Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects downstream delivery of likely AI-paraphrased mass-produced lure content by identifying bursts of near-duplicate subject lines from newly-seen domains with auth failures.
Detects downstream delivery of likely AI-paraphrased mass-produced lure content by identifying bursts of near-duplicate subject lines from newly-seen domains with auth failures.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects OfficeHome sign-in events featuring the 90014 error code (missing OAuth nonce). The rule looks for a specific mismatch where mobile browser User Agents are observed on a system reported as Windows 10, a pattern consistent with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token replay attacks attempting to access Microsoft 365 environments.
Detects high-risk identity modifications (password or MFA resets) following an IT helpdesk ticket that lacks mandatory security controls, such as callback verification, manager approval, or established ticket history. This behavior is indicative of vishing and social engineering attacks aimed at helpdesk personnel to compromise user accounts.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects high-risk identity modifications (password or MFA resets) following an IT helpdesk ticket that lacks mandatory security controls, such as callback verification, manager approval, or established ticket history. This behavior is indicative of vishing and social engineering attacks aimed at helpdesk personnel to compromise user accounts.
Detects alerts that reference specific CVEs historically exploited by the threat group QTFY against internet-facing applications, including common vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure, FortiOS, Citrix ADC, Exchange, F5 BIG-IP, Log4Shell, and others, when the alert severity is Medium or High and contains indicators of exploit or initial access.
Detects instances where a user grants high-privilege permissions (Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, offline_access) to an OAuth application within 24 hours of a risky sign-in event. This pattern is commonly observed in AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) or consent-phishing attacks designed to establish persistent access to cloud resources.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns from a single IP address that target multiple accounts with a high success rate within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of targeted credential guessing or password spraying informed by reconnaissance, as it deviates from the typical low-success-rate patterns of broad brute-force attacks.
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
This rule detects potential MFA fatigue attacks (Push Bombing) by monitoring sign-in logs for a high volume of authentication prompts directed at a single user within a one-hour window. It specifically identifies patterns where a user receives multiple denied MFA push requests followed by at least one successful approval. The rule also accounts for suspicious behavior such as requests originating from multiple IP addresses or geographic locations.
Detects multiple consecutive MFA challenge events (ResultCode 50074 or 50140) for a single user session occurring on unmanaged devices (trustType is null or unknown) while using the Chrome browser. This pattern may indicate an attempt to bypass or exhaust MFA mechanisms, or credential abuse on non-compliant devices.
Detects anomalous high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft 365 (SharePoint or OneDrive) by a single user within a 15-minute window, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft 365 (SharePoint or OneDrive) by a single user within a 15-minute window, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network traffic directed toward specific domains and subdomains identified as associated with the SpiceRAT, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware infrastructure. It correlates data from DNS events and general security/network logs to detect potential command and control (C2) communication patterns, regardless of specific source IP overlap.
Detects downstream delivery of likely AI-paraphrased mass-produced lure content by identifying bursts of near-duplicate subject lines from newly-seen domains with auth failures.
Detects downstream delivery of likely AI-paraphrased mass-produced lure content by identifying bursts of near-duplicate subject lines from newly-seen domains with auth failures.
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