Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
This rule detects the suspicious creation or modification of local user accounts (e.g., 'svc_ipurple') occurring within a short 15-minute window following the execution of Windows Package Manager (Winget) configuration tasks. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated configuration files (DSC) to establish persistence or escalate privileges on a compromised system.
Detects the creation or invitation of new users in Azure AD where integrated identity-verification platforms have flagged document authenticity, liveness, or face matching as anomalies. These flags are cross-referenced with suspicious account attributes such as geolocation mismatches, the use of VOIP phone numbers, or the usage of newly registered email domains, suggesting a potential fraudulent account creation attempt.
Detects the use of the net.exe or net1.exe utility to add a local user account with the specific password string 'Numlock!123'. This pattern is frequently used by attackers or malicious scripts to establish persistence or secondary access on a system.
Detects the creation or unauthorized usage of the 'p2pwn' backdoor account and associated 'p2password' credentials on Dahua devices. This indicator is linked to exploitation of CVE-2024-39943, which allows for persistent unauthorized access that survives device factory resets.
Detects the use of the net.exe or net1.exe utilities to create a new user account with a hardcoded password string ('Numlock!123') in the command line. This is a common indicator of automated exploitation, credential hardcoding, or post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects various system events (including process execution and user account creation) that contain the specific string 'p2pwn' in combination with the string 'p2password'. This pattern suggests the activity involves potentially malicious credential testing, hardcoded credential usage, or suspicious account interaction activity.
Detects modifications to Active Directory user accounts (Event IDs 4720, 4738) that coincide with suspicious MFA registration indicators—such as increased device counts, software token activations, or default device/token placeholders—within one hour of a successful user authentication event. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover or persistence activities involving MFA manipulation.
This rule detects potential unauthorized activity originating from 1C Enterprise processes (rphost.exe, rmngr.exe, 1cv8.exe, 1cv8c.exe) when involving specific keywords like '1C-Shell.dt' or 'KRAUD'. It specifically monitors for the subsequent execution of local user account management commands (net user, net localgroup, New-LocalUser) by the 1C server process (rphost.exe) within an hour of the initial suspicious event.
Detects the creation of a local user account using the hardcoded 'Numlock!123' password, a characteristic artifact associated with Ransom Busters threat group operations. The rule monitors command-line activity from net.exe or net1.exe to identify attempts to add users with this specific, known malicious credential.
Detects the execution of the 'net user' command with the '/add' parameter using the hardcoded password 'Numlock!123'. This pattern is frequently observed as a persistence mechanism employed by threat actors during ransomware operations to establish unauthorized administrative access.
Detects the creation or use of known backdoor accounts ('p2pwn', 'p2password') on Dahua surveillance devices, which are often utilized by adversaries to maintain unauthorized access to compromised hardware.
Detects administrator-privileged actions in JFrog Artifactory audit logs attributed to the 'token:anonymous' identity, the tell-tale signature left when CVE-2026-42018 (unauthenticated token retrieval) is chained with CVE-2026-42016 (privilege escalation) to mint an admin-scope token that retains the anonymous username. Also relevant to CVE-2026-82329 authentication bypass activity.
Detects instances where a non-administrative user account creates two or more computer accounts within a 24-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of a compromised account attempting to add rogue machines to the domain for persistence or further lateral movement.
This rule detects the creation of a new administrator account in WordPress within one hour of a specific plugin update event (specifically for the 'admin-menu-editor-pro' plugin). This pattern is indicative of a post-exploitation activity where a compromised or vulnerable plugin is used to gain administrative access to the WordPress instance.
Detects the creation of a new administrator account in WordPress by monitoring for SQL INSERT operations targeting the wp_users and wp_usermeta tables that involve setting the wp_capabilities to administrator. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized account creation often associated with compromised or malicious WordPress plugin updates.
Detects the creation of a new local user account followed by its immediate addition to the Administrators or Remote Desktop Users groups, a common pattern observed in post-exploitation activities related to CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) for achieving persistent administrative access.
Detects the creation of a new user account in Nacos, followed immediately by an authentication failure and then a successful authentication, which may indicate an attacker using automated tools to create and test a backdoored administrative account.
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