Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting activity by monitoring Windows Event ID 4768 (TGT Request). It identifies multiple Kerberos AS-REQ requests from a single IP address within a 10-minute window, where the PreAuthType is 0 (indicating no pre-authentication) and the encryption type is RC4 (0x17 or 23). This behavior is characteristic of enumeration and exploitation tools such as Rubeus or Impacket's GetNPUsers.py, which attempt to obtain extractable TGTs for accounts that do not require Kerberos pre-authentication.
Detects multiple Kerberos AS-REQ (Event ID 4768) requests initiated for distinct user accounts from a single source IP within a short timeframe (10 minutes) where Kerberos pre-authentication was not used (Pre-Authentication Type 0). This pattern is a key indicator of AS-REP roasting activity, often performed by tools like Rubeus or Impacket's GetNPUsers.py to harvest user TGTs for offline cracking.
This rule detects a correlation between an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate request (Event ID 4887) containing certificate attributes (SAN, altname, or UPN) and a subsequent Kerberos TGT request (Event ID 4768) within an hour, where the requested account name does not match the ticket user. This behavior is indicative of potential certificate-based authentication abuse, such as 'ESC1' or 'Golden Certificate' attacks where a certificate is requested and immediately used for credential impersonation.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGS ticket requests (Event ID 4769) using weak encryption (RC4/0x17) directed at multiple unique Service Principal Names (SPNs) from a single host or user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique used by attackers to harvest service account credentials for offline brute-force cracking.
Detects a single account requesting an abnormally high number of distinct Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) tickets for SPN-mapped accounts within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of Kerberoasting, where an attacker requests service tickets to perform offline brute-force cracking of service account passwords, often used for lateral movement.
Detects a burst of Kerberos TGS-REQ (Ticket-Granting Service Request) messages using RC4 encryption (etype 0x17) over UDP or TCP port 88. A high volume of these requests from a single source within a short timeframe is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique where an attacker requests service tickets to perform offline password cracking of service account credentials.
Detects two suspicious Kerberos activity patterns indicative of potential credential theft or reconnaissance: 1) A single account requesting tickets for multiple services or across multiple hosts in a short duration, which may indicate automated credential harvesting such as Kerberoasting; 2) The use of RC4 encryption (0x17) for Kerberos tickets, which is an older, weaker protocol and may indicate a forced downgrade attack to facilitate offline password cracking.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (AS-REQ, Event ID 4768) where authentication is performed using a certificate (PKINIT) instead of a password. This pattern is commonly associated with Pass-the-Certificate attacks, often utilized by tools like Certipy following certificate enrollment or relaying to obtain a TGT as part of a credential access chain.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (AS-REQ, Event ID 4768) where authentication is performed using a certificate (PKINIT) instead of a password. This pattern is commonly associated with Pass-the-Certificate attacks, often utilized by tools like Certipy following certificate enrollment or relaying to obtain a TGT as part of a credential access chain.
Detects Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests where the ticket encryption type is RC4 (0x17). This behavior, commonly referred to as Kerberoasting, involves requesting service tickets for accounts with service principal names (SPNs) set, often to perform offline brute-force attacks against the service account's password hash. The rule excludes common service account patterns and machine accounts to reduce noise.
Detects a single user account performing an unusually high volume of Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests (Event ID 4769) within a short window, specifically using RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is highly characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request tickets for various service principal names (SPNs) to perform offline password cracking.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request service tickets for service accounts in order to perform offline brute-force attacks to recover the service account password. The rule filters out machine account requests and focuses on standard user or service account requests.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for an unusually high volume of Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests (event ID 4769) for non-machine service accounts, specifically focusing on tickets encrypted with RC4 (etype 23). A high count of ticket requests or distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs) requested by a single client in a short period is characteristic of an adversary attempting to harvest hashes for offline cracking.
This rule monitors for potential Kerberos Golden Ticket attacks by detecting specific indicators within Windows security events. It identifies Event ID 4769 with a PAC validation failure status (0x1F), and the use of weak RC4 encryption (0x17) in either TGT requests (Event ID 4768) or service ticket requests (Event ID 4769). These behaviors are often associated with forged Kerberos tickets where the attacker may be using weak encryption or malformed PAC data.
Detects Kerberos TGS (Service Ticket) requests utilizing the insecure RC4 encryption type (0x17). This pattern is a hallmark of Kerberoasting, where an attacker requests service tickets for SPNs in an attempt to crack the service account credentials offline.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request service tickets for service accounts in order to perform offline brute-force attacks to recover the service account password. The rule filters out machine account requests and focuses on standard user or service account requests.
Detects Kerberos TGT and service ticket requests that utilize deprecated or weak encryption types (RC4/DES) often associated with Golden Ticket attacks, specifically in environments where AES is mandated. The rule groups these events by user, service, and IP address to identify potential anomalies indicative of credential forgery.
This rule detects potential attempts to abuse a Trusted Domain Object (TDO) to traverse a one-way Active Directory trust. It identifies suspicious activities such as Kerberos ticket requests (AS-REQ/TGS-REQ) targeting trust accounts (inter-realm indicators) or DCSync-style replication requests targeting the TDO object to extract domain secrets.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a widely used offensive security tool for Kerberos manipulation, including ticket requests, pass-the-ticket, and credential dumping.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (TGS-REQ) using RC4 encryption (etype 0x17) and specific ticket options (0x40810000), which are commonly associated with Kerberoasting attacks. This rule filters out service accounts (ending in $) to reduce noise, as these legitimate account types frequently request tickets.
Detects a single account requesting an abnormally large number of Kerberos service tickets (Event ID 4769) using weak RC4 encryption (0x17) within a short window. This pattern is characteristic of Kerberoasting attacks, where an adversary requests service tickets for offline password cracking.
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