and Google to reduce noise, aiming to identify potential phishing or malware activity leveraging VBScript for network communication.
Detects a script or document containing PowerShell commands for web retrieval (Invoke-WebRequest or DownloadString) that specifically targets an .rtf file from a URL. This pattern is indicative of a staging mechanism for malware like Animateclipper.
Detects Python executing a web-administration exploit with valid credential input and explicit two-factor bypass logic, matching the AI-assisted semantic trust-flaw exploitation described by GTIG.
Detects PowerShell referencing AMSI internals, reflection, or amsiInitFailed before executing a downloaded stage. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes executing commands that contain keywords related to AMSI bypass techniques, such as 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', 'AmsiScanBuffer', 'amsiContext', 'GetField', combined with 'SetValue', 'Reflection', or 'NonPublic'. This indicates an attempt to modify AMSI's behavior in memory.
Detects the spawning of shells (bash, sh) or utility processes (npx) as child processes of Amazon Q or VS Code extension host components. This activity is indicative of exploitation attempts involving malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations within workspace environments, as identified by CVE-2026-12957.
This rule monitors for suspicious child processes (like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or rundll32.exe) spawned by dllhost.exe. Dllhost.exe is typically a legitimate Windows process for COM object hosting, and it spawning command-line interpreters or administrative utilities is often indicative of malicious activity, such as process injection or lateral movement.
This rule detects various activities associated with the SilverFox loader chain, including Defender exclusion modifications, suspicious child processes spawned from trojanized OEM binaries, VirtuOne DLL loading, scheduled task creation with specific names or unusual principals, creation of 'checktime.vbs' in public user directories, and masquerading of 'svchost.exe' in the Windows directory.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned from AutoGen Studio or mcp.py Python processes, which could indicate a WebSocket command injection vulnerability (AutoJack - CWE-78). The rule looks for common shell or command execution binaries and keywords in the process command line.
Detects suspicious activity indicative of CryptoBandits malware, specifically JScript stealer polling the clipboard and beaconing actions. This rule identifies instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawn clip.exe (for clipboard access), curl.exe (for C2 communication via Tor SOCKS5 with specific keywords like 'REPL', 'SEED', 'PKEY'), or cmd.exe within a staging directory like 'Public\Documents'. It also looks for specific filenames in the command line such as 'exefu.js', 'ofolu.js', 'words.txt', or 'ugate.exe'.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks from XML files in 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\' by 'schtasks.exe' and subsequent execution of JavaScript payloads via 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' from the same public documents directory. This activity is attributed to the CryptoBandits threat group.
Detects potential DCOM lateral movement by identifying svchost.exe spawning DCOM host processes (mmc.exe, mshta.exe, wmic.exe) with the '-Embedding' argument, followed by these DCOM host processes spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe). This pattern is indicative of adversaries leveraging DCOM for remote code execution and subsequent shell access.
Detects the spawning of suspicious child processes such as PowerShell, cmd, or rundll32 from common productivity applications like Microsoft Office or PDF readers. This pattern is often indicative of macro-based execution, malicious document payloads, or living-off-the-land techniques used to initiate secondary stages of an attack.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell sessions by monitoring for common indicators such as manual manipulation of AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or reflection-based patching techniques. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code without security interference.
Detects instances where an email client (Outlook, Thunderbird, Edge, Chrome, Firefox) spawns `cmd.exe` with highly obfuscated command-line arguments. This behavior is characteristic of phishing delivery chains, specifically mentioning Phantom Stealer, which often uses Base64, XOR, and Donut for obfuscation. The rule looks for specific keywords and patterns indicative of obfuscated commands, such as `-enc`, `-EncodedCommand`, `FromBase64String`, `certutil`, `^^`, `!x!`, and `set /p`.
Detects various activities associated with Operation Poisson Havoc Demon, including the loading of 'senti.dll' (a shellcode carrier), PowerShell execution spawned from 'explorer.exe' (indicating potential shellcode injection), execution of 'RevS.ps1' (a PowerShell reverse shell), and the presence of other suspicious files like 'PhantomBackdoor' and 'TencShell'.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' or Windows Security Event ID 4698, specifically looking for tasks configured to run with 'HighestAvailable' privileges or tasks that execute suspicious script files (sys.vbs, Thal.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges.
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