Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
769 detections
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Detects the installation and execution of the Cloudflare tunnel utility (cloudflared) as a Windows service. This behavior has been observed in Akira ransomware intrusions, where attackers use cloudflared to create a covert C2 tunnel and obscure RDP sessions by routing traffic through Cloudflare, effectively masking the true origin of connections to the compromised host.
Detects behaviors associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the dropping of .sys driver files into non-canonical directories, the registration and execution of kernel services via sc.exe, the use of fltMC to load filter drivers, and the loading of driver modules from non-standard locations.
This rule detects SMB traffic indicative of remote service creation over the SVCCTL named pipe, a pattern characteristic of tools like PsExec used for lateral movement and remote code execution.
Detects the dropping, service creation, or execution of known vulnerable drivers and associated BYOVD tools. These tools are used by The Gentlemen RaaS group to escalate privileges to kernel level and terminate endpoint security products.
Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers (rwdrv.sys, hlpdrv.sys) used for potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, accompanied by evidence of antivirus tampering through process execution or the creation of suspicious directories related to AV killing utilities.
This rule monitors Linux-based SD-WAN infrastructure (vManage, vSmart, vBond) for suspicious persistence mechanisms, unauthorized account creation, unauthorized SSH key modifications, credential file tampering, and rogue configuration changes related to OMP/IPSec peering and unauthorized tenant-list uploads.
Detects the installation and operation of the RustDesk remote access tool as a persistent Windows service. This behavior has been identified in the Akira ransomware intrusion chain where adversaries utilize remote access tools for post-compromise persistence and control. The rules monitor for service creation via command-line utilities (sc.exe, PowerShell), registry modifications related to service configurations, and Windows Service Control Manager events (Event ID 7045) that register RustDesk as a persistent system service.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities by monitoring Windows Event Logs for suspicious network logons combined with service installations typical of post-exploitation tools like Impacket (psexec.py, wmiexec.py, smbexec.py). It flags service names and paths that match known tool patterns, specifically looking for high-frequency lateral movement attempts within a 30-minute window, including specific command-line indicators in service image paths.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying users who, within a short timeframe (90 seconds) of their first recorded network logon (EventID 4624, Logon Type 3), perform suspicious follow-up activities such as explicit credentials usage (4648), network share access (5140), or remote service installation (7045).
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying users who, within a short timeframe (90 seconds) of their first recorded network logon (EventID 4624, Logon Type 3), perform suspicious follow-up activities such as explicit credentials usage (4648), network share access (5140), or remote service installation (7045).
This rule monitors for indicators of Impacket toolset usage across multiple data sources, including named pipe access (Event 5145), service creation (Event 7045), scheduled task creation (Event 4698), and process execution (Event 1). It flags suspicious activity associated with modules like secretsdump, wmiexec, psexec, and smbexec, aggregating findings by source host and user to evaluate the breadth of potential unauthorized activity.
This rule detects the installation of a new Windows service by monitoring Security Event IDs 4697 and 601. It extracts details about the service name, file path, and account used. The rule flags services that have suspicious binary paths, such as those within user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads) or paths containing common living-off-the-land binaries, which may indicate persistence or the loading of malicious drivers.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045) where the service executable path contains both 'System32' and 'svchost', and the service description is either empty or contains 'Network'. This combination of characteristics can indicate the installation of a malicious service, potentially a backdoor or trojan, attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system service.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows service where the service type is set to 'kernel' via the sc.exe command-line utility. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to load a kernel driver or perform low-level system modifications, which is often used by rootkits or malicious drivers. The rule filters out known trusted publishers to reduce noise.
Detects GreenBlood ransomware attempting to establish persistence by creating a new Windows service. This rule identifies suspicious 'sc.exe' commands that include 'green' or 'blood' in the service name, or 'sc.exe' commands creating services from common temporary/application data paths. It also looks for direct registry modifications to the Services key with 'green' or 'blood' in the key name.
Detects the use of fltMC.exe to spawn service control commands (sc.exe) or command processor (cmd.exe) with arguments for starting, stopping, creating, deleting, or configuring Windows services. This activity may indicate an attempt to manipulate drivers or services to impair system defenses or achieve persistence.
Detects the creation of a Windows service using the 'sc.exe' utility where the service executable is located in a potentially untrusted directory such as Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Users\Public, or Downloads. This behavior is frequently used by adversaries to establish persistence or execute malicious code with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'MixedSvc' or containing 'Mixed Reality' in the command line where the binPath points to a non-System32 directory or the Windows Media Player folder, which is indicative of potential service hijacking or persistence techniques.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry keys or values within the 'CurrentControlSet\Services' path that refer to 'rustdesk'. This typically indicates the installation or configuration of the RustDesk remote access tool as a system service, which may be unauthorized or used for persistence by an adversary.
This rule detects the installation of known vulnerable kernel drivers (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver - BYOVD). These drivers are often exploited by adversaries to gain kernel-level code execution, elevate privileges, or disable security tools (EDR).
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