Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
Author: alex verboon @alexverboon.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
'Identifies when a recently created Group was added to a privileged built in domain local group or global group such as the Enterprise Admins, Cert Publishers or DnsAdmins. Be sure to verify this is an expected addition.
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
'Identifies accounts that have been added to a PIM managed privileged group'
'This query looks for unfamiliar Sign-in's thats not seen recently for the given user
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
This query shows all modifications to highly sensitive active directory groups (also known as Tier 0). An example of these groups include Domain Admins, Schema Admins and Enterprise Admins.
More info can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/security/compass/privileged-access-access-model#evolution-from-the-legacy-ad-tier-model
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
This advanced hunting query requires Defender for Identity be deployed due to it's reliance on the IdentityDirectoryEvents table.
More info can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/security/compass/privileged-access-access-model#evolution-from-the-legacy-ad-tier-model
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
This advanced hunting query requires Defender for Identity be deployed due to it's reliance on the IdentityDirectoryEvents table.
This query looks for Entra ID group adds identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
One of the indicators of compromise for the Nobelium (formerly Solorigate) campaign was that unexpected service principals have been added to privileged roles. This query looks for service principals that have been added to any role.
See Understanding "Solorigate"'s Identity IOCs - for Identity Vendors and their customers..
Reference - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/understanding-quot-solorigate-quot-s-identity-iocs-for-identity/ba-p/2007610
See Understanding "Solorigate"'s Identity IOCs - for Identity Vendors and their customers..
Reference - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/understanding-quot-solorigate-quot-s-identity-iocs-for-identity/ba-p/2007610
'Identifies when a user account was created and then added to the builtin Administrators group in the same day.
This should be monitored closely and all additions reviewed.'
This should be monitored closely and all additions reviewed.'
Look for adding a user to Administrators in remote desktop users via PowerShell.
'Identifies when a user account has been added to a privileged built in domain local group or global group such as the Enterprise Admins, Cert Publishers or DnsAdmins. Be sure to verify this is an expected addition.'
'Identifies accounts that are added to a privileged group and then quickly removed, which could be a sign of compromise.'
This query looks for Entra ID role adds identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
Find accounts that have been added/removed from groups in AD.
Detects when users are added to privileged Active Directory groups. This is a critical event as it can lead to privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive resources within an Active Directory environment. The rule specifically looks for Windows Event Code 4728, which indicates a member was added to a security-enabled global group, security-enabled local group, or security-enabled universal group.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative role within Office 365. While adding users to administrative roles is not inherently malicious, it is a sensitive action that warrants validation due to the elevated privileges granted. The rule specifically looks for the 'Add member to role.' event type within Office 365 and requires the role to be present in a predefined watchlist of sensitive roles.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows domain group named "ESX Admins". This activity is suspicious because VMware ESXi hypervisors joined to an Active Directory domain grant full administrative access by default to members of a group with this specific name. This could indicate a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-37085, which allows an attacker to elevate privileges on a domain-joined ESXi hypervisor.
The analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. This activity is detected by analyzing Entra ID logs from the `azure_monitor_aad` data source, specifically looking for "Add app role assignment to service principal" or "Add member to role*" operations initiated by a service principal. This detection is crucial for identifying potential bypasses of administrative consent processes, which could lead to unauthorized privilege grants. If malicious, this could allow attackers to exploit automation to assign sensitive permissions without proper oversight, compromising the security of the Azure AD environment.
The analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.
The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.
The analytic detects the assignment of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user is added as an eligible member to a PIM role. This activity is significant because PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and their assignment should be closely monitored to prevent unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this to gain privileged access, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the environment.
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