Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
769 detections
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Detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create, delete, or start a service named 'MixedSvc', or attempts to execute a process masquerading as 'Mixed Reality.exe' from a suspicious directory (Windows Media Player folder). These activities are often associated with persistence or masquerading techniques used by threat actors.
Detects the creation of persistence via a malicious Windows service named 'MixedSvc' or any service pointing to 'Mixed Reality.exe' located within 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\'. This activity is consistent with the 'Operation DragonReturn' campaign and the 'Silver Fox' threat actor, where the 'Mixed Reality.exe' binary acts as a host for DLL-sideloading of the DcRAT backdoor.
Identifies the malicious RMM establishing persistence by creating a system service configured to auto-start the backdoor on reboot. The rule specifically looks for the 'sc.exe' utility being used to create a service with a binary path pointing to an executable within the 'AppData' directory and configured for automatic startup.
Detects processes that exhibit signs of C2 communication (specifically on ports 4000-5000, associated with SystemBC) followed by the writing of executable or script files to SMB/UNC paths and subsequent remote lateral movement execution via WMI, Windows services, or scheduled tasks on the same host.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service where the executable path is located in suspicious directories (e.g., ProgramData, AppData, Temp, Users Public). It correlates the service installation event (using sc.exe) with the subsequent execution of the binary by services.exe within a two-hour window, identifying potential persistence mechanisms or malicious service-based execution.
Detects the creation of Windows services where the executable path is located in suspicious or volatile directories such as ProgramData, Temp, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of malware, specifically the The Gentlemen RaaS group, establishing persistence or deploying malicious components on a compromised system.
Detects the installation of RustDesk as a persistent Windows service. RustDesk is a remote access tool that has been observed in intrusion chains, including those involving Akira ransomware, to provide hands-on-keyboard access to threat actors.
Detects a suspected malicious activity sequence where PowerShell is used to download the cloudflared utility from GitHub, followed by a silent MSI installation of cloudflared. This sequence is indicative of post-exploitation activity often associated with Bumblebee malware leading to the establishment of covert C2 tunneling, frequently observed in Akira ransomware intrusion chains.
Detects the installation of the RustDesk remote access software as a Windows system service. This is identified by monitoring Event ID 7045 (Service Installation) for service names or image paths associated with RustDesk.
Detects the installation of 'cloudflared.exe' as a Windows service from a non-standard file path. The rule specifically correlates this service installation with preceding PowerShell commands typically used to download remote files, consistent with tradecraft observed in Akira and Bumblebee campaigns to establish covert C2 tunneling.
Detects the installation of the Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared) utility as a Windows service, often used by threat actors to establish persistent, outbound command-and-control (C2) channels that bypass standard network perimeter controls. This rule monitors for PowerShell-based downloads from GitHub, silent MSI-based installation, and the execution of the 'service install' command.
This rule detects potentially malicious lateral movement or persistence activities by monitoring the creation or modification of executable files in remote network shares and startup folders, as well as the use of administrative tools like sc.exe or schtasks.exe to create services or tasks. The rule specifically filters out processes signed by Microsoft, focusing on non-standard or unsigned binaries that perform these administrative actions across multiple instances, indicating potential automated lateral propagation.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or start a service on a remote host, identified by the presence of UNC paths (\\) and service management commands (create, start) in the command line.
This rule detects potential malicious activity associated with the 'CadenceOptimizer' service and related 'agt.dll' library. It monitors for the creation or modification of Windows Registry keys for persistence, the creation or loading of a specific DLL in the 'ProgramData\CorsairUtil' directory, and the injection of code into 'svchost.exe' via 'Brn_Agent' command line arguments.
Detects the installation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains strings commonly associated with remote access or remote control software, such as 'remotepc' or 'rpclient'. This may indicate the unauthorized deployment of remote administration tools.
Detects the installation, service creation, registry modification, and network activity associated with the Tailscale VPN tool. This rule monitors for persistent use of Tailscale, which can be utilized by threat actors to establish encrypted mesh access to internal environments.
Detects the creation of Windows services initiated by ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of the abuse of the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) DSC configuration engine to install persistent malicious services, potentially leveraging PSDscResources.
Detects instances where ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe spawns sc.exe, which is indicative of Windows service creation or modification occurring via WinGet Desired State Configuration (DSC) abuse to establish persistence.
This rule monitors for signs of Atlas RAT activity on Linux systems, including the execution of processes matching known Atlas RAT naming conventions, unauthorized modifications to system persistence mechanisms (systemd or init.d directories) by non-package management utilities, and anomalous outbound network connections originating from sshd or PAM-related processes.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms on Linux systems by identifying the creation of new systemd service files, modifications to init.d scripts, or the use of systemctl to enable or start services. The rule specifically excludes standard package management activities (apt, yum, dnf, dpkg) and flags if the triggered service operation involves suspicious file paths.
Detects the deployment and execution of GS-Netcat (gsocket), a tool often used for creating persistent reverse shells or backdoors. The rule identifies processes associated with gsocket, instances where the 'uptime' command is masqueraded with suspicious command-line arguments, and unauthorized creation or modification of systemd service files designed for persistence.
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