Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Python command lines that exhibit patterns indicative of Kramer obfuscation, specifically looking for the presence of 'import', 'base64', 'ctypes', and 'eval' keywords. This combination suggests an attempt to obfuscate malicious code within a Python script, often used for dynamic loading and execution of payloads.
Detects Microsoft Teams spawning child processes (cmd, powershell, wscript, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, certutil) after receiving external communications, a technique used by MuddyWater for initial access and execution.
Detects PowerShell using the Add-Type cmdlet to dynamically compile C# code referencing keylogging (SetWindowsHookEx) or screen capture (CopyFromScreen) APIs. This behavior is indicative of PS1Bot in-memory module execution.
Detects the specific process chain: wscript.exe -> powershell.exe -> MSBuild.exe, which is characteristic of the SHADOW#REACTOR malware campaign. This chain indicates the use of scripting interpreters (Wscript and PowerShell) to launch MSBuild for malicious purposes, often involving in-memory execution or compilation of malicious code.
Shebangs (#!) are native to Unix-like operating systems (macOS and Linux). Standard Windows consoles (Command Prompt and PowerShell) do not natively use them. However, they do work on Windows when using tools such as the Python Launcher, Git Bash, Cygwin, or Unix-like environments such as WSL. In simple terms, a Shebang tells the operating system which interpreter should execute a script. For example: #!/usr/bin/python3
For this query, I would recommend performing some threat hunting first and creating a whitelist for known false positives or trusted devices (for example, devices managed by developers). Once the detection is properly tuned, it can be a good way to monitor the download or import of Shebang files on suspicious directories, making it a strong candidate for a threat detection rule.
For this query, I would recommend performing some threat hunting first and creating a whitelist for known false positives or trusted devices (for example, devices managed by developers). Once the detection is properly tuned, it can be a good way to monitor the download or import of Shebang files on suspicious directories, making it a strong candidate for a threat detection rule.
This rule detects suspicious process creation events where common scripting or command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe, regsvcs.exe) are spawned by Microsoft Office applications (winword.exe, excel.exe, powerpnt.exe, outlook.exe). This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled malware attempting to execute payloads.
This rule detects instances where common command and scripting interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe) are launched by unusual parent processes. The rule specifically looks for these interpreters being spawned by processes other than explorer.exe, notepad.exe, mspaint.exe, or svchost.exe, and triggers if this occurs at least twice within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys (Run, RunOnce, RunOnceEx, Policies\Run) where the new value contains common scripting interpreters like PowerShell, cmd, cscript, or wscript, and the path is not within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence by ensuring their malicious script or command executes upon user login.
Detects suspicious command-line executions indicative of potential malicious activity, including the use of certutil for encoding/decoding, bitsadmin for transfers, and various PowerShell command invocations. This rule monitors process creation events (EventID 4688) for specific command-line patterns that are often abused by adversaries for tasks such as file transfer, execution, or obfuscation.
This rule detects command-line executions that involve downloading content from the internet and immediately executing it. It specifically looks for `SecurityEvent` with `EventID 4688` (process creation) where the `CommandLine` contains keywords associated with web client operations (`IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient)`, `DownloadString`, `DownloadFile`, `Invoke-WebRequest`, `curl.exe`) and also contains terms indicating a download and execute intent (`http`, `payload`, `execute`). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for initial access, execution, and persistence.
This rule detects the execution of ScreenConnect client services or MSI installers when initiated by common scripting or installer processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or msiexec.exe. This behavior can indicate the abuse of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for malicious purposes, such as initial access, persistence, or remote control by adversaries.
This rule detects attempts by PowerShell to modify the Windows Registry to re-enable Windows Script Host. This behavior has been observed with AsyncRAT, which may attempt to repair the script environment if it was disabled by defenders.
Detects the execution of the 'wmi_remote_escalate.py' script, which is associated with the MuddyWater APT group for lateral movement and privilege escalation using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
Detects malicious script injection into HTTP responses via MitM
Detects when scripting language interpreters (Node, Python, Bun, NPM) create or modify files within the '/etc/cron.d/' directory. This activity is suspicious as it may indicate a compromised package or malicious actor attempting to establish system-wide persistence via scheduled tasks.
Detects non-standard scripts altering the authorized_keys file to inject attacker SSH public keys, providing persistent backdoor access to the compromised machine. Specifically looks for modifications or creations of 'authorized_keys' files by 'node', 'python', or 'bun' processes.
Detects Node.js executing scripts matching a random temporary pattern (e.g., /tmp/pXXXXX.js). This pattern is generated by post-install scripts of malicious NPM packages, indicating potential supply chain compromise or malicious script execution.
Detects Explorer.exe spawning PowerShell to fetch a polymorphic server-side payload where the URL contains randomized alphanumeric parameters preventing static caching.
Identifies PowerShell commands that generate a unique victim ID by hashing the concatenated ComputerName and UserName, a technique used by the InstallFix malware.
This rule detects instances where 'Invoke-WebRequest' (or its aliases 'IEX', 'IWR') is executed by 'powershell.exe' directly from 'explorer.exe'. This pattern is often indicative of a user launching a malicious PowerShell command from the Run dialog, clipboard, or a shortcut, rather than within a legitimate script context. This specific detection is linked to the ClickFix campaign, which uses information stealers.
Detects PowerShell downloading payloads from cdn.jsdelivr.net, which has been associated with malware like ClearFake.
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