Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a multi-stage activity chain where a user performs a git clone, followed by Visual Studio Code, Node, or Python spawning a shell or interpreter, which then initiates a network connection to known suspicious staging infrastructure. This behavior is indicative of a developer machine being compromised to exfiltrate code or download malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious network activity from common scripting and runtime environments (Python, Node.js) that communicate with known blockchain-related infrastructure (e.g., Tron, Aptos). The rule flags processes that establish connections to multiple distinct external IP addresses while querying these specific domains, which may indicate cryptocurrency mining, wallet-stealing malware, or unauthorized distributed computing activity.
This rule detects scenarios where common web browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Edge, IE) launch Windows scripting hosts (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to execute .vbs files. This behavior is highly characteristic of drive-by download attacks or malicious browser-based content attempting to execute local scripts for further exploitation.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task via 'schtasks.exe' that specifically involves the 'MasterPackager.Updater' and execution of a 'script.vbs' file. This behavior is indicative of potential software deployment or persistence mechanisms utilizing VBScript within a scheduled task.
Detects instances where PowerShell.exe spawns Regasm.exe. Regasm.exe is a known Windows utility that can be abused to proxy execution of arbitrary code, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass application controls or execute malicious payloads.
Specifically flags Invoke-WebRequest being launched directly from the Explorer shell context, bypassing normal script delivery to pull the Potemkin loader.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools from common user-writable or temporary directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, Public). The rule further filters for processes commonly abused for payload delivery and command execution (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe), or processes containing typical obfuscation and download indicators, excluding benign system process initiators.
Detects multiple executions of wscript.exe or cscript.exe within an hour that involve command-line arguments containing business-related keywords (e.g., Invoice, Payment) and script extensions (.vbs or .vbe). This behavior is often indicative of automated malware staging, such as malicious macro-enabled documents spawning script engines.
Detects instances where package managers like npm, pip, or python execute shells or scripting interpreters with command-line arguments indicative of software installation or build processes. This pattern is common in supply chain attacks where malicious packages run code during their installation phase.
Detects anomalous process spawning where VS Code or Amazon Q language server processes (e.g., node, amazonq-lsp) execute shell utilities (e.g., bash, curl) with arguments related to .amazonq/mcp.json or specific credential/exfiltration commands. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of the MCP server auto-execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-12957).
Detects post-execution cleanup activities associated with Yuta/Glove stealer, including the deletion of files in PyInstaller temp directories (_MEI*), temporary paths, and the removal of specific stealer components (e.g., YutaCore.dll, SLaunch.exe) via command-line utilities like cmd.exe or PowerShell.
Detects suspicious child processes (such as PowerShell, CMD, or WScript) being spawned by Microsoft Office applications or email clients, which is indicative of exploitation activity consistent with Gamaredon spear-phishing campaigns. This specifically monitors for execution patterns attempting to deploy 'Ptero' family implants potentially following exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-8088.
Detects the execution of various suspicious file types (executable, scripts, shortcuts) from common Windows temporary directories (AppData\Local\Temp and Windows\Temp). The rule excludes common installers and binaries signed by reputable software publishers to reduce noise.
Detects instances where a Node.js process (invoked via npm) spawns suspicious secondary processes such as shell interpreters (cmd, powershell, sh, bash) or network utilities (curl, wget). This pattern is often indicative of malicious npm lifecycle scripts (e.g., preinstall, postinstall) attempting to perform system reconnaissance or download secondary payloads.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe, msiexec.exe, or cmd.exe initiated with command lines pointing to script files (.js, .vbs) or shortcut files (.lnk) located on removable drives (d-z drive letters). This behavior is characteristic of the Raspberry Robin worm spreading via infected USB media.
Detects the execution of Python scripts that include libraries (pynput, pyxhook) or functions (GetAsyncKeyState, WH_KEYBOARD_LL) frequently used by keyloggers to capture user keystrokes. It also monitors for suspicious input device access and command-line arguments indicative of keystroke monitoring.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/proxy execution tools (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are used to inject into other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe) using CreateRemoteThread. The detection is further refined by looking for command-line indicators often associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts.
Detects PowerShell reading image files and loading their contents directly into memory as .NET assemblies, a stealth technique used to hide malicious payloads inside benign-looking files.
This rule detects the installation of new Windows services (EventID 7045) where the service's executable path (ServiceFileName) contains common scripting interpreters like 'cmd', 'powershell', or 'wscript'. This pattern can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or execute malicious code via a newly created service that leverages scripting capabilities.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the OilRig threat group's BONDUPDATER/ALMA Communicator malware. It identifies suspicious, highly regular DNS TXT record queries (QueryType 16) originating from common system tools like nslookup.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe. The detection logic calculates the statistical regularity of query intervals to identify automated beaconing patterns, which is a hallmark of C2 communication using DNS tunneling or data exfiltration via DNS.
Detects the deletion or renaming of .jse (JScript Encoded) files by the Windows script hosts wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This activity is often associated with the cleanup of obfuscated scripts after they have been executed as part of a malicious campaign.
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