Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with a specific flag sequence ('-NoP -NoL -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc') that is characteristic of the Wmiexec script, often used for lateral movement and defense evasion.
Detects an attempt to execute code or create a service on a remote host using `winrm.vbs` via `cscript.exe`. This technique leverages Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to interact with WMI for remote execution, often for lateral movement or persistence.
Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware, specifically looking for command-line patterns indicative of its execution and discovery techniques. This includes the use of mshta.exe to execute HTA files via PowerShell, querying the registry for Terminal Server Client information, and using PowerShell to upload files.
Detects the creation of a remote thread from a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) into another process. This activity can be indicative of process injection techniques used by adversaries to execute malicious code or evade defenses. A filter is included to exclude known legitimate activity from CompatTelRunner.exe.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution initiated via rundll32.exe, specifically looking for the combination of 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell' within the ServiceFileName field of Windows Security Event ID 4697 (Service Creation). This technique is often used for defense evasion and to execute malicious PowerShell scripts.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution initiated via rundll32.exe. This rule specifically looks for Windows Security Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system) where the ServiceFileName contains specific keywords indicative of rundll32.exe being used to execute obfuscated commands, potentially involving PowerShell.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains highly obfuscated PowerShell commands. Specifically, it looks for 'cmd' executing a 'set' command to define an environment variable, followed by PowerShell execution with the '-f' format operator, which is characteristic of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR+ launcher technique. This method uses environment variables and string manipulation to hide malicious PowerShell code.
This rule detects the use of 'powercat' or 'powercat.ps1' within PowerShell classic logs. Powercat is a PowerShell-based network utility similar to Netcat, often used by adversaries for network communication, including reverse shells, bind shells, and file transfers, potentially bypassing traditional network controls. This activity is indicative of command and control communication or lateral movement using non-application layer protocols.
This rule detects the use of the 'Get-Clipboard' command within PowerShell logs. This command allows an adversary to retrieve the current content of the system clipboard, which could contain sensitive information copied by a user.
This rule identifies attempts to clear the PowerShell console history. Adversaries often clear command history to remove traces of their activities on a compromised system, making forensic analysis more difficult. The rule specifically looks for the 'Clear-History' cmdlet or the deletion of the 'ConsoleHost_history.txt' file, which stores PowerShell command history.
This rule detects the installation of a root certificate on a Windows system via PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block text containing commands like 'Move-Item' or 'Import-Certificate' targeting the 'Cert:\LocalMachine\Root' path. Adversaries may install root certificates to bypass security warnings when connecting to their controlled web servers, facilitating man-in-the-middle attacks or credential harvesting.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to modify Access Control Lists (ACLs) on files or directories within the Windows system folders. This activity is suspicious as it can be used by adversaries to gain persistence, elevate privileges, or evade defenses by modifying critical system file permissions.
This rule detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-SmbShare`. Adversaries often use this cmdlet to discover shared folders and drives on remote systems, which can help them identify valuable information for collection or potential targets for lateral movement. This activity is a common precursor to further reconnaissance and exploitation within a network.
This rule detects the usage of the PowerShell cmdlet `Test-NetConnection` to probe network connectivity to a specified computer name and port, specifically looking for connections to ports other than the commonly used 80 or 443. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to establish or test communication channels over non-standard ports, potentially to bypass network defenses or obscure command and control activities.
Detects the execution of an MSI file using PowerShell and the WMI Win32_Product class. This method can be used for defense evasion by leveraging a trusted system utility (PowerShell) and a legitimate WMI class to install software, potentially bypassing traditional application whitelisting or execution policies.
Detects PowerShell command lines that contain both the 'hidden' argument and specific Base64 encoded keywords. These keywords are often associated with malicious PowerShell scripts used for various post-exploitation activities, including process injection, memory manipulation, and remote thread creation. The rule aims to identify obfuscated and stealthy execution of malicious PowerShell.
Detects attempts to decompress Gzip archives using PowerShell's GZipStream::Decompress method. This technique can be used by adversaries to unpack malicious payloads that have been compressed to evade detection.
This rule detects suspicious patterns in program names or command-line arguments that are commonly associated with malicious samples, hacktools, or exploit kits. It looks for specific keywords and file names in the 'Image' (executable path) and 'CommandLine' fields. Examples include CVE-related strings, common exploit/artifact names like 'poc.exe', 'meterpreter', and various PowerShell scripts often used in post-exploitation such as 'inject.ps1', 'Invoke-CVE', 'mimikatz.ps1', and 'powercat.ps1'.
Detects various obfuscated PowerShell IEX (Invoke-Expression) invocation patterns generated by the Invoke-Obfuscation framework. The rule specifically looks for distinct string manipulation and variable concatenation techniques used by the framework within the ServiceFileName field of Windows Security Event ID 4697.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell'. This specific combination is indicative of an attempt to execute obfuscated PowerShell code via rundll32.exe, a common technique for defense evasion and execution.
Detects when a Microsoft Office application (Excel, Publisher, Outlook, OneNote, PowerPoint, Word) loads a PowerShell core DLL. This behavior is highly suspicious as Office applications typically do not need to load PowerShell DLLs, and it can indicate an attempt to execute PowerShell code within the context of a trusted Office application, potentially for defense evasion or malicious scripting.
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