Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks named after Microsoft Edge updates or the execution of suspicious Wscript commands, which may indicate persistence or execution by the LxBaseRAT malware.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3 scripts using mshta.exe as the parent process from suspicious or non-standard directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass application execution policies or obfuscate malicious script execution.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3 scripts using mshta.exe as the parent process from suspicious or non-standard directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass application execution policies or obfuscate malicious script execution.
Detects the execution of a potentially malicious, renamed AutoIT interpreter from a temporary directory, where the process command line or associated file activity involves a specific, obfuscated loader script (kojuyn.ini). The rule identifies behavioral patterns consistent with malware staging and execution, including the use of random filenames for both the interpreter and the script, characteristic of loaders using custom string deobfuscation and decryption routines.
Detects the termination of 'wscript.exe' using 'taskkill.exe' or PowerShell 'Stop-Process'. This behavior is commonly used by malicious loaders to stop script-based execution after a payload has been staged or executed to minimize forensic artifacts and potential detection by defenders monitoring long-running processes.
Detects the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) executing files with suspicious double extensions, specifically those mimicking PDF documents (e.g., .pdf.js) or utilizing the .jse extension. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless initial execution lures, often seen in ClickFix-style or VEIL#DROP campaigns designed to trick users into executing malicious scripts.
Detects the use of .NET reflection APIs, such as Assembly.Load or Reflection.Emit, within PowerShell command lines. This technique is commonly used to load and execute malicious code entirely in memory, facilitating fileless malware execution and bypassing traditional disk-based security controls.
Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
This rule detects anomalous, high-frequency actions performed by browser extensions that lack concurrent user interaction events (such as keyboard input, clicks, or gestures). It monitors for automated browser API calls or prompts originating from web browsers like Chrome, Edge, and Opera that exhibit potential malicious behavior, such as silent data collection, navigation, or unauthorized scripting.
Detects the presence of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) binaries and their associated malicious behaviors. The rule identifies suspicious artifacts including password prompt requests using osascript to deceive users, attempts to access keychain and browser credential databases, and the use of curl piping to remote shell execution which is a common delivery vector for this malware family.
This rule monitors for a multi-stage attack pattern involving two potential indicators: first, it identifies phishing emails containing a 'Google Docs' link combined with an attachment named 'API Logic Flaw'. Second, it detects browser activity involving the paste of JavaScript code or suspicious browser clipboard activity, which may indicate an attacker attempting to execute malicious scripts directly in the user's browser context.
Detects the creation of shortcut files (.lnk) within the current user's Startup folder using Windows command line utilities or scripts that leverage the WScript.Shell COM object. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence to ensure malicious payloads execute upon user logon.
Detects the execution of command-line tools (powershell, cmd, bash, curl, etc.) originating from common package managers and build tools (npm, node, pip, python, yarn). The rule flags these processes if they contain command-line arguments indicative of suspicious activity such as base64-encoded commands, remote script execution (IEX, curl/wget to shell), or indicators of persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, registry Run keys).
Detects the execution of Python scripts named 'exploit.py' or 'exp.py', which are common naming conventions associated with proof-of-concept or exploit code.
Detects the execution of Python scripts named 'exploit.py' or 'exp.py', which are common naming conventions associated with proof-of-concept or exploit code.
Detects anomalous activity originating from or associated with the PostgreSQL service account, including the execution of shells and utilities commonly used for post-exploitation or system enumeration, as well as external network logins. This activity is indicative of credential abuse or container escapes where an adversary attempts to execute commands on the underlying host.
This rule detects potentially malicious process execution chains where VBScript or unknown/suspicious binaries (such as ProfileQuickHost.exe) are used to launch Node.js processes, specifically targeting JavaScript files or VBScript agents. This pattern is often associated with the execution of remote access trojans (RATs) or custom malware loaders.
This rule detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line referencing an HTA file, followed within 10 minutes by a network connection initiated by mshta.exe to a remote URL containing .js or .xml extensions. This behavior is indicative of mshta.exe being used as a proxy to execute remote malicious payloads, a common technique for fileless malware execution and defense evasion.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
This rule detects the execution or presence of batch files named 'Invoice Details.bat'. The use of such naming conventions in scripts is often a tactic employed in phishing campaigns to lure users into executing malicious code disguised as business-related documents.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts located in the user's temporary folder. The detection logic looks for common obfuscation flags such as WindowStyle Hidden, NoProfile, and NoLogo, combined with the -File argument, which are frequently used by droppers and malicious payloads to execute scripts in the background while evading immediate user observation.
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