Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects the use of PsExec or SC.exe to create services on multiple remote endpoints within a short time window. This pattern is characteristic of adversary-driven mass deployment of ransomware or other malicious payloads where remote execution via Windows service control is used to move laterally across a network.
This rule detects evidence of remote service installation and execution, commonly associated with tools like PsExec, PaExec, and RemCom, or the direct use of Windows administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$) to execute binaries remotely. The rule monitors for process creation events involving known service binary names, service creation attempts, or the execution of binaries staged in administrative network shares.
Detects the installation and execution of MeshAgent, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, by identifying specific command-line arguments, service names, and renamed binary execution. Adversaries often use RMM tools for persistent remote access and command and control.
Detects a sequence of events where a suspected sideloaded process (e.g., masquerading as common tools like curl or vim) is followed within 30 minutes by the registration of a new Windows service, a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis threat group.
Detects the creation or modification of serverless functions (AWS Lambda, Azure Function Apps, GCP Cloud Functions) that exhibit high-risk configurations. These include functions assigned overly permissive IAM roles, configured for public or unauthenticated invocation, or tied to event triggers commonly abused for persistence in cloud environments.
Detects the creation of suspicious Windows services associated with remote execution tools like PsExec, PAExec, or custom tools that leverage SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). The rule correlates the service creation event (Event ID 7045, 4697) with preceding network connection attempts to SMB shares, and subsequent service termination or state change events within a short timeframe, which is a pattern characteristic of remote lateral movement and command execution.
Detects the creation of a remote service (Event ID 7045 or 4697) on a Windows host shortly after a remote SMB logon. The detection specifically looks for service binary paths associated with well-known lateral movement tools like PsExec (PSEXESVC), the ADMIN$ network share, or randomized executable names within the Windows Temp directory, which are common artifacts left by tools such as Impacket psexec.py and CrackMapExec.
Detects the creation of a Windows service that impersonates the legitimate Windows Time (w32time) service name or display name but utilizes a binary located outside of the standard system32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often used by backdoors like RemotePanel to evade detection after initial compromise.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service using common administrative tools like sc.exe or PowerShell's New-Service cmdlet that masquerades as the legitimate Windows Time service (w32time). The rule specifically flags service creation commands that use relevant service names but point to non-standard, suspicious executable paths or configurations, potentially indicating persistence or malicious activity by RemotePanel.
Detects potential lateral movement and persistence activities by identifying suspicious Windows service installations via event ID 7045. The rule flags services with suspicious names or paths (e.g., Temp folders, Public directory) and correlates them with incoming SMB connections (port 445) or services spawned directly by services.exe from suspicious locations, aggregated by host and remote IP.
Detects potential lateral movement by monitoring for the creation of services associated with PsExec (e.g., PSEXESVC or ADMIN$ share usage), followed by a network connection over SMB (port 445) and the subsequent execution of the corresponding remote process.
Detects lateral movement patterns associated with PsExec or its variants. The rule correlates SMB administrative share access (ADMIN$ or IPC$), the subsequent installation of a service (often named PSEXESVC or using a temporary executable path), and the immediate execution of a command or shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) by that service.
Detects service-creation commands (sc create / New-Service / reg add under a Services key) whose COMMAND LINE itself references a known NeedyMantis binary name or sideload staging folder. Requiring the malicious reference to appear in the command being executed -- rather than merely in the calling process's own folder location -- removes false matches from unrelated legitimate software that happens to be installed under a similarly-named folder.
Detects the installation or loading of a non-standard kernel driver followed by the termination of known security/EDR agent processes. This behavior is indicative of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack, where attackers leverage kernel-level privileges from a vulnerable driver to bypass EDR protections and disable security tools prior to encryption or other malicious activities.
Detects the modification of service permissions for the 'AgtaBackupAgentSvc' service using the 'sdset' command via 'sc.exe', 'cmd.exe', or 'powershell.exe'. Adversaries use this technique to hide services or modify access to them by applying a specific Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string to bypass security enumeration or maintain persistence.
Detects the creation of Windows services that reference file paths often associated with NeedyMantis malware sideloading activities. These paths typically involve directories inside ProgramData or ProgramFiles where benign executables are used to sideload malicious DLLs.
Detects coordinated activity characteristic of NotPetya-like lateral movement. It identifies a local account authenticating across multiple hosts (credential reuse), followed by the creation of a transient Windows service (typically for remote command execution) and the invocation of rundll32.exe to execute a DLL export by ordinal on the same device.
Detects service-creation commands (sc create / New-Service / reg add under a Services key) whose COMMAND LINE itself references a known NeedyMantis binary name or sideload staging folder. Requiring the malicious reference to appear in the command being executed -- rather than merely in the calling process's own folder location -- removes false matches from unrelated legitimate software that happens to be installed under a similarly-named folder.
Detects modifications to the 'PlugPlay' Windows service using 'sc.exe', specifically involving changes to the binary path (binpath) and subsequent service status changes (start/stop) within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is often associated with the persistence or hijacking of services to execute malicious files, specifically targeting Microsoft Office or Copilot-related process names.
Correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within 90 minutes: LSASS memory access consistent with credential dumping, followed by remote service or WMI-based lateral movement, and finishing with mass file renames or modifications characteristic of ransomware encryption.
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