Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
769 detections
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Detects an accelerated sequence of attack phases—specifically recon, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistence—occurring on a single device within a short timeframe (15 minutes). This behavioral pattern indicates potential automated or script-orchestrated intrusion activity.
Detects the creation or start of the PSEXESVC service, which is a characteristic behavior of the PsExec tool used for remote execution and lateral movement.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious batch scripts (e.g., 'bd_test_k7old.bat') via cmd.exe, or the creation of a Windows service involving kernel drivers using sc.exe, which may indicate testing of defensive mechanisms or the deployment of potentially malicious kernel-level components.
Detects the installation of a new kernel-mode service using system utilities like sc.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is a common indicator of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack intended to gain kernel-level privileges.
Detects the execution, network connections, and service installation of MeshAgent or associated binaries (e.g., mvtcs.exe). The rule identifies potential unauthorized or malicious use of this remote management software by looking for process activity, specific network connections to known infrastructure, and service persistence mechanisms.
Detects the creation of new system services using EventID 7045 where the ImagePath points to suspicious temporary directories, administrative shares (ADMIN$), or utilizes randomly generated service names. This pattern is commonly associated with PsExec-style lateral movement and ransomware staging.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern consistent with a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) chain. It identifies the installation of specific known vulnerable drivers (e.g., Alinubx.sys, nvfsflt64.sys) and the registration of a corresponding service (NvFsFilter), followed by the mass termination of various security software and EDR processes within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using kernel-mode privileges to disable security controls.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is associated with the SparroWocky threat. The rule flags the service creation event (Event ID 7045) and identifies if the service description matches the known malicious signature, which attempts to masquerade as a legitimate auditing tool.
Detects the installation or service creation of 'gdrv.sys', a known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver often abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to escalate privileges.
Detects various persistence mechanisms used by the CARBONATO botnet on Linux systems, including registration of cron jobs, systemd services/timers, and the usage of 'chattr +i' to make persistence files immutable.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service using the service control manager command-line utility (sc.exe). This command is commonly used by attackers to achieve persistence by creating services that execute malicious binaries at startup, or to run processes with SYSTEM privileges.
Detects the presence or installation of 'truesight.sys' or 'rentdrv2.sys' drivers, which are associated with malicious activity. The rule also triggers when system utilities like sc.exe or services.exe are used to set services related to these names to a 'demand' start type, indicating potential persistence or malicious driver loading.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver or the creation of an NvFsFilter service, which are associated with a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack leveraging a renamed CcProtect driver to bypass security protections such as PPL.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the creation or modification of specific system driver files (nvfsflt64.sys, Alinubx.sys) combined with the installation or initiation of a Windows service associated with NVIDIA filter names. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms, potential rootkit activity, or the deployment of vulnerable drivers (BYOVD).
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects instances where known NetSupport Manager binaries (client32.exe, netsupportmanager.exe, pcicfgnt.exe) are used to perform persistence-related actions, such as creating a new Windows service, adding a scheduled task, or modifying Run/Winlogon registry keys.
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