Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
769 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
293
239
59
42
39
Contributors
188
145
112
101
29
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
769
Platforms
710
56
10
9
6
Products / Services
317
159
152
133
37
MITRE Techniques
603
504
364
327
195
CVEs
5
4
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
7
1
IDS Protocols
9
1
Detects the execution of the PsExec service (PSEXESVC) or command-line usage indicating remote service execution, including the standard PsExec '-accepteula' flag combined with network path indicators. Additionally detects the creation of the PSEXESVC service registry key, which is indicative of PsExec-based lateral movement or remote administration.
Detects the creation of a Windows Service pointing to a suspected Komari agent binary in a non-standard directory (Public, ProgramData, or Temp) to survive reboots. This rule specifically looks for 'sc.exe' being used with the 'create' command and a 'binPath' argument that includes one of the specified directories and ends with '.exe'.
Identifies the creation of the specific background system service associated with TiFlux, cementing its persistence on the host. This rule specifically looks for the 'sc.exe' utility being used with the 'create' command and 'TiFlux.start= auto' in the command line, indicating the creation of a service for persistence.
Detects potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks by monitoring for known vulnerable driver files being created or loaded as kernel modules, as well as the registration of kernel-mode drivers from non-standard or user-writable locations like Temp, Tmp, AppData, or Public directories.
Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Detects the modification or termination of critical Windows security services using the Service Control utility (sc.exe). Attackers frequently disable Defender and associated security center services to allow undetected payload execution.
Detects the modification or termination of critical Windows security services using the Service Control utility (sc.exe). Attackers frequently disable Defender and associated security center services to allow undetected payload execution.
Detects the modification or termination of critical Windows security services using the Service Control utility (sc.exe). Attackers frequently disable Defender and associated security center services to allow undetected payload execution.
Detects the modification or termination of critical Windows security services using the Service Control utility (sc.exe). Attackers frequently disable Defender and associated security center services to allow undetected payload execution.
Udm Hola Monitor Service
YARA-L
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
This rule detects the registration of a Windows service named 'msidiskserver' or a service whose ImagePath ends with 'fsdiskbit.sys'. This activity is associated with the 'FISHMONGERS' threat actor group and their 'SprySocks' malware, which uses a transient driver for persistence. The rule focuses on registry events related to service creation or modification.
Correlates the dropping of the vulnerable driver with sc.exe creating a kernel-level service to load it into memory.
Detects the MYRA RAT (Operation Friday Harvest) establishing persistence by creating systemd user services disguised as legitimate system daemons (colord, haveged) under ~/.config/systemd/user/, enabling the service via systemctl --user enable, and dropping binaries to ~/.local/bin/. Also covers related persistence artifacts including /usr/local/lib/.libcache.so and /etc/profile.d/.sh.local. The rule also identifies node or node.exe spawning systemctl with the --user flag.
Udm Hola Monitor Service
YARA-L
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
Targets service registration for msidiskserver or an ImagePath ending in fsdiskbit.sys. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Detects sc.exe creating a Windows service named OneDriveServers to mask ScreenConnect persistence, as observed in Operation SilentCanvas.
Detects the creation of a Windows service using administrative tools (sc.exe or net.exe) followed closely by an instruction to start that service within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or lateral movement.
This rule detects the usage of standard Windows system administration utilities (infinstall.exe, devcon.exe, pnputil.exe, sc.exe) when the command line arguments include keywords commonly associated with driver loading or kernel-level operations, which may indicate the installation of a rootkit or malicious driver.
Detects the creation of 'update-monitor.service' in the systemd directory, a known persistence mechanism for the Miasma toolkit.
This rule correlates the creation and subsequent removal of a driver service within a 15-minute window. It specifically looks for registry events indicating the creation and deletion of a service key, where the service's image path ends with '.sys' or the key name contains 'msidiskserver'. This behavior is indicative of the transient driver-loading workflow used by SprySOCKS malware.
Detects the creation of systemd unit files masquerading as Google Chrome components used to launch the GS-Netcat backdoor on boot.
Page 23 of 37