Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) activations for high-privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) that occur outside of defined business hours or are performed without an associated justification or ticket number. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or abnormal use of elevated privileges.
Detects the assignment of high-privileged Entra ID roles to a user account shortly after that same account underwent a password reset or MFA method change initiated by a helpdesk-privileged account. This detection pattern is specifically designed to identify Scattered Spider (UNC3944) tactics where social engineering is used to manipulate helpdesk processes to compromise identities and escalate privileges.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects when highly privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) are assigned to users in Entra ID, specifically flagging instances where the actor assigns the role to themselves (self-elevation) or where the target account was created within the last 7 days. This behavior deviates from standard administrative workflows and is a strong indicator of potential account compromise or malicious privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
This rule detects the suspicious creation or modification of local user accounts (e.g., 'svc_ipurple') occurring within a short 15-minute window following the execution of Windows Package Manager (Winget) configuration tasks. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated configuration files (DSC) to establish persistence or escalate privileges on a compromised system.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful user login from an IP address not previously seen for that specific user in the last 14 days, followed immediately (within 1 hour) by sensitive administrative operations performed by the same user, such as adding members to roles or modifying application permissions.
Detects high-velocity administrative activity performed by a single user account in Azure Active Directory, specifically focusing on account provisioning and role membership changes. The rule flags patterns such as password resets, enabling/disabling accounts, adding new users, and privilege escalation (e.g., granting Global Administrator roles), which are indicative of malicious post-compromise activity.
Detects high-risk AWS IAM privilege escalation activities, such as attaching AdministratorAccess policies, creating new access keys, roles, or users, occurring shortly after a suspicious sign-in event (e.g., impossible travel or new device login with MFA) for the same principal.
This rule monitors for suspicious process execution (e.g., cmd, powershell) spawned from PaperCut service processes (pc-app.exe, tomcat.exe) followed by a Domain Admin group membership change on the same device within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts following the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-81578/CVE-2026-82078).
This rule detects high-risk administrative operations in Azure Active Directory (such as role assignment, password resets, and account status changes) that occur within 3 hours of a user's sign-in. This pattern often indicates an account compromise followed by immediate privilege escalation or persistence establishment.
Detects specific administrative actions within Entra ID/Azure AD, including directory role assignments, password resets, and account enablement/disablement. This rule monitors for sensitive identity lifecycle and privilege management events that, if performed by unauthorized actors or in an unexpected context, could indicate account compromise, persistence, or privilege escalation.
This rule monitors for additions to the 'Domain Admins' group (Event IDs 4728, 4732, 4756) that occur within 15 minutes of an authentication event (Event ID 4624) involving accounts associated with PaperCut software on a Domain Controller. This pattern is indicative of a potential follow-on action after a PaperCut exploitation incident, where an attacker leverages initial access to perform privilege escalation.
Detects administrative role assignments or additions, such as 'Global Administrator', occurring for a user shortly after a device code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-based post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an illicitly obtained device code to escalate privileges within a cloud environment.
Detects instances where a user signs in via a Device Code authentication flow and subsequently adds a member to a highly privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins, Global Administrators) within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential account compromise where an attacker uses an OAuth device code flow to establish access and then escalates privileges.
Detects potential privilege escalation in Entra ID (Azure AD) by monitoring for the assignment of high-privileged administrative roles to users or the granting of admin consent to applications, which can be leveraged to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects potentially unauthorized or anomalous activations of highly privileged Entra ID roles (e.g., Global Administrator). The rule identifies activations that lack a business justification, occur during unusual hours (outside of 06:00-22:00), or exhibit burst patterns of repeated activation/deactivation cycles which may indicate automated credential abuse or persistence attempts.
Detects the addition of a user to the 'Domain Admins' group using common administrative command-line tools such as net group, Add-ADGroupMember, dsadd, or net localgroup. This serves as a proxy indicator for potential privilege escalation.
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