Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
Detects PowerShell script blocks attempting to exfiltrate data using ICMP by creating a System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping object and sending data. This method allows adversaries to bypass traditional network controls by tunneling data over ICMP.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing patterns commonly associated with Mimikatz, a tool used for dumping credentials. The rule looks for specific strings related to Mimikatz functionalities like 'DumpCreds', 'DumpCerts', 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords', and 'crypto::certificates' in conjunction with 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that contain keywords associated with collecting local email data, specifically targeting Microsoft Outlook. It looks for script names like 'Get-Inbox.ps1' or the use of Outlook COM objects ('Microsoft.Office.Interop.Outlook', 'Microsoft.Office.Interop.Outlook.olDefaultFolders', '-comobject outlook.application'). This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to gather sensitive information from a user's local email client.
Detects attempts to modify a PowerShell user profile using the `Add-Content` cmdlet to inject suspicious commands. This technique can be used for persistence, as the injected commands will execute every time a PowerShell session starts for that user.
Detects the usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll" DLL. This DLL is often used by attackers to perform Active Directory enumeration, especially in environments where RSAT (Remote Server Administration Tools) are not installed or administrative privileges are not available.
This rule detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Invoke-Command' with the '-ComputerName' parameter. This combination indicates an attempt to execute commands on a remote host using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). Adversaries commonly use this technique for lateral movement within a network after gaining valid credentials.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution leveraging `clip.exe` to retrieve commands from the clipboard. This technique is often used for defense evasion to hide malicious scripts.
This rule detects the use of `Start-Process` with the `-PassThru` and `-FilePath` parameters in PowerShell script blocks. The `-PassThru` parameter allows `Start-Process` to return a process object, which can be used to interact with the started process in the background, potentially for stealthy execution or to bypass interactive prompts. The `-FilePath` parameter specifies the executable to run. This combination can be indicative of an adversary attempting to execute a process in a less conspicuous manner.
Detects the execution of the `AgentExecutor.exe` binary when it is used to execute PowerShell scripts. This binary can be abused as a Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBIN) to run PowerShell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy set to "Bypass" or to execute any binary named "powershell.exe" located in a path provided as the 6th positional argument. The rule specifically looks for `AgentExecutor.exe` being executed with command-line arguments indicating PowerShell script execution, such as `-powershell` or `-remediationScript`. It filters out legitimate usage where the parent process is `Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe`.
Detects the use of `cmd.exe` to launch PowerShell commands that leverage `clip.exe` and the Windows clipboard for obfuscated execution. This technique is often used to evade detection by breaking up malicious payloads or commands.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts via 'Runscripthelper.exe' when the command line contains 'surfacecheck'. This behavior is suspicious as 'Runscripthelper.exe' is a legitimate Windows binary that can be abused for indirect command execution, often as part of Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) techniques.
Detects PowerShell execution that includes base64 encoded WMI class names such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", "Win32_Process", "Win32_UserAccount", or "Win32_LoggedOnUser" in the command line. This technique is often used by adversaries to obfuscate their actions and evade detection.
Detects PowerShell script execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). This rule identifies instances where 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe' is launched, and its command line arguments include 'Get-Content' and '-Stream'. This combination indicates that PowerShell is being used to read and potentially execute content hidden within an Alternate Data Stream, a common technique for defense evasion.
Detects the creation of a PowerShell module where the module contents specifically include "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This pattern is indicative of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary, which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking. An attacker might use this technique to execute arbitrary code by tricking the legitimate signed binary into loading a malicious PowerShell module.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that utilize the `System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher` object to enumerate Active Directory for computer objects. Specifically, it looks for the creation of this object, the addition of properties to load (like 'name'), and the execution of `findall()` to retrieve results. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover domain-joined computers within an Active Directory environment.
Detects usage of PowerShell cmdlets to disable or remove Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) trace sessions. This activity can be an attempt by an adversary to impair defenses by blocking or removing indicators that would normally be collected by security monitoring tools.
Detects PowerShell script blocks that contain commands used to export certificates from the local certificate store. This activity can be abused by threat actors to steal private keys from compromised machines.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that attempt to import modules from suspicious directories such as the user's temporary folder ($Env:Temp), application data folder ($Env:Appdata), or the C:\Users\Public\ directory. Adversaries often use these locations to drop and execute malicious PowerShell modules to evade detection or achieve persistence.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize 'mshta' for execution, often seen in defense evasion tactics. The rule specifically looks for a combination of keywords in PowerShell script block logs, indicating the use of 'set', '&&', 'mshta', 'vbscript:createobject', '.run', and '(window.close)' which are characteristic of Invoke-Obfuscation techniques involving MSHTA.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution that attempts to enumerate installed software on a Windows system. Specifically, it looks for the combination of `Get-ItemProperty`, `\software\`, `Select-Object`, and `Format-Table` within the PowerShell script block text. This pattern is commonly used to query the registry for installed applications under `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\` and format the output.
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