Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
This rule detects activities related to Tampermonkey (a popular browser extension for userscripts) or interactions with paste.sh, often used for hosting scripts or payloads. The rule monitors both process-level executions and network requests for these indicators, which may be associated with malicious script execution or browser-based credential or session theft.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with command-line arguments often used to obfuscate scripts or hide activity, such as encoded commands (-enc), base64 decoding, or running the process with a hidden window.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (wmiprvse.exe) launches suspicious command-line interfaces or interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, cscript, etc.), or executes scripts from sensitive/temporary directories. The rule includes exclusions for common management tools to reduce noise.
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
Detects the execution of a Java JAR file (specifically cmd.jar) that is initiated by a shell process (sh). This behavior may indicate an attempt to run malicious Java-based payloads or secondary scripts through a command-line interface.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
Detects scripts or files referencing the JSCeal loading chain that invokes node.exe with -r preflight.js to decompress and execute a compiled V8 bytecode app.jsc payload
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
Detects execution of shell scripts where a remote resource is fetched via curl with silent flags and immediately piped into a shell interpreter. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery of malicious payloads or installation of unauthorized tools.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
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