Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Indirect Prompt Injection (IDPI) attempts where malicious instructions are dynamically injected into the DOM using JavaScript or concealed within HTML data attributes. Attackers use these methods to bypass static analysis tools and deliver hidden prompts to AI/LLM agents that process raw web content.
Detects the execution of the Lua interpreter with a script that has a .ini extension or the known malicious name 'alien.ini' from the Notepad++ supply chain attack. This TTP was used to load and execute shellcode via the Lua Alien FFI library.
Detects the enumeration of camera or microphone hardware using the 'Get-PnpDevice' PowerShell cmdlet. This behavior is a precursor to surveillance activities such as webcam capture or audio recording and has been associated with the Moonrise RAT.
Detects a PowerShell command pattern commonly used by the IClickFix framework. This involves using a hidden window to download a script (often .ps1 or .json) and execute it, bypassing the execution policy. This is a common technique following a "ClickFix" social engineering lure.
Detects Node.js package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm) spawning suspicious child processes like network utilities or shells during the installation of a package. This TTP is abused by malicious packages like 'ambar-src' which use 'preinstall' lifecycle scripts to download and execute secondary payloads.
Detects the Microsoft SharePoint worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning suspicious child processes often used for post-exploitation activity, such as command shells or scripting engines. This behavior is a strong indicator of a webshell execution, as seen in the ToolShell exploitation campaigns.
Detects instances where a LNK file execution is followed by the launch of a PowerShell process that contains command-line arguments for downloading and/or executing content from the internet. This behavior is the initial execution step in the attack chain detailed in the referenced Fortinet report.
Detects svchost.exe spawning a shell process (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) where its parent is not the legitimate services.exe. This behavior is a known technique used by Moonrise RAT to proxy commands and evade detection. The rule further scopes to commands targeting temp or public directories, which are common malware staging areas.
This rule detects activity associated with a developer-targeting campaign leveraging malicious Next.js repositories. It identifies suspicious network connections to known Vercel staging domains and C2 IPs/ports/paths, as well as suspicious process execution patterns involving Node.js or VS Code related processes, and file events related to specific repository artifacts or sensitive file access by developer-adjacent processes. The detection logic covers network communication, process execution, and file system activities indicative of this specific threat.
Detects PowerShell using the Unblock-File cmdlet to remove the Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) from a file located in the C:\ProgramData directory. This technique was observed in an APT36 campaign to allow a staged payload to execute without triggering Windows security warnings.
Detects PowerShell scripts that dynamically define and compile C# code to access Win32 APIs associated with process injection. This fileless technique is used by malware like Dead#Vax to inject shellcode (e.g., AsyncRAT) into the memory of legitimate processes, evading disk-based detection. The rule specifically looks for the use of `Add-Type` to compile C# code that imports functions from `kernel32.dll` and utilizes `VirtualAllocEx`, `WriteProcessMemory`, and `CreateRemoteThread`.
Detects instances where a development environment like VS Code or Cursor spawns a shell process that then uses a download utility to fetch and execute remote content. This is a known TTP for the 'Contagious Interview' campaign which abuses IDE task auto-execution features.
This rule detects the execution of PHP with command-line arguments indicative of web shells like 'aws.php' and 'file_save.php', which have been used in the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731. The detection looks for the use of eval with base64 decoding and specific, non-standard parameters used to pass commands.
This rule detects activity related to the EmEditor watering hole attack, specifically looking for PowerShell execution making requests to known malicious lookalike domains and network connections to the associated infrastructure. A match suggests a potential download of malicious code during what appeared to be a legitimate install or update. Investigation should focus on identifying the host, user, source of activity, and legitimacy of the install source, followed by evidence preservation, credential reset, and a search for follow-up malicious activity.
Detects a pattern associated with the 'ClawHavoc' campaign where processes related to the OpenClaw AI framework download and immediately execute content from the internet. This is often seen in malicious 'prerequisite' or 'setup' scripts exploiting CVE-2026-25253.
Detects the execution of a shell command that decodes a base64 string and pipes the output directly into another shell for execution. This is a common obfuscation technique used by malware, including the AMOS stealer dropper delivered via malicious OpenClaw skills, to hide the initial payload.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3.exe (or renamed versions) from non-standard paths or with suspicious script extensions, which is indicative of CastleLoader activity. This rule specifically looks for AutoIt interpreter execution, including renamed files with .pif or .com extensions, originating from common temporary or user-writable directories like AppData or Temp, and executing suspicious script file extensions such as .a3x, .t, or .vstm, or very short command lines.
Detects instances where an npm or node process spawns a shell, which in turn executes a command-line networking utility like curl or wget. This behavior is indicative of a malicious pre/post-install script used in supply chain attacks, such as the one seen with the 'ambar-src' package.
This rule identifies network connections or BITS transfer jobs targeting specific IP addresses and URLs associated with recent ClickFix campaigns. It also detects the use of system utilities like bitsadmin.exe and powershell.exe to download files, a common tactic for these threats.
This rule identifies various activities associated with the Dohdoor malware campaign, combining multiple detection heuristics into a single result set. It looks for PowerShell executing curl to download batch scripts, copied Windows tools run from shared folders with unusual arguments, suspicious DLL loads from shared folders, and network connections to C2-style domains identified in the campaign.
Detects the use of certutil.exe to decode a batch script that is referencing itself as the source file. This is a 'fileless' technique used by attackers to hide and extract embedded payloads, as seen in the 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
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