Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawn a hidden PowerShell process that includes '-decode' arguments targeting files within the C:\ProgramData directory. This pattern is characteristic of the Kimsuky threat group, specifically the NUKESPED JSE loader, which uses Windows Script Host to execute staged, base64-encoded payloads.
Detects evidence of file deletion activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED loader chain. The rule monitors for the execution of 'del' commands via cmd.exe initiated by script interpreters (wscript.exe, powershell.exe) to remove malicious artifacts such as .jse, .a9oc files, or specific executable names like zlrenu8.exe from the system, characteristic of post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects web browsers and browser-related applications (e.g., Chrome, Edge, ChatGPT, Electron apps) spawning suspicious child processes that are commonly used for command-line execution or script interpretation. This behavior is often indicative of malicious extensions, browser exploits, or attempts to leverage browser processes for initial execution or lateral movement.
Detects web browsers and browser-related applications (e.g., Chrome, Edge, ChatGPT, Electron apps) spawning suspicious child processes that are commonly used for command-line execution or script interpretation. This behavior is often indicative of malicious extensions, browser exploits, or attempts to leverage browser processes for initial execution or lateral movement.
Detects the execution of a JSE file by a script host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) followed by the immediate deletion of that same file within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a 'fileless' or 'dropper' style execution pattern where a script is executed to perform malicious activity and then self-deleted to remove artifacts.
Detects the execution of AppleScript files by the Script Editor application or the osascript utility, often associated with Maccy.scpt, which may indicate unauthorized script execution or automation attempts.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
This rule detects file creation or modification events associated with the Miasma campaign. It identifies specific payload files (e.g., .claude/setup.mjs, .vscode/tasks.json), the use of specific marker strings in file metadata or origin URLs, and obfuscated task configurations in VS Code directories that leverage bun or node to execute base64-encoded or character-encoded commands.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe with commands querying Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) classes (AntiVirusProduct, SecurityCenter2, Win32_Product) often used by the Grandoreiro banking trojan to identify installed security software and sandbox environments. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious parent-child relationships, such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or mshta.exe spawning wmic.exe, especially when the originating script or binary is unsigned or originating from non-standard paths like AppData.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell 7 by leveraging the JIT heap to patch internal AmsiUtils methods or manipulate System.Management.Automation AMSI fields.
Detects AI-powered development tools like Claude Code (running via node) spawning shell interpreters, executing common setup/configuration scripts, or invoking network utilities during project initialization. This activity is indicative of indirect prompt injection attacks where an adversary lures an AI agent into executing malicious code from a repository.
Detects AI coding agents (such as Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot CLI, etc.) spawning shell interpreters (bash, cmd, powershell) to execute installation or configuration scripts from within git-cloned repository directories. This activity is indicative of indirect prompt injection attacks where an adversary manipulates the agent into autonomously running malicious setup code.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes common npm lifecycle scripts (e.g., preinstall, postinstall) that subsequently spawn suspicious child processes such as shell interpreters, network utilities, or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of malicious packages (such as those associated with the Trum3it campaign) attempting to download or execute secondary payloads during the installation phase.
Detects the creation or manipulation of WMI event subscriptions using wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or mofcomp.exe. These tools are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence by triggering malicious code execution via WMI event filters, consumers, and bindings.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
Detects PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe that explicitly uses the '-WindowStyle Hidden' parameter, a technique observed with the Potemkin loader to mask its execution.
Detects reconnaissance activities where known binary analysis tools or scripts scan the AnyDesk 9.7.6 runtime binary for specific PE markers (e.g., COM interface IDs, adprinterpipe string) associated with a known LPE vulnerability. This behavior indicates an attacker is fingerprinting the application to prepare for exploitation.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters spawned by code editors or runtime environments (e.g., VS Code, Cursor, Node.js) with specific command-line arguments involving 'init'. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to leverage development tools to execute custom scripts, potentially for automated deployment, persistence, or malicious payload initialization.
Detects suspicious behaviors during npm package lifecycle events, specifically node.exe spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) or initiating network connections to known malicious or suspicious domains typically associated with npm supply chain attacks.
This rule detects potentially malicious self-upgrade patterns in Node.js applications, specifically monitoring for the execution of scripts like 'sync-peer.cjs', the use of 'BACKUP_TARGET_VERSION' environment variables, or npm packaging commands initiated via lifecycle hooks (e.g., 'postinstall'). These behaviors are characteristic of supply chain attacks or automated persistence mechanisms that attempt to replace or upgrade application code during the installation or execution process.
Detects network activity and process execution patterns associated with the Amadey loader and Operation FlutterBridge. The rule monitors for unauthorized file downloads from self-hosted GitLab repositories using raw paths, delivery of malicious archives like 'protected.zip', and the execution of common downloaders (PowerShell, cmd, curl, wget) triggered by known Amadey process artifacts (Yfgfwb.exe).
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