Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects scenarios where a user's password is reset or sessions are revoked in Azure Active Directory, followed closely by mailbox access (items accessed, sent, or deleted) from a client IP address that was never seen interacting with that mailbox prior to the password reset event.
The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
The following analytic detects attempts to reset the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator password on a Domain Controller. It leverages event code 4794 from the Windows Security Event Log, specifically looking for events where the DSRM password reset is attempted. This activity is significant because the DSRM account can be used similarly to a local administrator account, providing potential persistence for an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain administrative access to the Domain Controller, posing a severe risk to the domain's security.
An account was unlocked and then authenticated from the same IP as the account that unlocked it
Detects when a privileged SAP user's credentials are reset by an administrator and subsequently used to log in from the same IP address that the administrator previously used.
Detects when a privileged SAP account modifies the master record of a different user within a specified timeframe.
Detects modifications to privileged SAP accounts' user master records or authorizations, indicating potential account manipulation or privilege abuse.
Detects the modification of a user's master record via an administrative action within SAP, which may indicate unauthorized account manipulation or privilege escalation.
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
The following analytic detects the addition of a servicePrincipalName (SPN) containing invisible Unicode characters to an Active Directory computer object via Windows Security Event 5136.
This is the key indicator of the KerberLoss attack (CVE-2026-25177), where an attacker with write access to a machine account's SPN attribute injects a collision SPN that contains a Zero Width or other invisible Unicode character (e.g. U+200C Zero Width Non-Joiner).
LDAP's string preparation rules (RFC 4518) cause these characters to be ignored during uniqueness checking, allowing the write to succeed even when an identical SPN already exists on another machine account.
The Kerberos KDC, however, does not apply the same normalisation — it finds two accounts with matching SPNs and returns KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, causing a Kerberos denial-of-service or forcing clients to fall back to NTLM downgrade.
This is the key indicator of the KerberLoss attack (CVE-2026-25177), where an attacker with write access to a machine account's SPN attribute injects a collision SPN that contains a Zero Width or other invisible Unicode character (e.g. U+200C Zero Width Non-Joiner).
LDAP's string preparation rules (RFC 4518) cause these characters to be ignored during uniqueness checking, allowing the write to succeed even when an identical SPN already exists on another machine account.
The Kerberos KDC, however, does not apply the same normalisation — it finds two accounts with matching SPNs and returns KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, causing a Kerberos denial-of-service or forcing clients to fall back to NTLM downgrade.
Detects high-risk operations performed by the Entra ID/AAD Connect synchronization service account (e.g., Sync_* or ADToAADSyncServiceAccount). This account, which often holds broad directory permissions, is a prime target for attackers to gain persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud directory. The rule monitors for unauthorized sign-ins, sensitive configuration changes (such as modifications to federation trust, authentication policies, or directory synchronization settings), and password resets targeting the sync account itself.
By default, the Windows guest account is heavily restricted, with limited permissions and access to system resources.
However, if the guest account is activated, it can potentially be used to perform malicious activities such as installing malware, deleting files, stealing data, or even taking control of the system.
However, if the guest account is activated, it can potentially be used to perform malicious activities such as installing malware, deleting files, stealing data, or even taking control of the system.
Detects instances where a user account registers or modifies MFA authentication methods (such as phone numbers or apps) for a different user account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker with administrative privileges attempting to establish persistence on a target account by adding their own MFA device.
Detects the creation or modification of system users and groups on NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances by monitoring Syslog events (e.g., nsconmsg, audit logs). The rule specifically triggers when these actions occur outside of standard business hours or on weekends, indicating potential unauthorized account manipulation or unauthorized persistence mechanisms.
The following analytic detects a user account (non-machine account) adding or removing a servicePrincipalName (SPN) on a computer object in Active Directory, via Windows Security Event 5136.
In normal AD operations, SPN values on computer objects are managed exclusively by the computer account itself (during domain join or name change), by Domain Controllers during replication, or by the SYSTEM/NETWORK SERVICE context — all of which appear as accounts ending in the dollar sign ($) convention.
A named user account writing to the servicePrincipalName attribute of a computer object is anomalous and may indicate an attacker with delegated WriteProperty rights over computer accounts performing SPN manipulation.
In normal AD operations, SPN values on computer objects are managed exclusively by the computer account itself (during domain join or name change), by Domain Controllers during replication, or by the SYSTEM/NETWORK SERVICE context — all of which appear as accounts ending in the dollar sign ($) convention.
A named user account writing to the servicePrincipalName attribute of a computer object is anomalous and may indicate an attacker with delegated WriteProperty rights over computer accounts performing SPN manipulation.
The following analytic detects a user account modifying its own userPrincipalName (UPN) to match the sAMAccountName of another account via Windows Security Event 4738.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
Detects the creation or modification of a local NetScaler administrative account with superuser (nsroot-level) privileges via the appliance CLI or management API. This activity is indicative of persistent administrative backdoors potentially established after the exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-88771 or CVE-2026-88772.
The following analytic identifies when the SID of a privileged user is added to the SID History attribute of another user. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4742 and 4738, combined with identity lookups, to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to abuse SID history for unauthorized access across multiple domains. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or maintain persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities including local account creation, modification of account security policies, and enabling of administrative services or credential exposure settings within a short time window. This typically indicates post-exploitation behavior where an adversary is attempting to establish persistence or facilitate further lateral movement.
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