Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
597 detections
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Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates via device code and, within a short timeframe (two hours), registers a new device to their account. This behavior is indicative of the 'ARToken' persistence pattern, where an adversary uses a stolen session to bind a rogue device to the victim's account, potentially to mint a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for persistent access.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
Detects reconnaissance and persistence behaviors associated with the Akira ransomware attack chain, specifically the execution of the Cloudflare Tunnel daemon for remote access or the creation/modification of local user accounts via standard Windows tools.
Detects the registration or modification of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information in Entra ID or Okta that occurs within 15 minutes of a sign-in event flagged as risky. This behavioral pattern is a common indicator of persistence being established by an attacker after performing an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack, where they leverage a stolen session to register their own MFA factors to maintain long-term access.
Detects MFA or credential reset activities on high-value or privileged accounts that lack a corresponding out-of-band verification signal, such as manager approval or identity proofing, within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attempts where attackers manipulate help-desk procedures to bypass identity protections.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious configuration changes on Cisco IOS XR devices, specifically targeting the creation of SPAN/mirroring sessions, ACL modifications to bypass traffic filtering, and changes to AAA or local user authentication settings. These patterns are consistent with post-compromise activities by adversaries seeking persistence and traffic interception.
Joins password reset events to subsequent legacy-protocol (IMAP/POP/SMTP/ActiveSync) or non-interactive sign-ins for the same user, catching attackers who pivot to less-monitored protocols immediately after a vished self-service reset.
Detects the presence of an unauthorized administrative account (e.g., 'ops') on MikroTik RouterOS devices following a system 'Flagged' indicator. This rule correlates administrative account creation or modification events with system-reported compromise indicators to identify post-exploitation persistence mechanisms related to known RouterOS vulnerabilities.
Detects when high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Directory.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All) are granted to a service principal via admin consent. This behavior can be used by attackers to gain persistent, stealthy administrative access to a Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
This rule detects the assignment of sensitive Microsoft Graph API application roles to a service principal, which can be an indicator of an adversary establishing a directory-wide backdoor in an Azure/Entra ID environment. This technique is often used to escalate privileges following an initial compromise of a low-privilege application registration.
Detects instances where a user grants OAuth consent or assigns roles to an application that lacks a verified publisher and requests broad permissions across multiple sensitive categories (e.g., Mail, Files, and Directory). This behavior is characteristic of consent-phishing campaigns designed to harvest data from cloud environments.
This rule detects when a new password credential (client secret) is added to an existing Azure AD Service Principal or application. This activity is a common method for adversaries to establish persistence in a cloud environment that survives password resets or MFA enforcement on the original administrative account.
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM access key (CreateAccessKey) for the root account or identities with administrative naming conventions. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has gained high-privileged access, as new access keys provide a durable way to maintain programmatic control that bypasses standard session-based security controls.
Detects the creation or modification of AWS Lambda functions that are associated with high-privilege IAM actions and triggered by EventBridge rules monitoring sensitive events like IAM user creation or console logins. This pattern indicates an attempt to establish event-driven, persistent backdoors within the AWS environment by automating malicious actions on new users or logins.
Detects the attachment or creation of IAM policies that grant administrative access (via 'AdministratorAccess' policy name) or full wildcard permissions ('Action': '*', 'Resource': '*') to users, roles, or groups. This activity is a common indicator of privilege escalation following a cloud identity compromise, frequently observed in campaigns by threat actors such as Scattered Spider (UNC3944).
This rule monitors Office 365 management logs for device registration or join events in Azure Active Directory where the resulting device state is flagged as both non-compliant and unmanaged, despite having a 'Workplace' or 'AzureAd' trust type. It further aggregates these events by user to identify potential suspicious patterns, such as bulk registrations or rapid activity within a 30-minute window, which may indicate account compromise or unauthorized device enrollment.
Detects when a new owner is added to an Azure/Entra ID enterprise application or service principal. This activity is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to gain long-term, high-privilege access, such as modifying application credentials or API permissions, without requiring directory administrator roles.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects instances where a risky Azure AD sign-in (e.g., token replay or confirmed compromise) is closely followed (within 24 hours) by sensitive application or service principal credential modifications by the same user account. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence establishment via account manipulation.
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
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