Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell or command-line modification of Defender real-time monitoring immediately before ransomware activity. This rule specifically looks for commands that disable real-time monitoring within Microsoft Defender.
Detects a game-related child process collecting username, language, timezone, keyboard layout, and regional settings in one sequence. This rule specifically looks for command-line executions using 'cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe', or 'wmic.exe' that include commands like 'whoami', 'Get-WinSystemLocale', 'Get-TimeZone', 'Get-WinUserLanguageList', 'keyboard layout', or 'Win32_TimeZone'.
Detects a multi-stage in-memory delivery chain associated with Operation Poisson, where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe to load and execute the Havoc Demon agent in memory via a VBScript stager.
Detects the execution of Python scripts that include libraries (pynput, pyxhook) or functions (GetAsyncKeyState, WH_KEYBOARD_LL) frequently used by keyloggers to capture user keystrokes. It also monitors for suspicious input device access and command-line arguments indicative of keystroke monitoring.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt as child processes spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, where the parent process command line indicates a JavaScript file being executed from the AppData or Temp directories. This behavior is highly characteristic of the Gootloader malware dropper, which leverages script engines to initiate subsequent malicious stages.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt as child processes spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, where the parent process command line indicates a JavaScript file being executed from the AppData or Temp directories. This behavior is highly characteristic of the Gootloader malware dropper, which leverages script engines to initiate subsequent malicious stages.
This rule detects potential supply chain compromise involving typosquatted npm packages. It monitors for the execution of npm packages with names closely resembling legitimate libraries (e.g., 'thirdweb', 'rainbownkit'), followed by suspicious post-install scripts that attempt to initiate network connections to known malicious domains or modify sensitive files.
Detects suspicious child process execution originating from Node.js environments. The rule monitors for common package installation scripts (e.g., postinstall) or suspicious command-line indicators associated with known malicious patterns, such as domain connections, library masquerading, and unauthorized script execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution chains (-nop, -w hidden, iex (gc) used in ClickFix RAT delivery.
Identifies PowerShell executing scripts or expressions from the ProgramData directory, which may indicate malicious staging or backdoor execution. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes where the command line includes 'C:\ProgramData\' and also contains keywords like 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', or '.ps1', suggesting the execution of a script or expression.
Detects calls to NtAllocateVirtualMemory originating from scripting engines or binaries executing from temporary user-controlled locations. This behavior is commonly associated with reflective loading, shellcode execution, and in-memory malware.
Identifies the creation of PowerShell or batch files in unusual ProgramData subdirectories by command-line interpreters, which may indicate malware staging or persistence preparation.
Detects the creation of PowerShell or batch scripts within the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common location abused by malware for payload staging and persistence. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is cmd.exe or powershell.exe and the file extension is either .ps1 or .bat.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity involving 'cscript' or 'wscript' (Windows Script Host) combined with keywords like 'download', 'execute', or 'powershell'. A high count of such events (3 or more within 5 minutes) from the same computer and account is flagged, indicating potential exploit kit activity, malicious script execution, or initial access attempts.
This rule detects a high volume of PowerShell or Command Prompt executions from a single computer by a single account within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an APT-style multi-stage attack pattern where an adversary is executing numerous commands in quick succession, potentially for discovery, execution, or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for command lines containing 'powershell' and '-enc' (encoded command) or 'cmd' and '/c' (execute command and terminate).
Detects suspicious execution patterns indicative of ransomware utilizing batch scripts. This rule triggers when 'cmd.exe' or 'powershell.exe' execute at least 5 times within a 5-minute window, with command lines containing '.bat', '.cmd', or '/c', suggesting automated script execution often seen in ransomware attacks.
This rule detects suspicious execution of common scripting interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe, python.exe) from temporary directories (Temp, AppData, %TEMP%). A high count (5 or more) of such events within an hour for a given computer and account is considered suspicious, indicating potential malicious activity like malware execution or persistence.
Detects execution of mshta.exe with command line arguments containing web-related indicators (http) or scripting engines (vbscript, javascript). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using mshta.exe as a proxy to execute remote malicious payloads or inline scripts, effectively bypassing application controls and browser security contexts.
Detects the execution of VBScript, JavaScript, or HTA files via cscript.exe or wscript.exe when the script file originates from suspicious locations such as AppData, Temp, or via URL/network paths. The rule filters out scripts launched by known trusted publishers to minimize noise from legitimate system or application activity.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments typically used for proxy execution of scripts or malicious DLL functions (javascript:, vbscript:, ShellExec_RunDLL, LaunchINFSection), which is a common technique used by attackers to bypass security controls and execute arbitrary code, excluding instances involving comsvcs.dll.
Detects instances where Microsoft Teams (teams.exe) initiates child processes that are commonly used as interpreters, such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, or rundll32.exe. This activity is frequently associated with the execution of malicious payloads delivered via phishing or collaboration platforms.
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