Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous Kerberos TGS-REQ activity (Event ID 4769) from a single user account targeting five or more distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs) using RC4 encryption (0x17). This pattern is consistent with Kerberoasting techniques used by offensive tools like Rubeus, where service tickets are requested for offline cracking to extract plaintext service account credentials.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Kerberos Service Ticket requests (Event IDs 4768 and 4769) that utilize the weak RC4 encryption type (0x17). The rule filters for non-computer account activity and specific suspicious Ticket Options that are commonly associated with tool-based Kerberoasting attacks.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (EventID 4769) that utilize RC4 encryption (0x17) instead of the more secure AES encryption. Attackers often force RC4-HMAC when requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs) because these tickets are susceptible to offline brute-force attacks to recover service account passwords. This technique is a common precursor to lateral movement and privilege escalation in Active Directory environments.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (EventID 4769) that utilize RC4 encryption (0x17) instead of the more secure AES encryption. Attackers often force RC4-HMAC when requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs) because these tickets are susceptible to offline brute-force attacks to recover service account passwords. This technique is a common precursor to lateral movement and privilege escalation in Active Directory environments.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (AS-REQ, Event ID 4768) where authentication is performed using a certificate (PKINIT) instead of a password. This pattern is commonly associated with Pass-the-Certificate attacks, often utilized by tools like Certipy following certificate enrollment or relaying to obtain a TGT as part of a credential access chain.
Detects suspicious post-compromise activity associated with ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates. This rule monitors for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (e.g., weak encryption types or TGS requests) closely followed by access to sensitive credential stores or tools on the same host, which is indicative of credential harvesting after a session hijacking or initial access event.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying an abnormal volume of RC4-encrypted Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests (Event 4769) targeting service accounts, followed closely by a successful logon (Event 4624) from a previously dormant service account, suggesting the successful use of a cracked service ticket for unauthorized authentication.
Detects anomalous Kerberos ticket requests that are characteristic of Golden Ticket attacks. The rule flags the use of weak encryption types (e.g., RC4) commonly used in forged tickets even in AES-enforced environments, and direct requests for the KRBTGT service account outside of legitimate ticket renewal operations.
This rule detects potential Kerberos Golden Ticket activity by monitoring Windows Event IDs 4768 (TGT Request) and 4769 (TGS Request) for indicators of forgery. Specifically, it flags TGT requests that utilize RC4 encryption ('0x17') in environments where AES is expected, excluding standard krbtgt account activity.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (AS-REQ, Event ID 4768) where authentication is performed using a certificate (PKINIT) instead of a password. This pattern is commonly associated with Pass-the-Certificate attacks, often utilized by tools like Certipy following certificate enrollment or relaying to obtain a TGT as part of a credential access chain.
Detects anomalous patterns of Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting attacks. The rule identifies accounts requesting a high volume of service tickets for distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding the krbtgt account.
This rule detects instances of Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) requests (Event IDs 4768 and 4769) that utilize the legacy RC4 encryption type (0x17). In modern Active Directory environments where AES is the standard for Kerberos, the use of RC4 can be a strong indicator of a Golden Ticket attack or other unauthorized ticket forging activities, as adversaries often force a downgrade to RC4 for easier offline cracking.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for high volumes of Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests using the weak RC4 encryption type (0x17) from a single account within a 5-minute window. It excludes machine accounts and common system service requests to reduce noise.
Detects anomalous Kerberos service ticket (TGS) requests or successful logons where the corresponding Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request (Event ID 4768) is absent within the monitored window. This pattern is a primary indicator of offline-forged Kerberos tickets, such as those generated by Mimikatz, which bypass legitimate KDC interaction for ticket issuance.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4769 for TGS service ticket requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). It correlates these individual requests to identify a single user account requesting an abnormally high volume of service tickets within a 10-minute window, which is highly characteristic of automated SPN enumeration and cracking tools like Rubeus or Impacket.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) that use RC4 encryption (0x17 or 17). It identifies accounts requesting TGS tickets for a large number of unique Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding requests for host-based services (ending in $). High volumes of such requests from a single user are indicative of an attempt to gather service tickets for offline password cracking.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for an unusually high volume of Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) for tickets encrypted with RC4 (0x17) within a short timeframe. The rule tracks the count of requests and the diversity of Service Principal Names (SPNs) requested by a specific user account, excluding machine accounts.
Detects Kerberos ticket requests (AS-REQ/TGS-REQ) that exhibit characteristics of a forged Golden Ticket, specifically the use of legacy RC4 (0x17) encryption in environments where AES is typically preferred, non-standard ticket options (0x40810000), and requests for accounts or services that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event. This detection aims to identify the post-compromise phase where an adversary uses a forged TGT to impersonate domain accounts.
This rule monitors for an abnormally high number of Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests using the RC4-HMAC encryption type (0x17) from a single IP address to various service accounts. This pattern is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique where attackers attempt to obtain service tickets to crack service account passwords offline.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying anomalous behavior where a single account requests 5 or more unique Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) tickets within a 5-minute window, excluding common service accounts and krbtgt ticket requests. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate and obtain tickets for multiple services for offline brute-force password cracking.
Detects anomalous Kerberos ticket requests that are characteristic of Golden Ticket attacks. The rule flags the use of weak encryption types (e.g., RC4) commonly used in forged tickets even in AES-enforced environments, and direct requests for the KRBTGT service account outside of legitimate ticket renewal operations.
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