Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of python.exe or pythonw.exe from the LogiOptionsPlus temporary directory within AppData. This behavior is atypical for standard Logitech software operation and may indicate the execution of arbitrary scripts or malicious payloads masquerading under a legitimate software path.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Photo Studio' or the execution of a VBScript file named 'PhotoStudio.vbs' located within a 'PhotoStudioVBS' folder, which are artifacts associated with the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) threat group to maintain persistence.
Detects suspicious delivery and execution chains characteristic of the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) group. The rule monitors for WScript, CScript, or CMD processes spawning PowerShell with evasive flags (hidden, bypass, encoded, etc.) accessing suspicious file paths, or the execution of a renamed AutoIt3 binary from non-standard locations like Temp or AppData, which are common indicators of stage-two downloader activity.
Detects the creation or modification of a registry run key entry that configures 'mshta.exe' to launch an HTA file, potentially from a remote URL. This technique is used for persistence and to proxy execution of malicious scripts via the legitimate mshta.exe utility.
Detects the LuaJIT interpreter (luajit.exe) or the AutoIt3 interpreter (AutoIt3.exe) being used to execute a file with a .ttf, .au3, or .a3x extension from %PUBLIC%\Libraries as a script argument. This technique is used in the TTF Trap campaign where a malicious Lua loader is disguised as a TrueType Font file and passed as a parameter to the dropped LuaJIT 2.1.0-beta3 interpreter, or alternatively executed via AutoIt3 as an equivalent execution vehicle, to evade detection.
Detects the creation or modification of a registry run key entry that configures 'mshta.exe' to launch an HTA file, potentially from a remote URL. This technique is used for persistence and to proxy execution of malicious scripts via the legitimate mshta.exe utility.
Detects the use of mshta.exe to fetch and execute remote content that subsequently spawns PowerShell, often utilizing techniques to obfuscate commands or load scripts in-memory. This behavior is indicative of fileless malware execution or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects Python process creation where the command line references base64, zlib, and ctypes libraries concurrently. This combination is frequently used by attackers to deobfuscate, decompress, and execute payloads dynamically in memory, often bypassing traditional file-based detection mechanisms.
MMC Spawning Windows Shell
Cortex XDR
Detects instances where the Microsoft Management Console (mmc.exe) launches suspicious child processes often associated with adversary activity, such as command shells, scripting engines, or system management utilities. This behavior is frequently used to proxy execution or perform unauthorized system modifications, with the exception of the standard Task Scheduler snap-in.
Detects the execution of JScript files via wscript.exe where the file name follows the 'wupd_' naming convention. This pattern is characteristic of LabubaRAT, which drops obfuscated or malicious scripts with this prefix to execute them using the Windows Script Host.
Detects Node.js processes spawning child Node.js processes where the command line references known IPFS gateways, the 'sync.js' script name, or specific Content Identifiers (CIDs) associated with Miasma malware or related decentralized distribution activity.
Detects the creation or modification of a registry run key entry that configures 'mshta.exe' to launch an HTA file, potentially from a remote URL. This technique is used for persistence and to proxy execution of malicious scripts via the legitimate mshta.exe utility.
Detects the LuaJIT interpreter (luajit.exe) or the AutoIt3 interpreter (AutoIt3.exe) being used to execute a file with a .ttf, .au3, or .a3x extension from %PUBLIC%\Libraries as a script argument. This technique is used in the TTF Trap campaign where a malicious Lua loader is disguised as a TrueType Font file and passed as a parameter to the dropped LuaJIT 2.1.0-beta3 interpreter, or alternatively executed via AutoIt3 as an equivalent execution vehicle, to evade detection.
Detects the use of mshta.exe to execute code directly from a remote URL that includes a numeric path segment. This behavior is often associated with the retrieval of HTA, VBScript, or JScript payloads from attacker-controlled servers, where the numeric path may indicate a versioned payload or a specific exploit delivery mechanism.
Detects potential execution of malicious HTA files or encoded PowerShell commands initiated from the Windows Explorer Run dialog. This behavior is consistent with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog to bypass security controls under the guise of verifying a fake CAPTCHA.
This rule detects the execution of Java JAR files from suspicious or unconventional directories (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Public folders). It filters out known build tools and CI/CD agents to focus on potentially malicious or unauthorized execution of JAR files that might indicate payload staging or execution in high-risk locations.
This rule detects two suspicious patterns: 1) Using the sc.exe utility to create a new Windows service configured to start at boot, often used for persistence or to execute malicious payloads with system privileges. 2) The execution of PowerShell.exe directly by the service control manager (services.exe), which is highly atypical for normal system operations and often indicates malicious script execution initiated as a service.
Detects malicious downloader activity where mshta.exe or a spawned runexe.bat script utilizes PowerShell's Net.WebClient to download and execute secondary payloads. This is a common pattern for stage-two malware delivery.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized database manipulation of the 'xadmin' platform, including suspicious administrative role modifications and deletions. It also monitors for suspicious Python script execution involving the 'bcrypt' library, which can be used to generate or verify password hashes in potentially malicious scripts.
Detects instances where the 'Werkbit' process initiates either 'curl' or 'bash' to download files from GitHub-related domains. This behavior is indicative of a living-off-the-land technique used to fetch secondary payloads or scripts during a post-exploitation phase.
Detects PowerShell scripts containing logic indicative of extracting payloads hidden via steganography (e.g., LSB or channel-based extraction from pixel data) combined with memory-based decryption. This behavior is commonly associated with stealthy malware loaders attempting to reconstruct malicious code from image files.
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