Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic identifies instances where a shell (PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe) is spawned from W3WP.exe, the IIS worker process. This activity is significant as it may indicate webshell activity, often associated with exploitation attempts like those by the HAFNIUM Group on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Detects PowerShell commands using encoded command-line arguments to execute 'net user', 'net group', or 'net share' commands. This technique is often used by adversaries to obfuscate their actions and evade detection.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) to download files from known file-sharing or content delivery network (CDN) domains. It specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of file download operations, such as '.DownloadString(', '.DownloadFile(', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', and 'wget'. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is leveraged to retrieve potentially malicious payloads from untrusted or commonly abused online services.
Detects the execution of a malicious Node.js payload, a technique used by the EvilAI malware campaign. EvilAI launches node.exe via cmd.exe to run a JavaScript file from the user's temporary directory. The script name follows a specific pattern (GUID followed by 'or', 'ro', or 'of').
Detects the execution of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) from the Netlogon or Sysvol shares. This activity is highly suspicious as these shares are typically used for Group Policy and logon scripts, not for direct execution of interactive shells or scripting engines by users or processes. This could indicate an adversary attempting to execute malicious code or scripts from a central, often replicated, location within a Windows domain environment, potentially for lateral movement, persistence, or privilege escalation.
This detection identifies potential FakeCAPTCHA/ClickFix clipboard hijacking campaigns by looking for PowerShell execution with hidden window parameters and distinctive strings related to fake CAPTCHA verification. These campaigns use social engineering to trick users into pasting malicious PowerShell commands from their clipboard, typically delivering information stealers or remote access trojans.
The analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool, posing a severe threat to the environment.
This analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands to install unsigned AppX packages using Add-AppxPackage or Add-AppPackage cmdlets with the -AllowUnsigned flag. This activity is significant as adversaries may use unsigned AppX packages to install malicious applications, bypass security controls, or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to install unauthorized applications that may contain malware, backdoors, or other malicious components.
Detects the use of 'curl' on macOS with specific flags (-f, -s, -L) commonly used to download and execute scripts from the internet. This pattern is a known technique used by malware like AMOS Stealer to gain initial access by tricking users into running malicious commands in the Terminal.
Detects the execution of an executable or script file from the NETLOGON share. This behavior was observed during the deployment of the Obscura ransomware and is a strong indicator of lateral movement or malicious deployment via Group Policy.
Detects the execution of a suspicious PowerShell dropper script, often initiated by a user clicking a malicious file (e.g., LNK). This pattern is common in phishing campaigns, including those by groups like Kimsuky. The detection looks for PowerShell commands that use common evasion techniques (like hidden windows or bypassing execution policies).
Detects the execution of osascript with a command line that includes curl to download and execute a remote script, a technique used by the Odyssey Stealer malware.
Detects attempts to query system information directly from the Windows Registry using 'reg.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets like 'Get-ItemPropertyValue' or 'gpv'. The rule specifically looks for queries related to time zone, network configuration, operating system details, installed programs, Windows Defender status, existing services, and scheduled tasks.
Detects PowerShell preparing to execute shellcode using the CallWindowProc API. This technique is used to bypass EDRs by executing code without creating a new thread, which is a commonly monitored API call.
Detects the execution of a malicious Linux payload, possibly within a .desktop file, a technique used by APT36. The rule identifies a bash process executing an inline command that downloads and runs a payload, often using a combination of curl, xxd, base64, and eval.
This analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by `WScript.exe` or `CScript.exe`. Adversaries and malware commonly use these scripting hosts to execute various Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINs), other scripts like PowerShell, or to spawn suspended processes for code injection as a defense evasion technique. While this TTP may detect some legitimate scripts that utilize the listed child processes, it serves as a strong indicator that a script might be executing suspicious code.
The analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698 to identify when such tasks are registered. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detects the execution of a shell script downloaded via curl or wget on macOS, a technique associated with ClickFix campaigns delivering malware like Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS).
This rule detects commands executed via the Run dialog (Win+R), which is often used by attackers or malicious scripts to launch tools like PowerShell, cmd, or other malicious payloads. It specifically looks for modifications to the 'RunMRU' registry key by 'explorer.exe' that contain suspicious keywords or patterns indicative of command execution, especially in scenarios like ClickFix-style attacks where users are tricked into running commands.
Detects defense evasion tactics used by UpCrypter, such as checking for forensic tools or sandbox environments.
Detects PowerShell commands, particularly those involving download and execution cradles (irm/iex), being written to the RunMRU registry key. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attacks like 'ClickFix' where users are tricked into pasting and running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
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