Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
365 detections
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'Identifies when a user account was created and then added to the builtin Administrators group in the same day.
This should be monitored closely and all additions reviewed.'
This should be monitored closely and all additions reviewed.'
'Detects when a Guest User is added by a user account that has not been seen adding a guest in the previous 14 days.
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts added should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts added should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
// Detect Active Directory service accounts that are not active because their last logon was more than 14 days ago
// Replace XXX on line 4 with the naming convention start of your Active Directory service accounts
// Replace XXX on line 4 with the naming convention start of your Active Directory service accounts
'This query looks at the last 14 days for "Consent to application" operation by a user/app which could potentially mean unauthorized access. Additional context is added from AuditLogs based on CorrleationId from the same account that performed the action.'
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
'Summarizes uses of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches to create persistence
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136
Query for users being created using "net user" command
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -
e.g. in this example we look for some undocumented variations (e.g. /ad instead of /add)'
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136
Query for users being created using "net user" command
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -
e.g. in this example we look for some undocumented variations (e.g. /ad instead of /add)'
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
This query calculates device uptime based on periodic DeviceInfo which is recorded every 15 minutes regardless of device's network connectivity and uploaded once device gets online. If its interval is over 16 minutes, we can consider device is turned off.Calculated uptime may include up to 30 minutes gap. Devices may be turned on up to 15 minutes earlier than the "timestamp", and may be turned off up to 15 minutes later than the "LastTimestamp". When the single independent DeviceInfo without any sequential DeviceInfo within 16 minutes before or after is recorded, "DurationAtLeast" will be displayed as "00.00:00:00".
'This hunting query identifies Accounts that are new or inactive and have accessed or used GitHub that may be a sign of compromise.'
'Identifies when a new user is granted access and any subsequent audit related activity. This can help you identify rogue or malicious user behavior.'
Search for the creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema.
Identifies the creation of local users via the net.exe command. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' is executed with the 'user' and 'add' arguments in the command line.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicating the creation of a user account, a successful login by that user, and the subsequent deletion of the same user account within a 4-hour timeframe. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary creating temporary accounts for malicious activities, using them, and then removing them to cover their tracks or evade detection. The rule specifically targets Windows login events (event code 4624).
Identifies the creation of local users via the net.exe command
Detects the creation of a new user account on an ESXi system using the 'esxcli' command-line interface. This activity can be an indicator of an adversary establishing persistence or gaining unauthorized access to the hypervisor.
Detects the creation, login, and deletion of a user account over a predefined timeframe
The analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.
This analytic identifies the invitation of an external guest user within Azure AD. With Azure AD B2B collaboration, users and administrators can invite external users to collaborate with internal users. External guest account invitations should be monitored by security teams as they could potentially lead to unauthorized access. An example of this attack vector was described at BlackHat 2022 by security researcher Dirk-Jan during his talk `Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities`. This detection leverages the Universal Audit Log (UAL)/o365:management:activity sourcetype as a detection data source.
This analytic detects the creation, deletion, or modification of the "ESX Admins" group in Active Directory. These events may indicate attempts to exploit the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-37085).
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