Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious process creations where common system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, lsass.exe, winlogon.exe) act as parent processes for scripting or command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe) and the child process runs with a low or untrusted integrity level. This pattern can indicate process injection or other forms of malicious execution where an attacker attempts to hide their activity by masquerading as legitimate system processes.
This rule detects the execution of node.exe or npm.cmd where the command-line arguments include specific indicators associated with suspicious third-party libraries, typosquatted packages, or known malicious domains. These indicators often point to unauthorized external dependencies or potential supply chain attack patterns in JavaScript-based environments.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with Microsoft Outlook, specifically targeting registry modifications related to Outlook security settings or suspicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by outlook.exe.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage Windows Forms or GDI APIs (e.g., System.Windows.Forms.Screen, System.Drawing.Bitmap, CopyFromScreen) to perform screen capture. Adversaries often use these native .NET capabilities to capture desktop screenshots during post-exploitation.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage Windows Forms or GDI APIs (e.g., System.Windows.Forms.Screen, System.Drawing.Bitmap, CopyFromScreen) to perform screen capture. Adversaries often use these native .NET capabilities to capture desktop screenshots during post-exploitation.
This rule detects the execution of specific Python scripts associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign. These scripts include 'spray_da.py' (domain admin password spray), 'smb_test.py' (SMB validation/lateral movement), 'spider.py' (Active Directory crawler), and 'ad_full_audit.py' (Active Directory full audit). Detection is based on the Python executable (python.exe, python3, etc.) running with these script names in the command line or as the executed file.
Detects the execution of multimedia capturing utilities like ffmpeg or OBS Studio when spawned by common scripting or administrative processes. This pattern often indicates unauthorized screen, audio, or video recording potentially used in data exfiltration or reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of multimedia capturing utilities like ffmpeg or OBS Studio when spawned by common scripting or administrative processes. This pattern often indicates unauthorized screen, audio, or video recording potentially used in data exfiltration or reconnaissance.
Detects instances where the Windows script hosts wscript.exe or cscript.exe establish outbound network connections to common web ports (HTTP/HTTPS) on external IP addresses. This behavior is frequently associated with script-based malware, droppers, or C2 beacons.
This rule detects potential web shell activity on ColdFusion or IIS servers by monitoring for the creation of known malicious file names typically associated with web shells and the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, whoami.exe, powershell.exe) by common web server worker processes (w3wp.exe, coldfusion.exe, jrun.exe). It also identifies suspicious command-line patterns referencing the web root directory.
Detects reconnaissance activity where an adversary uses common administrative utilities (e.g., wmic, powershell, tasklist, sc, reg) to identify installed security software, antivirus products, or monitoring agents on a Windows system. This activity is often a precursor to defense evasion or impairment.
Detects the execution of command-line interfaces (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe) when spawned by common browser processes or Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for drive-by downloads or malicious scripts executed via the browser, characterized by command lines containing download indicators (e.g., Invoke-Expression, curl, certutil, encoded commands).
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote) launching command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This pattern is often associated with macro-based malicious code execution.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious executable or script files (.exe, .lnk, .vbs, .ps1, .hta) or autorun.inf files on removable drives (D-Z) initiated by common script interpreters or suspicious processes. This activity is then correlated with prior detections of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM/Primitive Bear) implant activity, such as Ptero-family malware, specific obfuscated PowerShell patterns, or HTML smuggling delivery via mail/Office clients on the same host within a 24-hour window.
Detects suspicious execution of Node.js processes initiated by VS Code (or Cursor) that appear to be running JavaScript payloads disguised as font files (.woff2) or other suspicious assets. It also monitors for the creation or modification of '.vscode/tasks.json' files by package managers or source control tools, which could indicate the configuration of malicious 'folderOpen' tasks used for persistence or automated execution upon workspace opening.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe) initiated by mmc.exe or explorer.exe, excluding known legitimate Microsoft Management Console (MMC) flags and common management snap-ins. This pattern is indicative of potential proxy execution or misuse of system administration utilities to run unauthorized code.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys that point to files within user-writable directories (AppData or Temp). This behavior is correlated with preceding execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Node, or CMD) on the same endpoint, which is a common pattern for dropper or RAT installation stages.
This rule detects potential attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for the loading of amsi.dll in suspicious processes, combined with behavioral indicators such as execution from user-writable paths, child process creation, or outbound network connections, and the presence of strings associated with common AMSI bypass techniques.
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior involving the creation of autorun.inf files on removable drives combined with the execution of VBScripts from removable media using wscript.exe, indicative of a worm propagating via USB devices.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where a web browser (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox) spawns suspicious child processes (e.g., mshta.exe, wscript.exe) with command-line arguments that include indicators of script execution, remote code download, or command invocation, which is a common pattern in drive-by download attacks and malicious link execution.
Microsoft Secure Score added a recommendation to block outbound traffic from mshta.exe in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. This reduces risk from attacks using mshta.exe, requires admin action to enable, and impacts compliance monitoring and data access.
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