Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects execution of the Edgecution malware suite native messaging host (native_host.py), which fingerprints the host system by reading environment variables (USERNAME, COMPUTERNAME, etc.). The rule correlates this behavior with a specific, suspicious process lineage originating from Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe -> native host -> python.exe).
Detects the execution of AutoHotkey-based Edgecution malware stagers (set36418917.ahk/.exe) and their associated file-drop events in unusual locations like user temp and downloads folders. This activity is associated with the threat actor UNC6692 following hands-on-keyboard access via Quick Assist.
This rule detects the presence of the Edgecution native_host.py Python backdoor by identifying specific, hardcoded code structures used for XOR deobfuscation. It specifically looks for the decryption loop combined with the registry lookup against 'HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Edge' used to derive the decryption key, as well as distinct function names and error strings associated with the malware's implementation.
Detects the JadeProx VBS stagers (script.vbs, pdf.vbs, Claude.vbs) launched via wscript.exe only when followed by the known suspicious child-process behavior - either the ftp.exe -s:script.dat alternate trigger, or the wscript.exe-spawned launch of the signed ServiceHub.DataWarehouseHost.exe binary used to sideload TriBack Loader. Matching on the VBS filename alone is too broad since wscript.exe executing .vbs scripts is common for legitimate admin/logon scripting; requiring the parent-child correlation to the follow-on suspicious action narrows the detection to the actual attack chain.
Detects a PowerShell or command shell process spawned directly by explorer.exe, consistent with a victim using the Win+R Run dialog to paste and execute a clipboard-borne command as instructed by a fake 'Webcam Compatibility'/'SECURITY WARNING'/'Zoom SDK Update' ClickFix modal. Tightened to reduce false positives from routine admin Run-dialog usage by excluding shell invocations that reference a saved script file (-File, .ps1/.bat/.vbs) or common IT support script/deployment paths, since a genuine ClickFix paste-execute is an inline one-off command typed/pasted directly into the Run box rather than a call to a maintained script. Analysts should additionally corroborate with a short-lived explorer.exe parent session (Run dialog opened immediately before the child process spawn) where session telemetry is available.
Detects the JadeProx VBS stagers (script.vbs, pdf.vbs, Claude.vbs) launched via wscript.exe only when followed by the known suspicious child-process behavior - either the ftp.exe -s:script.dat alternate trigger, or the wscript.exe-spawned launch of the signed ServiceHub.DataWarehouseHost.exe binary used to sideload TriBack Loader. Matching on the VBS filename alone is too broad since wscript.exe executing .vbs scripts is common for legitimate admin/logon scripting; requiring the parent-child correlation to the follow-on suspicious action narrows the detection to the actual attack chain.
Detects the macOS ClickFix dropper chain where curl fetches a disguised Mach-O payload (winapp.bin/ZoomSDK.bin) within a process chain that also shows an osascript decoy dialog or a self-deleting shell script, consistent with BlueNoroff's fake meeting-app installer delivery.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform reflective assembly loading of a payload that has been decrypted using AES and decompressed with GZip. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory while bypassing static file-based detection.
Detects scheduled task creation used for persistence by the TTF Trap phishing campaign. The obfuscated JScript dropper checks for the absence of next-stage files and a marker variable (e.g. 'YESSSSSSSS') before copying itself to %PUBLIC%\Libraries and spawning cmd.exe to run schtasks with a recurring minute-based interval referencing the dropped loader files in that folder. Broadened beyond the exact 'schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 15' pattern to also catch scheduled task creation referencing %PUBLIC%\Libraries with other minute intervals, and direct wscript.exe/cscript.exe execution of files staged under %PUBLIC%\Libraries as part of the marker-gated persistence check.
Detects the Grandoreiro Campaign 2 obfuscated VBS loader executed via wscript.exe / cscript.exe from a user-writable directory. The rule has been expanded to also detect additional Grandoreiro behaviors, including the spawning of Delphi payloads from AppData, WMI queries for AntiVirusProduct, browser kiosk mode execution, and potential DLL side-loading of abused legitimate executables (FastStone, MinGW, FreeMat, AbiWord).
Detects a specific attack chain where users are tricked into copying and pasting a malicious command (ClickFix) that downloads and executes a secondary stager named winPatch.zip via curl or wscript.exe, commonly associated with recent social engineering campaigns.
Detects execution, chmod, or invocation of the fuckaliyun.sh script used to disable Alibaba Cloud's Cloud Shield/Yundun host security monitoring agent, plus the associated iptables install added by JadeProx's modified variant of the script. Requires an actual execution context (direct invocation, chmod +x, or a bash/sh interpreter with the script as an argument or parent process) rather than any incidental string reference to 'fuckaliyun'.
Detects execution, chmod, or invocation of the fuckaliyun.sh script used to disable Alibaba Cloud's Cloud Shield/Yundun host security monitoring agent, plus the associated iptables install added by JadeProx's modified variant of the script. Requires an actual execution context (direct invocation, chmod +x, or a bash/sh interpreter with the script as an argument or parent process) rather than any incidental string reference to 'fuckaliyun'.
Detects suspicious execution patterns associated with the SleeperGem supply chain attack, where a compromised Gem install script (git_credential_manager-2.8.3/bin/install) spawns shell or PowerShell commands to trigger secondary malicious scripts like deploy.sh or redirects output to /dev/null.
Detects osascript executing AppleScript containing 'do shell script ... with administrator privileges' to elevate execution, where the osascript process was spawned by a non-shell parent process, consistent with the EtherHiding macOS loader technique.
Detects the BlueNoroff VBScript implant's C2-tasked execution engine — dual wscript.exe invocations with campaign-specific numeric arguments, or a curl-fetched secondary payload chained into cmd/WScript.Shell execution — excluding legitimate installer deployment tooling.
Detects execution of Lua/LuaJIT binaries, specifically luau.exe or lua(jit).exe, with command-line arguments referencing ico64.txt, or execution via application.cmd. This behavior is often associated with malware loaders attempting to execute secondary scripts or payloads.
Detects the JadeProx VBS stagers (script.vbs, pdf.vbs, Claude.vbs) launched via wscript.exe only when followed by the known suspicious child-process behavior - either the ftp.exe -s:script.dat alternate trigger, or the wscript.exe-spawned launch of the signed ServiceHub.DataWarehouseHost.exe binary used to sideload TriBack Loader. Matching on the VBS filename alone is too broad since wscript.exe executing .vbs scripts is common for legitimate admin/logon scripting; requiring the parent-child correlation to the follow-on suspicious action narrows the detection to the actual attack chain.
Detects the BlueNoroff VBScript implant discovering Telegram Web session files (IndexedDB LevelDB storage) via wscript/cscript, narrowed to invocations referencing the campaign's known implant filenames or numeric-suffixed staging variables to exclude unrelated browser or automation activity.
Detects suspicious delivery and execution chains characteristic of the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) group. The rule monitors for WScript, CScript, or CMD processes spawning PowerShell with evasive flags (hidden, bypass, encoded, etc.) accessing suspicious file paths, or the execution of a renamed AutoIt3 binary from non-standard locations like Temp or AppData, which are common indicators of stage-two downloader activity.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform webcam image capture by utilizing .NET reflection with 'System.Drawing' and 'System.Windows.Forms' namespaces. This technique has been identified as being used by the TOKYOCORE ransomware to perform victim surveillance by capturing and saving camera snapshots as PNG files.
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