Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious commands launched directly from the Windows File Explorer address bar. By analyzing DeviceProcessEvents, it identifies when explorer.exe spawns common command-line utilities (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, etc.) with arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as remote script downloads, encoded commands, or bypass flags.
Detects native Windows command and scripting interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) initiating external network connections to multiple distinct IP addresses, which is often an indicator of automated C2 beaconing or lateral movement activity.
This rule detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to run JavaScript (.js) or VBScript (.vbs) files located in common user-writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Documents. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious scripts dropped as part of phishing attacks or initial access vectors.
This rule detects pre-payload beaconing activity associated with the Meow RAT malware. It covers both network-based detection (outbound HTTP POST to known C2 domains and paths) and endpoint-based detection. Endpoint detection includes 'curl' processes communicating with known C2 infrastructure, 'osascript' processes spawned in the context of 'curl' C2 communication, and 'curl' commands using specific flags ('-k', '-s') along with a known build hash. This activity typically occurs before the main destructive payload is delivered.
Detects the PowerShell downloader stage of the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting campaign. The malware decodes an AES-encrypted blob in the npm package and executes powershell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass targeting settings.ps1, or invokes curl.exe (from node.exe or powershell.exe) to download a payload from nvidiadriver.net disguised as a Windows driver update.
Detects modifications to Registry Run or RunOnce keys that include references to 'ManageEngine' or 'SystemOptimizer' and attempt to execute scripting hosts like wscript, cscript, powershell, or cmd. This behavior is indicative of persistence mechanisms often used by adversaries.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with web browser processes, including the execution of Python scripts, the loading of browser extensions from non-standard directories like AppData or Temp, the creation of Python scripts by browsers in temp folders, and outbound network connections by Python processes following browser activity. These patterns are often associated with browser-based exploitation, extension-based malware, or initial access stages where a browser is used as a conduit for malicious code execution.
Detects the execution of common Windows system information discovery utilities (systeminfo, hostname, ver) when spawned by command interpreters or scripting engines, which is a common behavior in post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
This rule detects processes attempting to access or manipulate Windows clipboard data, often used by adversaries to steal sensitive information copied by users. It monitors common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, WScript, CScript, and MSHTA executing clipboard-related functions or interacting with clip.exe.
This rule detects processes attempting to access or manipulate Windows clipboard data, often used by adversaries to steal sensitive information copied by users. It monitors common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, WScript, CScript, and MSHTA executing clipboard-related functions or interacting with clip.exe.
Detects the execution of specific Python scripts associated with the FortiBleed campaign. These scripts include 'spray_da.py' for domain admin password spraying, 'smb_test.py' for SMB validation and lateral movement, 'spider.py' for Active Directory crawling, and 'ad_full_audit.py' for Active Directory auditing. Detection is based on the Python interpreter executing these specific script filenames.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh.exe with an encoded command. Adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate their malicious scripts and evade detection. The rule specifically looks for the '-EncodedCommand' or '-enc' parameter followed by a base64-encoded string of at least 20 characters.
Detects programmatic file downloads from SharePoint and OneDrive using automation tools like PowerShell, PnP, Graph SDK, Python, Node.js, or generic CLI tools (curl, wget) rather than typical browser access. This can indicate data exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to high-volume Server Message Block (SMB) share enumeration and the execution of a specific Python script named 'backup_dfs.py'. It combines three detection logics: identifying processes executing 'backup_dfs.py', detecting an unusual number of SMB network connections to common administrative shares (SYSVOL, NETLOGON, DFS), and flagging high-volume SMB-related identity directory events targeting SYSVOL or NETLOGON. This behavior could indicate an adversary performing discovery of network shares, collecting data, or preparing for data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with arguments containing URLs, script languages (vbscript, javascript), or .hta file extensions, which is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious code via a legitimate Windows utility.
Identifies execution of the Windows PowerShell cradle used by GLASSWORM's WASM loader. It looks for 'irm' fetching a URL containing the specific '/win32/i/_' path structure, piped to 'iex'.
Detects JavaScript using the 'ghost_once_footer_' key with localStorage read and write operations, indicative of potential web-based attacks leveraging compromised Ghost CMS instances. This rule specifically looks for the string 'ghost_once_footer_' in conjunction with 'localStorage.getItem' and 'localStorage.setItem', suggesting a mechanism for persistent or one-time data storage in the browser's local storage.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to run script files (.vbs, .js, .wsf, .hta) located in commonly abused writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor executing scripts that have been dropped onto the system as part of a phishing campaign or other attack vector.
Detects the execution of 'osascript' with command-line arguments indicative of a credential phishing attempt, specifically looking for prompts that display a dialog asking for a password with a hidden answer field. This is associated with the Sapphire Sleet threat actor's macOS intrusion techniques.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to execute code via remote URLs, JavaScript, or specific DLL functions known to be abused for proxy execution. This behavior is commonly associated with fileless malware and living-off-the-land techniques to bypass security controls by utilizing legitimate Windows binaries.
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