Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
597 detections
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Detects Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) activity followed by the deletion of authentication methods within a 1-hour window. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or bypass multi-factor authentication after gaining initial access to an account, potentially executed by threat groups like Storm-2949.
Detects removal of registered authentication methods shortly after a password reset, a sequence that can prevent the legitimate user from recovering the account. This rule specifically looks for successful 'Delete user authentication method' or 'Remove authentication method' operations in AuditLogs.
Detects an SSPR (Self-Service Password Reset) event immediately followed by the registration of a new Microsoft Authenticator method for the same user. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker has compromised an identity, performed a password reset, and is attempting to establish a new MFA method for persistent access.
Detects when a guest user (identified by '#EXT#' in their UPN) is assigned a sensitive role like 'Agent ID Administrator' or 'AgentAdministrator' in Entra ID. It also detects when any user, including guest users, performs modifications related to 'Agent' blueprints. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or unauthorized administrative actions by external users within an Azure Active Directory environment.
Identifies device registration events where the user agent indicates script or automated frameworks (like axios, node, undici, node-fetch) rather than native registration clients. This behavior is associated with adversaries like Tycoon 2FA, which establishes device-bound persistence (PRT) that survives standard session revocation, making this a critical post-compromise detection.
This rule detects suspicious administrative activities in Azure AD, Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, Exchange, or Teams when performed by accounts that are not explicitly identified as 'admin' or 'service' accounts. It looks for a combination of at least 5 operations and 2 unique operation types within a 2-hour window, targeting group, application, or service principal related resources. This could indicate an attacker using compromised non-privileged accounts to perform administrative actions or escalate privileges.
Detects bulk deletion or disabling of accounts to lock out defenders
Detects creation of accounts with names mimicking legitimate service accounts
This rule detects when a single user makes multiple changes to security groups within a short timeframe (binned hourly). Specifically, it looks for Event IDs 4752 (A security-enabled global group was changed), 4753 (A security-enabled local group was changed), or 4754 (A security-enabled universal group was changed). This could indicate an attempt to manipulate group memberships for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Detects the creation of a new Global Administrator or Company Administrator account in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory). Adversaries may escalate privileges from compromised MDM administration roles (like Intune) to Entra ID Global Admin to cement full control over the tenant.
This rule detects modifications to the 'AdminCount' attribute in Active Directory, indicated by Event ID 5136. Changes to this attribute can signify privilege escalation attempts or modifications to highly privileged accounts.
Detects when a user account's 'UserAccountControl' attribute is modified to include the 'Not Delegated' flag (EventID 4738). This change can be an indicator of an attacker attempting to alter account behavior for persistence or to evade detection, or it could be a legitimate administrative action.
This rule detects the creation or modification of user accounts on Windows systems by monitoring Security Event IDs 4741 (A security-enabled local group was created) and 4742 (A computer account was changed). It summarizes the count of such changes per hour by the subject user name, which can help identify unusual or excessive account management activities.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure AD device registration. It identifies instances where a single user principal name (UPN) performs 5 or more device registrations or adds members to groups within a one-hour window, specifically targeting device resources. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register multiple devices to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
Detects when a single user account performs 5 or more account creations (EventID 4720) or account enables (EventID 4722) within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate malicious behavior, such as an attacker establishing persistence or expanding access, or it could be a sign of automated account provisioning.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure AD device registration. It identifies instances where a single user principal name (UPN) performs 5 or more device registrations or adds members to groups within a one-hour window, specifically targeting device resources. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register multiple devices to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a user successfully performs a multi-factor authentication (MFA) device login to Microsoft Office 365 via a browser, and within a 15-minute window, the same user either creates a new inbox rule or adds a new device. This combination of events could indicate an adversary gaining initial access and then setting up persistence (e.g., forwarding emails) or further device enrollment.
Detects LDAP-based modification of authentication configurations for credential theft
Detects LDAP account modifications used to maintain persistent access
This rule detects when a user account is disabled on a Windows system by monitoring Security Event ID 4725. It summarizes the count of disabled accounts per hour, grouped by the subject user name. This can indicate administrative actions, but also potential malicious activity such as an attacker disabling accounts to disrupt services or hinder incident response.
This rule detects when a user account is disabled on a Windows system by monitoring Security Event ID 4725. It summarizes the count of disabled accounts per hour, grouped by the subject user name. This can indicate administrative actions, but also potential malicious activity such as an attacker disabling accounts to disrupt services or hinder incident response.
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