Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects XWorm V6 infection chain where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe executing a .ps1 with Start-Process powershell
This rule detects suspicious Python script execution via svchost.exe. Specifically, it looks for svchost.exe processes running from a user's profile directory that execute Python commands containing 'import', 'requests', 'exec(', and a URL (http:// or https://). This pattern is indicative of a Python interpreter being used to download and execute malicious code, potentially masquerading as a legitimate svchost process.
Detects PowerShell command lines that exceed a certain length of characters or more, which may indicate obfuscated or automated malicious activity. It also specifically looks for common PowerShell download and execution patterns within the command line.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns indicative of the ClickFix / CrashFix Python RAT. This rule specifically looks for 'finger.exe' or 'powershell.exe' with encoded or obfuscated commands, especially when initiated by common browser processes or explorer.exe, which aligns with social engineering techniques involving malicious copy-pasting.
This detection identifies a pattern associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, where a user is tricked into copying a malicious command and pasting it into a PowerShell terminal. The query correlates a recent clipboard operation with a subsequent suspicious PowerShell execution by the same user on the same device.
This rule detects the execution of command-line interpreters (bash, powershell, cmd, python) that include commands for invoking expressions or downloading content (invoke-expression, curl, wget, Invoke-WebRequest) AND contain specific keywords associated with AI agents (moltbot, openclaw, clawdbot). This combination suggests an AI agent potentially executing arbitrary or malicious commands, possibly as a result of prompt injection or an unusual script execution scenario.
Detects a sequence of macOS system profiling and software update commands associated with the UNC1069 'ClickFix' social engineering ruse, often followed by a payload download via curl piped to a shell.
Detects privileged credential retrieval from Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions via PowerShell, including CyberArk AIM, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault
This rule detects network connections to known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool domains initiated by `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe`. This behavior can indicate the unauthorized use of RMM tools by an adversary to gain remote access and control over a compromised system. The rule specifically looks for successful network connections where the remote URL matches a URI from a curated list of RMM domains, and the initiating process is either `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe`, excluding a specific bypass command line.
Detects file access or download activity from SharePoint or OneDrive where the user agent is PowerShell. This TTP has been associated with UNC6671 (related to ShinyHunters) for data exfiltration from SaaS applications.
PowerShell (parent explorer) launches WScript with minimized window and Invoke-WebRequest. Lampion campaign pattern per Microsoft blog.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'SoftwareProtection' that executes a Python script. This is a persistence mechanism used by the CrashFix campaign to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service.
Detects the execution of specific Python scripts (modes.py, extentions.py, or udp.pyw) using the silent pythonw.exe interpreter. This activity is associated with the ModeloRAT malware, which is used in the CrashFix campaign, indicating potential persistence or execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of Python scripts associated with the ModeloRAT, such as modes.py, extentions.py, or udp.pyw. This activity is part of the CrashFix campaign, where attackers deploy a portable Python environment to ensure payload execution.
Detects the execution of Python scripts with names associated with the ModeloRAT, often launched from user AppData or Temp directories as part of the CrashFix campaign.
Detects the PowerShell download cradle used by the Marco Stealer malware.
Detects the 'codesign' utility being used to extract code-signing requirements from trusted macOS system binaries. This is a key step used by malware to forge TCC permissions and inherit the privileges of trusted applications. The rule specifically looks for 'codesign' execution with '-d' and '--requirements' flags targeting common trusted binaries, initiated by scripting interpreters.
Detects the creation of a directory junction pointing to a OneDrive synchronization folder. This is a key component of the 'DoubleDrive' technique, used to force the synchronization of arbitrary local files for data exfiltration or cloud-based ransomware encryption.
Detects when a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool or a known lure spawns 'msiexec.exe' to download and execute a remote installer. This behavior is often abused by threat actors to deploy secondary payloads like additional C2 tools, leveraging legitimate RMM functionality.
This rule detects the execution of Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files via mshta.exe, specifically when initiated by explorer.exe and the command line contains a reference to an .hta file. This behavior is often abused by adversaries to execute malicious scripts or payloads.
Detects a command line pattern where `curl` is used to download a payload, which is then piped to `base64` for decoding and `gunzip` for decompression. This technique is commonly used by macOS infostealers like DigitStealer and MacSync to execute malware in memory without writing it to disk.
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