Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects regsvr32 with silent, unregister, or scriptlet options referencing a remote or user-writable resource. This behavior is often associated with malware like InstallFix to execute malicious code.
Detects indicators of an npm infostealer campaign, specifically identifying the execution of obfuscated JavaScript payloads disguised as font files (e.g., fa-solid-400.woff2) or eslint-loaders by Node.js, and the creation of a '_V' file used as a persistence marker to prevent redundant execution.
Detects attempts to invoke 'sudo' for privilege escalation or enumeration from non-interactive contexts such as scripts, scripting language interpreters, or web/application service processes. It also identifies 'sudo -l' or '--list' commands used for privilege enumeration.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanism installation by monitoring the creation of registry values in 'Run' or 'RunOnce' keys, followed by the execution of 'powershell.exe' or 'wscript.exe' on the same host within a 5-minute window.
Detects a potential multi-stage attack sequence where a file (archive or browser-related) is executed, followed by a script interpreter (wscript/cscript), and finally followed by a remote connection to common remote access ports (RDP, FTP, SMB, SSH). The rule correlates these events within a specific timeframe per device to identify likely lateral movement or remote command and control initialization.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (mshta, wscript, cscript) or PowerShell initiated by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This pattern is a common indicator of malicious macro or embedded script execution, often used to deliver secondary payloads.
This rule detects the execution of common scripting interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) that include command-line arguments referencing major cloud storage providers and file-hosting services. This behavior is frequently associated with data exfiltration or the staging of malicious payloads using legitimate web services.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload.
Detects the initial stage of the Meow RAT ClickFix campaign, specifically targeting fileless zsh loaders. This rule identifies command-line executions involving 'zsh', 'bash', or 'sh' that combine 'eval', 'base64', 'gzip', and either 'curl' or 'osascript', often with redirection to /dev/null. This pattern is indicative of a gzip+base64 encoded heredoc being fetched via curl and executed in memory, followed by osascript for further actions.
Detects the Gamaredon PteroVDoor malware chain, including initial execution of obfuscated VBScript files from Office applications or temporary folders, the spawning of PowerShell with obfuscated arguments, subsequent C2 communication over common ports to dynamic DNS domains, and secondary WMI event subscription persistence.
Detects execution chains attributed to the Gamaredon threat group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM). The rule monitors Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Equation Editor) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, where the child process contains suspicious patterns such as base64 blobs, script download commands, or known Gamaredon Ptero-toolset strings (PteroPaste, PteroVDoor, PteroDee). This activity is correlated with a network connection to non-Microsoft infrastructure within 60 seconds of process execution.
Detects USB-based lateral movement and persistence techniques associated with the Gamaredon group (PteroOdd/PteroPaste). The rule monitors for the connection of removable media followed by the creation of LNK files targeting AppData/Temp directories or UNC paths by specific processes (Office, Scripting engines, PowerShell), and the subsequent creation or modification of autorun.inf files on the same removable device.
Detects the multi-stage execution chain associated with the Gamaredon group's PteroEffigy loader. The rule monitors for PowerShell or scriptrunner instances originating from suspicious directories (AppData/Temp) that employ .NET reflection to load DLLs into memory. It then detects the subsequent creation of a scheduled task with a random alphanumeric name and the eventual execution of regsvr32 or rundll32 by that task to load the malicious DLL. Additionally, the rule identifies potential command-and-control activity by detecting specific Kazuar malware HTTP User-Agent strings.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the Gamaredon Group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM) involving the Ptero-family of malware. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of encoded PowerShell commands (using -EncodedCommand, IEX, or FromBase64String), registry modification to Windows Run/RunOnce keys referencing suspicious interpreters (wscript, mshta, powershell, rundll32) within user profile paths, and command-line indicators of C2 activity such as DownloadString/WebClient or specific .ru/.online domain patterns.
Detects the macOS script reading a downloaded text file, decoding the Base64 contents, and piping it to execution.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) spawning command-line interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WScript). This behavior is characteristic of malicious macros or exploitation attempts where Office applications execute shell commands to facilitate second-stage payload delivery or system compromise.
This rule detects suspicious execution of VBScript or VBE files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the command line contains keywords commonly associated with financial documents or urgent requests. A high count (3 or more) of such events from a single device within an hour is considered anomalous, potentially indicating a phishing attempt or malware execution.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe when invoked with command-line arguments indicative of script execution (e.g., vbscript:, javascript:, http(s)://) or when spawned by common Microsoft Office applications. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious document-based attacks, where office macros trigger mshta to download or execute obfuscated code.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
Correlates WScript execution terminating early if analysis environments are detected, before transitioning to PowerShell. This rule identifies a pattern where 'wscript.exe' executes and is quickly followed by 'powershell.exe' within a two-minute window, suggesting a potential anti-analysis technique used by malware like Vidar to evade detection in sandboxed environments.
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