Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
This rule detects suspicious clipboard access attempts initiated by common scripting interpreters (node.exe, python.exe, powershell.exe) in non-standard paths or correlated with recent external network connections. It is designed to identify potential credential theft or data staging using clipboard interaction methods often employed by malware.
Detects execution of python scripts or shell commands involving curl from temporary directories like /tmp, /Temp, or /Downloads. This pattern is commonly associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads, often involving downloading scripts via curl or executing files that mimic legitimate standalone python builds or system scripts.
Detects instances where PowerShell or mshta.exe are launched by a web browser or Windows Explorer, often indicative of the 'ClickFix' social-engineering campaign. In this scenario, users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands from a fake CAPTCHA or update prompt directly into a Windows terminal or the Run dialog, leading to code execution.
Detects execution chains associated with the SideCopy threat group's ReverseRAT payload. The detection looks for mshta.exe being spawned by common shell processes (explorer, wscript, cmd, powershell) to execute remote HTA content or access 'docsportal.in'. It also monitors for subsequent reflective DLL loading via rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which is indicative of the final ReverseRAT payload activation.
Detects the creation of a JavaScript file masquerading as a legitimate Microsoft PhotoEngine component ('PhotoStudio.js') within the '%LOCALAPPDATA%' directory. This behavior is associated with the LausivLoader malware, which uses this masquerading technique to evade detection.
This rule detects the LausivLoader initial-stage obfuscated JavaScript dropper. It identifies the malware either by specific file hashes (MD5/SHA256) or by detecting characteristic behaviors: small file size (<1MB), the presence of 'String.fromCharCode' obfuscation techniques, excessive junk comments, and supply-chain related lure strings.
This rule monitors for two distinct stages of potential account recovery abuse. First, it detects the execution of suspected Python scripts on an endpoint that contain command-line arguments related to password recovery or authentication codes. Second, it monitors network proxy/web logs for a high volume of API requests to the 'easy4ipcloud.com' domain associated with password reset or device probe endpoints, which may indicate automated credential stuffing or unauthorized device account recovery attempts.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe spawning a child process of powershell.exe where the command line arguments are highly suspicious, including headless mode, encoded commands, and hidden window parameters. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute obfuscated malicious scripts while attempting to avoid detection.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the patching of process memory or tampering with security instrumentation (such as Event Tracing for Windows - ETW) by common scripting host processes. It flags events like 'PatchProcessMemory', 'ProcessInjection', or references to 'AmsiScanBuffer' and 'EtwEventWrite' associated with PowerShell, WScript, or CScript, which are often used in post-exploitation scenarios to evade security controls and telemetry collection.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via direct memory modification or through script command-line arguments. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for AMSI-specific events (e.g., buffer patching, provider tampering) and looks for common PowerShell and scripting engine command-line patterns indicative of AMSI bypass techniques.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns conhost.exe with a headless flag, which in turn executes PowerShell with hidden, encoded command-line arguments. This pattern is often indicative of multi-stage malware loaders attempting to obfuscate execution and bypass security monitoring.
Detects the execution of command-line tools (cmd.exe or wscript.exe) spawned by Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) where the command line contains references to .lnk files or specific batch filenames (doxc.bat, config.bat). This behavior is often indicative of malicious shortcut files used to trigger secondary stage payloads.
This rule detects the execution of cmd.exe or powershell.exe where the command line arguments involve the deletion or renaming of specific file names potentially associated with unauthorized activities or malware components. It looks for common command-line utilities (del, ren) being used by command shells on specific files that may indicate artifact cleanup or staging.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution that interacts with the GitHub API, specifically targeting the upload of files or JSON data to repository endpoints. The logic looks for commands related to file system access, inclusion of 'api.github.com', and references to 'SmartUploader' or 'uploaded_files.json'. It further filters for activity occurring within standard user directories and enforces a check to ensure the GitHub repository name matches the local hostname, which is a common indicator of automated exfiltration scripts.
This rule detects command-line activity where a remote resource is downloaded via 'curl', decoded using 'base64', and then piped directly into a shell interpreter (sh, bash, or zsh). This pattern is commonly used in fileless execution or stage-one payload delivery by attackers to execute malicious scripts directly from memory.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with command-line arguments that reference VLC-themed filenames or presentations. This behavior is indicative of a malicious HTA file being used as a lure to drop the Lightlife RAT loader, leveraging the mshta.exe utility to bypass standard application execution controls.
Detects the execution of the Lightlife RAT via a PowerShell script named 'lightlife.ps1'. The rule monitors for processes running from the LOCALAPPDATA directory, the use of PowerShell with execution policy bypass and hidden window style, or execution triggered via common scripting hosts like wscript.exe or mshta.exe combined with PowerShell download cmdlets.
Detects the execution of batch files from temporary directories that employ command obfuscation techniques such as environment variable substring expansion, or which execute with a hidden window in conjunction with chained system utilities commonly associated with malicious activities (e.g., curl, tar, schtasks). This behavior is often indicative of staged payload delivery and execution.
Detects the execution of batch files from temporary directories that employ command obfuscation techniques such as environment variable substring expansion, or which execute with a hidden window in conjunction with chained system utilities commonly associated with malicious activities (e.g., curl, tar, schtasks). This behavior is often indicative of staged payload delivery and execution.
Detects the execution of common command-line and scripting tools initiated by ScreenConnect (ConnectWise) remote administration processes. This pattern often indicates unauthorized remote access, lateral movement, or post-compromise activity where legitimate administrative software is abused to run arbitrary commands.
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