Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects when high-privilege roles such as "Exchange Administrator," "SharePoint Administrator," or "Global Administrator" are granted within Office 365. It leverages O365 audit logs to identify events where these roles are assigned to any user or service account. This activity is significant for SOCs as these roles provide extensive permissions, allowing broad access and control over critical resources and data. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain significant control over O365 resources, access, modify, or delete critical data, and compromise the overall security and functionality of the O365 environment.
This analytic detects attempts to create an "ESX Admins" group using the Windows net.exe or net1.exe commands. This activity may indicate an attempt to exploit the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-37085). Attackers can use this method to gain unauthorized access to ESXi hosts by recreating the "ESX Admins" group after its deletion from Active Directory.
This analytic identifies the assignment of sensitive and privileged Azure Active Directory roles to an Azure AD user. Adversaries and red teams alike may assign these roles to a compromised account to establish Persistence in an Azure AD environment. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
This analytic identifies the assignment of the 'Application Administrator' role to an Azure AD user. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.
The analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
This analytic detects modifications to privileged groups in Active Directory, including creation, deletion, and changes to various types of groups such as local, global, universal, and LDAP query groups. It specifically monitors for changes to high-privilege groups like "Administrators", "Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", and "ESX Admins", among others. This detection is particularly relevant in the context of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities like the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-37085), where attackers may attempt to manipulate privileged groups to gain unauthorized access to systems.
The analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects the assignment of the Privileged Authentication Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory audit logs to identify when this specific role is assigned. This activity is significant because users in this role can set or reset authentication methods for any user, including those in privileged roles like Global Administrators. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could change credentials and assume the identity and permissions of high-privilege users, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and critical configurations.
This analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Windows Security Event ID 4732. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.
The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
This analytic detects instances where a user adds themselves to an Active Directory (AD) group. This activity is a common indicator of privilege escalation, where a user attempts to gain unauthorized access to higher privileges or sensitive resources. By monitoring AD logs, this detection identifies such suspicious behavior, which could be part of a larger attack strategy aimed at compromising critical systems and data.
This analytic detects an increase in modifications to Active Directory groups or objects. Frequent changes to AD groups or objects can indicate potential security risks, such as unauthorized access attempts, impairing defenses, or establishing persistence. By monitoring AD logs for unusual modification patterns, this detection helps identify suspicious behavior that could compromise the integrity and security of the AD environment. The rule specifically looks for a statistically significant increase in the number of unique objects modified by a source user over a 5-minute span, compared to their historical average and standard deviation.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative role within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It specifically looks for events where the event type is 'USER_CHANGE_PERMISSIONS', the product event type is 'Add member to role', and the product name is 'Azure AD Directory Audit'. The rule is configured to trigger when a user is assigned to a role with the TemplateId '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10', which corresponds to the Global Administrator role in Azure AD. This activity is sensitive and warrants validation due to the high privileges associated with administrative roles.
Detects when a new user is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) and subsequently assigned administrative or other specified roles within a 90-minute window. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or suspicious account setup activities.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a new user account is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and then, shortly after, that same user is assigned an administrative-level role. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating a new account and immediately granting it high-level access.
Adding users to administrative roles is needed but due to sensitivity of these roles, validation should occur when this occurs
Detect users who are newly created and then immediately assigned administrator level roles
Detects when a user is removed from a group in Microsoft Teams. This could indicate an attempt to remove a user's access to sensitive team resources or a legitimate administrative action.
This rule detects when a single user adds more than 4 members to the same Office 365 group within a 5-minute window. It specifically looks for successful 'Add member to group' events in Office 365 audit logs, focusing on the `GROUP_MODIFICATION` event type. The threshold of 4 users added is configurable.
This rule detects successful events where a user is added to a group within Office 365. It specifically looks for 'GROUP_MODIFICATION' events with the product event type 'Add member to group.' originating from 'Office 365' by 'Microsoft' where the security action was 'ALLOW'. The rule also identifies the user performing the action, the group name, group GUID, and the user who was added to the group.
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