Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of common command-line or scripting tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, ftp.exe) or .lnk file handling triggered by explorer.exe immediately following the mounting of a VHD or VHDX file. This behavior is indicative of an attacker mounting a malicious virtual disk image and executing payloads contained within it.
Detects recovered scripts/payloads that harvest environment variables, API keys, bearer tokens, and Kubernetes secrets/configmaps into a variable named LOOT
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a browser process makes a network connection, followed shortly by a direct execution of command-line tools (powershell.exe, mshta.exe, or cmd.exe) from the Windows explorer.exe process (e.g., via the Run dialog). This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands from a web page directly into their local environment.
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
This rule detects potential screen capture activity performed by either a suspicious executable (SearchTrustedRuntimeSvc.exe) that mimics a screen capture tool or a PowerShell script invoked by Node.js using .NET drawing libraries. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized information gathering, common in remote access trojans (RATs).
TokenGrabber Builder: Webhook XOR/Base64 Obfuscation Artifacts - detects webhook.txt persistence, XOR 0x5A + Base64 webhook obfuscation, WEBHOOK_PLACEHOLDER injection, and the _x() decode routine used to recover the exfiltration endpoint
Detects the execution of mshta.exe by explorer.exe with command line arguments containing script protocols (javascript:, vbscript:) or remote URLs. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious HTA files or inline scripts, bypassing security controls.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe by explorer.exe with command line arguments containing script protocols (javascript:, vbscript:) or remote URLs. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious HTA files or inline scripts, bypassing security controls.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) when using VS Code tasks (tasks.json). It identifies suspicious CLI arguments often associated with downloading, executing, or obfuscating scripts (e.g., PowerShell, curl, python, mshta) that are not part of standard development workflows like npm, yarn, or git, which are explicitly filtered out as noise.
Detects execution chains associated with the SideCopy threat group's ReverseRAT payload. The detection looks for mshta.exe being spawned by common shell processes (explorer, wscript, cmd, powershell) to execute remote HTA content or access 'docsportal.in'. It also monitors for subsequent reflective DLL loading via rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which is indicative of the final ReverseRAT payload activation.
Detects execution chains associated with the SideCopy threat group's ReverseRAT payload. The detection looks for mshta.exe being spawned by common shell processes (explorer, wscript, cmd, powershell) to execute remote HTA content or access 'docsportal.in'. It also monitors for subsequent reflective DLL loading via rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which is indicative of the final ReverseRAT payload activation.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698, specifically filtering for tasks that execute PowerShell, WScript, or JavaScript files. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms, such as those observed in the LausivLoader.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (headless mode, hidden window, encoded commands) spawned by WScript.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with obfuscated script execution or fileless malware staging.
This rule detects command-line activity where a remote resource is downloaded via 'curl', decoded using 'base64', and then piped directly into a shell interpreter (sh, bash, or zsh). This pattern is commonly used in fileless execution or stage-one payload delivery by attackers to execute malicious scripts directly from memory.
Detects the execution of a file with a '.Psh' extension named 'UBPPatch.Psh' that is launched by the process 'UBPUpdater.Exe'. This behavior is indicative of a masqueraded script execution where a suspicious binary or script is disguised with an unconventional extension to evade standard detection mechanisms.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects instances where Microsoft Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) spawns common interpreters or command-line tools (such as node, python, cmd, or powershell) that are not associated with known internal VS Code process behaviors like renderer tasks or tunnel operations. This activity may indicate malicious use of the integrated terminal or extension execution contexts to execute unauthorized code.
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