Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the Deno runtime with specific command-line arguments used by the LeakNet group to execute a base64-encoded JavaScript payload directly in memory. This "Bring Your Own Runtime" (BYOR) technique helps evade file-based detections.
This rule detects specific JavaScript obfuscation patterns used by the Coruna exploit kit framework. The kit was observed being used by multiple threat actors, including UNC6353 and UNC6691. The rule looks for two distinct patterns in process command lines: a map/join/fromCharCode obfuscation pattern and an integer XOR obfuscation pattern, typically executed by JavaScript-enabled processes like web browsers or scripting hosts.
Detects execution of shell scripts from mounted disk images (DMG), a technique
used to bypass Gatekeeper restrictions after macOS Sequoia updates.
used to bypass Gatekeeper restrictions after macOS Sequoia updates.
This file looks for the part of the TrustConnect campaign where a fake work-related app reaches out to download a remote access package. The language in the rule is kept close to the behavior from the report so it does not turn into a generic rule for every support tool. It focuses on a command that pulls a package with the ScreenConnect name while avoiding the official vendor address. That matters because many companies use remote support software for real work, and a broad rule would create too much noise. The point here is to catch the suspicious pattern where a disguised lure app is used to bring in hidden remote access, not to flag normal help desk activity. In plain language, this file tries to spot a download step that fits the fake workplace-software scam described by Microsoft, where something that looks safe or familiar is used to quietly place a control tool on the victim machine.
This rule detects PowerShell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, mbs.exe) that are executing commands to read the content of batch (.bat) or command (.cmd) files. This behavior has been observed in campaigns like Dead#Vax for self-parsing and in-memory payload extraction. The detection specifically looks for `Get-Content` or its alias `gc` within the PowerShell command line, targeting files with `.cmd` or `.bat` extensions.
Detects a specific script execution pattern where a batch file, often named 'rEgX.cmd', is read by a PowerShell process (or a renamed variant like 'mbs.exe') to extract a hidden, encrypted payload from its own content. This self-parsing technique, used by the Dead#Vax malware, looks for lines starting with a specific marker (e.g., '@') to bypass traditional file-based detection.
Detects WMI abuse for lateral movement, remote execution, and persistence.
Using native WMI, and one condition for PowerShell plus WMI queries
Using native WMI, and one condition for PowerShell plus WMI queries
This rule detects the creation of PowerShell aliases for high-risk cmdlets or .NET web client patterns. Adversaries may use 'Set-Alias' to create short, obfuscated aliases for common cmdlets like Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-Expression, or cmdlets related to Defender tampering, making their command-line activity harder to detect and analyze. This detection focuses on the 'ProcessCreated' event for PowerShell processes where 'Set-Alias' is used to map to a predefined list of suspicious cmdlets or patterns.
Detects a common PowerShell reverse shell pattern in script block logs (EID 4104). This pattern involves creating a TCP client, getting the network stream, and using Invoke-Expression (iex) to execute commands received over the network.
This detection rule identifies a persistence mechanism observed in the Dead#Vax campaign. It detects the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) being launched by the Task Scheduler engine (taskeng.exe or svchost.exe) to execute a VBScript from a suspicious, user-writable directory such as AppData or a specific ProgramData path like 'ProgramData\IntelDriver'. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence.
Detects the execution of a Python stager associated with OmniStealer. The stager uses an inline command to decompress and execute the final payload, a common technique for this malware family.
Detects Node.js or Python processes executing highly obfuscated or large inline expressions via the '-e' (Node.js) or '-c' (Python) flags. This technique is a primary execution method for stagers associated with North Korean APTs, such as DEV#POPPER and OmniStealer, which are often hidden in legitimate-looking configuration files.
Detects PowerShell scripts that dynamically define Win32 APIs (e.g., OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) using the Add-Type cmdlet. This technique, observed in the Dead#Vax campaign, allows attackers to perform process injection in a fileless manner by loading and invoking native functions from within PowerShell.
Detects a PowerShell process reading the content of a batch script named 'rEgX.cmd' to extract an appended payload. This technique is used by the DeadVax malware as part of its stage 3 execution.
Detects a specific script execution pattern where a batch file, often named 'rEgX.cmd', is read by a PowerShell process (or a renamed variant like 'mbs.exe') to extract a hidden, encrypted payload from its own content. This self-parsing technique, used by the Dead#Vax malware, looks for lines starting with a specific marker (e.g., '@') to bypass traditional file-based detection.
This rule set detects components of the ClipXDaemon, a Linux clipboard hijacker. The first rule, 'ClipXDaemon_Bincrypter_Loader', identifies a loader component characterized by specific strings related to process information, OpenSSL, gzip, and a pattern of variables (P, S, C, R) often used in shell scripts for unpacking, all within a small file size. The second rule, 'ClipXDaemon_ELF_Clipboard', targets the main ELF executable of ClipXDaemon. It looks for an ELF file that interacts with X11 clipboard functions (XConvertSelection, XSetSelectionOwner), attempts to masquerade its process name as 'kworker/0:2-events', and contains hardcoded cryptocurrency wallet addresses used by the attacker. Together, these rules aim to identify both the unpacking mechanism and the core functionality of the ClipXDaemon malware, which is designed to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses from the clipboard.
Detects 'osascript' (AppleScript) executing 'curl' to download a second-stage payload. This updated rule is tuned to detect specific indicators from a known campaign, such as the use of silent/insecure flags, downloads to hidden script files (e.g., .ex.scpt), or connections to known malicious domains.
Detects PowerShell attempting to read a specific batch file named 'rEgX.cmd' using Get-Content, a signature behavior of the Dead#Vax self-parsing loader. This technique is used to extract a hidden payload from the script itself.
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to read the contents of a batch file (specifically looking for '.cmd' or '.bat' extensions) to extract a payload. This logic focuses on the 'Get-Content' cmdlet being applied to a script file, which is a key component of the campaign's self-parsing and payload extraction mechanism, as seen in the Dead#Vax campaign.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) where the script file being executed resides on a newly mounted virtual disk volume (VHD, ISO, etc.).
This technique is used by malware, such as in the Dead#Vax campaign, to bypass the Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) security feature, allowing malicious files inside the container to execute without standard untrusted file warnings.
This technique is used by malware, such as in the Dead#Vax campaign, to bypass the Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) security feature, allowing malicious files inside the container to execute without standard untrusted file warnings.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell command intended to read the content of the batch script that launched it.
This technique is often used as a form of steganography to hide and extract an embedded payload from the script file itself.
Attackers, such as in the Dead#Vax campaign, use this method to deobfuscate and load the next stage of an attack in memory.
This technique is often used as a form of steganography to hide and extract an embedded payload from the script file itself.
Attackers, such as in the Dead#Vax campaign, use this method to deobfuscate and load the next stage of an attack in memory.
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