Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,009 detections
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Detects instances where Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) spawns PowerShell or CMD. This pattern is commonly observed in malicious document loaders or script-based droppers, such as those associated with the LokiBot malware, which use JScript files to initiate secondary payload execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts from the Windows Temp directory using common evasion flags (-NoProfile, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, -WindowStyle Hidden). This pattern is consistent with loaders attempting to maintain persistence while obfuscating their execution context, specifically associated with steganographic malware campaigns.
Detects the ClickFix social engineering technique where a user is coerced into copying and executing a malicious script from a web browser. The rule identifies instances where common web browsers spawn script interpreters such as powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, or wscript.exe, which is characteristic of the user pasting malicious commands into a command prompt interface.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks using utilities like schtasks.exe or at.exe that are followed by the execution of script-based interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, or WScript). This pattern is commonly indicative of an attacker establishing persistence by scheduling malicious scripts to run automatically.
Detects the execution of the NetSupport Manager remote access tool (client32.exe) when spawned by web browsers or script interpreters such as PowerShell or MSHTA. This behavioral pattern is frequently associated with malicious delivery chains including ClickFix and CastleLoader, where users are social engineered into downloading or executing suspicious payloads.
Detects command-line activity containing keywords related to API hooking (e.g., SetWindowsHookEx, hook, inline, trampoline) initiated by common scripting interpreters like powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or rundll32.exe. This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to inject code or capture data by intercepting process function calls.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Windows Defender via command-line utilities, PowerShell scripts, or registry modifications. This includes stopping services (sc/net), modifying Defender preferences (Set-MpPreference), and tampering with policy registry keys.
Correlates the BackgroundFix script execution with the unauthorized dropping and unpacking of malicious browser extensions into Chrome/Edge local app data paths. Specifically, it detects file creation events in browser extension directories when initiated by 'wscript.exe'.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features, including real-time, behavior, and script scanning monitoring, as well as modifications to the 'DisableAntiSpyware' registry key, disabling system recovery via bcdedit, or execution of common scripts used to disable Windows Defender.
This rule detects instances where common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE, Brave, Opera) spawn common administrative or scripting shells (PowerShell, CMD, mshta, wscript, cscript). This pattern is frequently indicative of drive-by downloads or malicious file execution triggered by social engineering, where an attacker leverages the browser process to spawn execution environments to run malicious scripts or payloads.
This rule detects instances where the WhatsApp Desktop application (WhatsApp.exe) spawns suspicious child processes commonly used for scripting or command execution, such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or rundll32.exe. It specifically excludes known legitimate update and service-related command lines to reduce false positives. This behavior could indicate a phishing attempt or malware execution originating from a compromised WhatsApp session.
Detects a user mounting a deceptive .dmg file that invokes a hidden .sh or .command script upon opening. This rule specifically looks for the 'hdiutil' process attaching a disk image and then correlates it with a process executing a hidden shell script (.sh or .command) from a mounted volume.
Detects non-browser applications (Python, PowerShell, cURL, wget, node) communicating directly with OpenAI or ChatGPT API endpoints, indicative of automated AI tradecraft by threat actors. This rule specifically looks for network connections to api.openai.com initiated by these common scripting or command-line tools.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts (.ps1) that were recently created in the AppData\Local\Temp directory. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with parameters indicating a hidden window, no profile loading, and a bypass execution policy, which are common characteristics of malicious PowerShell activity.
Detects suspicious process creations (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta, Wscript) originating from web browsers, explorer.exe (likely from the Run dialog), or rundll32.exe. This pattern is often associated with social engineering attacks like 'ClickFix' where users are tricked into pasting malicious commands.
Detects the execution of the 'RevS.ps1' PowerShell reverse shell, identified by its filename, SHA256 hash, or characteristic command-line arguments such as encoded commands or the use of 'ExecutionPolicy Bypass' combined with download cradle patterns (IEX, Invoke-Expression, DownloadString).
Detects the loading of System.Management.Automation.dll by processes that are not standard PowerShell executables (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell_ise.exe). This behavior is indicative of in-process PowerShell execution, potentially leveraging techniques like SHEETCREEP's RunspaceFactory.CreateRunspace(). The rule specifically looks for processes loading this DLL from suspicious paths like AppData or if the process is 'vaultsvc.exe', and further filters out cases where a powershell.exe child process is spawned, to reduce false positives.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with the TONResolver campaign where PowerShell is used to execute a Node.js-based RAT payload from a non-standard location in AppData\Local\Nodejs. This pattern monitors for the parent-child relationship where PowerShell launches a specific node.exe instance containing JavaScript file execution flags.
Detects anomalous PowerShell process execution by monitoring for indicators of obfuscation, use of download cradles, and execution from suspicious parent processes. This detection specifically aligns with techniques associated with the Millenium RAT C++ v4.x stagers, flagging processes that exhibit multiple risk indicators simultaneously.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with LegionLoader malware, specifically tracking files and processes interacting with the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. It triggers on the staging of '_socket.pyd', execution of Python interpreters from this directory, and associated C2 communication attempts with the domain 'birdeemusic.com'.
Detects Python scripts or interpreters executing network connections while residing in or interacting with non-standard, potentially suspicious directories or domains. This rule specifically monitors for Python processes (python.exe, pythonw.exe) associated with 'Traiolx Custom Utils', paths within 'AppData\Roaming\python', or network interactions with 'birdeemusic.com' and a specific hardcoded IP address, which are indicative of potential beaconing or command and control activity.
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