Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where Microsoft Excel (excel.exe) acts as a parent process for suspicious child processes, including command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe), scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe), or binary proxies (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe). This pattern is commonly associated with weaponized office documents executing malicious payloads via macros or other embedded scripts.
Detects suspicious execution of Python or shell scripts (bash, zsh, sh) from paths associated with 'openclaw' or 'clawhub' that are interacting with sensitive data files, including browser credential stores (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave), system keychains, and cryptocurrency wallet files.
Detects Add-AppxPackage -Register against a manifest on a UNC path. Legitimate loose-file registration during development points at local paths; a UNC InstalledLocation is the core of UNCanny - it hands the SYSTEM Windows Store InstallService a LoadLibraryW on an attacker-controlled UNC via plugin resolution.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the 'node-gyp' build tool used by npm. It monitors for two patterns: 1) npm spawning node-gyp, which can be an automated trigger for malicious binding.gyp files, and 2) node-gyp spawning node.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated JavaScript (e.g., base64 encoding, eval, AES-GCM patterns), a technique often seen in malicious Node.js packages.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Access, Publisher) spawning common command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used as an initial access vector to execute arbitrary code.
Detects the abuse of the Windows utility mshta.exe to execute potentially malicious scripts or remote HTML applications (HTA). The rule looks for command-line arguments involving remote URL fetches (HTTP/HTTPS/UNC) or inline script execution (vbscript/javascript), which are common techniques for bypassing security controls and executing payloads.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious queries against Windows Registry paths known to contain sensitive information, including security hives (SAM, SECURITY), application-specific secrets (PuTTY, OpenSSH, RealVNC), and system autologon credentials. It monitors both command-line executions of 'reg.exe' and PowerShell commands targeting these registry keys.
Detects attempts to disable the Windows Firewall using the netsh command-line utility or PowerShell cmdlets, as well as registry modifications related to firewall profiles. Adversaries often perform this action to impair host-based security controls and facilitate unauthorized inbound or outbound network traffic.
Detects a script interpreter deleting a downloaded HTA, JavaScript, PowerShell, or batch file after persistence has been created. This behavior is often associated with malware like InstallFix to remove initial infection artifacts.
Detects programmatic file downloads from SharePoint and OneDrive using automation tools like PowerShell, PnP, Graph SDK, Python, Node.js, or generic CLI tools (curl, wget) rather than typical browser access. This can indicate data exfiltration.
Detects Node.js processes launched via command line with potentially obfuscated or malicious code patterns. This includes the use of eval-like flags combined with JavaScript memory management or network-related library imports, as well as command lines containing unusually long hex-encoded strings or base64-encoded blocks often used by attackers to hide payloads.
Detects AMOS malware presenting a fake System Preferences password dialog via osascript to harvest user credentials, followed by validation using dscl -authonly. This is a key technique in the macOS ClickFix campaign delivering Atomic macOS Stealer.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh.exe with an encoded command. Adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate their malicious scripts and evade detection. The rule specifically looks for the '-EncodedCommand' or '-enc' parameter followed by a base64-encoded string of at least 20 characters.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes 'protocal.cjs' from 'NodePackages' paths, subsequently spawning child processes that perform host reconnaissance activities. This includes PowerShell commands querying registry keys related to installed software or listing applications.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious queries against Windows Registry paths known to contain sensitive information, including security hives (SAM, SECURITY), application-specific secrets (PuTTY, OpenSSH, RealVNC), and system autologon credentials. It monitors both command-line executions of 'reg.exe' and PowerShell commands targeting these registry keys.
Detects Node.js executing the malicious setup.cjs script or easy-day-js with the --no-warnings flag, associated with the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
Detects a PowerShell process initiated by node.exe that attempts to reflectively load a .NET assembly from memory. The detection specifically looks for keywords related to .NET Reflection, byte array loading, and a known C2 domain (hellolargeworld.com), along with the 'Extension.SubRoutine.Run2' invocation, indicating potential backdoor activity.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Access, Publisher) spawning common command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used as an initial access vector to execute arbitrary code.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) initiates execution of suspicious binaries such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or other scripting tools. This behavior is a common indicator of web shell exploitation on internet-facing servers like Microsoft Exchange or SharePoint.
Detects the execution of VBScript files containing 'ragecore' in the command line, specifically when launched via wscript.exe or cscript.exe from common staging or persistence directories such as Windows Temp, Users Public, or Startup folders.
This rule detects file creation or modification events associated with the Miasma campaign. It identifies specific payload files (e.g., .claude/setup.mjs, .vscode/tasks.json), the use of specific marker strings in file metadata or origin URLs, and obfuscated task configurations in VS Code directories that leverage bun or node to execute base64-encoded or character-encoded commands.
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